Self-Control as Self-Regulation: A Return to Control Theory

ABSTRACT

In an effort to build on previous theory and research it is argued that self-control is not synonymous with impulsivity, but rather should be conceptualized as self-regulation: the capacity to override impulsive desires. Using a sample of college students and a sample of serious adult criminal offenders, we test four hypotheses regarding the relationship between self-regulation, impulsivity, and several outcome measures reflecting antisocial or criminal behavior. Our findings within the college sample more strongly support the notion of self-control as self-regulation. The result differences between samples also highlight the need to consider limitations when generalizing results from more conventional student groups.

Notes

¹ A similar conceptualization of self-control, citing some of the same literature, has recently been put forth by Hay and Meldrum (2016).

² This is what the Greeks called akrasia or weakness of will (Ainslie 2001).

³ Reading the 2004 paper by Hirschi is a bit maddening because although the proffered new definition of self-control implies that it is remarkably similar to impulsivity, he (pp. 543–544) also seems to acknowledge that the two are not synonymous and that self-control is actually the capacity to override one’s intuitive and impulsive actions as evidenced by the analogy he employs in describing Ulysses’ need to be restrained when he desired to hear the seductive Sirens’ song promising to reveal the future: “… self-control is the set of inhibitions one carries with one wherever one happens to go … it is closely analogous to the idea of self-control as self-imposed physical restraint (à la Ulysses and the Sirens).” Ulysses (the Latin name for the Greek warrior of the Trojan war Odysseus) did not act in a non-impulsive way; he wanted to hear the Sirens’ call and he did. What he also did was override his impulse to just stand on the deck of the ship listening to their enchanting enticement (ultimately leading to the death of the listener) but had his shipmates plug their ears with beeswax (thus permitting them to protect the ship) and bind him safely to the ship’s mast. Ulysses/Odysseus was impulsive but overrode his impulsivity with self-regulation.

⁴ Here is how cognition can implicate emotion. The pull of immediate gratification is in large measure an emotional pull—the lure of the chocolate cake on the dessert cart activates an emotional response of pleasure—the capacity to self-regulate by imagining the possible long-term costs (weight gain and diabetes) provides an equally and hopefully more powerful emotion of possible or anticipated regret with enables me to steel myself against the immediate temptation of the dessert.

⁵ Mischel (2014:78) supports his view about the cognitive nature of self-control by arguing that its seat is in the pre-frontal cortex—“the thoughtful, rational, problem-solving areas … that make us distinctively human and able to consider long-term consequences.” For a similar position regarding the role of concentration on self-regulation or will power, see Ainslie (2001).

⁶ We added the lowest negative value in the distribution of factor scores so that all values of the frequency measure were positive.

⁷ In the college sample the Pearson correlation between the impulsivity and self-regulation scales was –.31, while in the adult offender sample the correlation was –.48.

⁸ There was some censoring at zero (30%) for the college sample responses to the intention to drink and drive question. We analyzed these data using two censoring models, the tobit and censored least absolute deviations (CLAD), and the results are the same as for the OLS models reported here.

⁹ See also the role of deficiencies in attention or “attentional control” in the theory of executive cognitive functioning (Giancola and Tarter 1999).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Chae Mamayek

CHAE MAMAYEK is a doctoral candidate within the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Maryland. Her research interests include rational choice and offender decision making, quantitative methodology, and public policy.

Raymond Paternoster

RAYMOND PATERNOSTER is a Professor within the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Maryland. His research interests include rational choice theory, offender decision making, and issues related to capital punishment.

Thomas A. Loughran

THOMAS A. LOUGHRAN is an Associate Professor within the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Maryland. His research interests include offender decision making and deterrence, illegal market participation, and quantitative methods.