ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the relationship between drug-related detentions for possession or petty dealing and drug-related violence. Two theoretical mechanisms are explored: (i) when a dealer is detained, the market is disrupted, and competition increases; (ii) when a consumer is detained, other consumers are deterred and seek new dealers, generating competition among groups and, consequently, increasing violence. These hypotheses are quantitatively evaluated using geocoded data from local San Luis Potosí, Mexico markets. Results suggest a relationship between drug-related violence and detentions occurring in a nearby location. These results emphasize the inefficacy of drug law enforcement strategies for reducing violence related to illegal drug markets in local settings and open the discussion for exploring different policies to reduce violence related to organized crime and the harms associated with illegal drug consumption.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Supplementary data
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/01639625.2024.2372421
Notes
1 Assuming that the price of one dose is US$2.5 and crystal users consume on average 3 doses per day.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Laura H. Atuesta
Laura H. Atuesta holds a PhD in Applied Economics from UIUC. She is an associate professor of the Division of Multidisciplinary Studies at CIDE (Mexico) and a visiting professor of the School of Finance, Economics and Government at Universidad EAFIT (Colombia).