Bringing Back Boss Tweed? Could At-Will Employment Work in State Government and, If So, Where?

Abstract

The lead author of this article[1] has proposed ending civil service tenure in the U.S. bureaucracy. Yet these arguments lose their force when applied to state and local civil service systems. In many states and localities limited media scrutiny, limited political competition, the weakness of existing bureaucracies, and a relative tolerance for spoils-oriented patronage make radical civil service reform risky. We develop a ranking predicting which states make the best and worst candidates for radical civil service reform. State level independent variables include corruption, traditional party organizations, media capacity, party competition, and bureaucratic capacity.

Keywords:

• civil service reform
• public personnel management
• spoils system
• state government reform
• state politics

The authors thank Eric M. Uslaner, Craig M. Wheeland, Leonard Shyles, Matthew Baird, and three anonymous reviewers for their assistance. The usual caveats apply.

Notes

1. Maranto, R. (2001). Rethinking the unthinkable: Reply to Durant, Goodsell, Knott, and Murray on “A case for spoils in federal personnel management.” Administration and Society 1998, 30 (1), 3–12. In Condrey, S., Maranto, R., Eds., Radical reform of the Civil Service. Lanham, M D: Lexington; Maranto, R. Thinking the unthinkable in public administration: A case for spoils in the federal bureaucracy. Administration and Society, 1998, 29 (6), 623–642. In Condrey & Maranto; Eds., 2001; Maranto, R. (1999). Turkey Farm: Why we can't delay civil service reform. Washington Monthly, (November), 27–30; Maranto, R. Praising civil service but not bureaucracy: A brief against tenure in the U.S. civil service. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 2002, 22 (3), 175–192.

2. Condrey, S. E. Reinventing state civil service systems: the Georgia experience. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 2002, 22 (2), 114–124. Gossett, C. W. Civil service reform: The case of Georgia. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 2002, 22 (2), 94–103; Lasseter, R. W. Georgia's merit system reform 1996–2001: An operating agency's perspective. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 2002, 22 (2), 125–132; Kellough, J. E., Nigro, L. G. Pay for performance in Georgia state government: Employee perspectives on Georgia gain after 5 years. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 2002, 22 (2), 146–166.

3. West, J. P. Georgia on the mind of radical civil service reformers. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 2002, 22 (2), 79–93. Bowman, J. S., Gertz, M. G., Gertz, S. C., Williams, R. L. Civil service reform in Florida: Employee attitudes 1 year later. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 2003, 23 (4), 286–304.

5. Under broadbanding a civil servant will not know the salaries of peers unless he or she files a Freedom of Information of Act Request, something few are likely to do; thus managers can use pay for performance without facing widespread complaints from their direct reports. While in the short term longstanding traditions might keep managers from exercising their new discretion, it seems plausible that over time new managers will adjust to the new administrative regime.

6. These arguments are not fully accepted by the second author of this paper. In particular, he doubts that ending civil service tenure will increase public respect for government bureaucrats.

7. Maranto, 2001; Maranto, 1998; Maranto, 1999; Maranto, 2002.

8. Maranto, 1999.

11. Van Riper, 1958; Fowler, D.G. (1943). The cabinet politician: the postmasters general, 1829–1909. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943; 344 pp; Maranto, 2005; Morone, J.A. (1998). The democratic wish: Popular participation and the limits of American government. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

13. Maranto, (2002); Maranto, (2005).

14. Harris, R.A., Milkis, S.M. (1989). The Politics of Regulatory Change; New York: Oxford University Press; Maranto, R. (1993). Politics and bureaucracy in the modern presidency: Appointees and careerists in the Reagan administration. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

15. Dionne, E.J., Jr. (1991). Why Americans hate politics. New York: Simon and Schuster; Hunter, J.D. (1991). Culture wars: the struggle to define America. New York: BasicBooks; Uslaner, E.M. (1993). The Decline of comity in Congress. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

17. Uslaner, 1993, op. cit.

18. Maranto, 2005; Ginsberg, B.; Shefter, M. Politics by other means, 3^rd ed.:New York: Norton; Mackenzie, G. C. Ed. Innocent until nominated. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution; Mackenzie, G. C., Hafken, M. (2002). Scandal proof: Do ethics laws make government ethical? Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

20. Maranto, 2005.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Maranto, 2001; Maranto, 1998.

34. Maranto, 1993.

35. Ibid.

37. Fenton, 1966.

38. Mayhew, 1986.

39. Elazar, D. J. (1972). American federalism: a view from the states. New York: Harper & Row; Sorauf, 1963; Riordan, W. L. (1963). Plunkitt of tammany Hall. New York: E.P. Dutton.

43. Elazar, D. J. (1972). American federalism: a view from the state. New York: Harper & Row; Gaventa, J. (1980). Power and Powerlessness. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press; Jackson, K. T. (1985). Crabgrass frontier: the suburbanization of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press.

44. Data on union strength come from Hirsch, B.T. Macpherson, D. (1997). Union Membership and Earnings Data Book. Washington, DC: Bureau of National Affairs Inc. The percentage of public sector employees covered by collective bargaining agreements was coded, which ranged from under 17% for South Carolina, Mississippi, and Virginia to more than 67% for Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New York. This variable did not correlate with other hypothetical independent variables; rather the South and West have few union members relative to other regions.