The Local Regulatory State: A Case of Double Standards?

Abstract

Two starkly contrasting strategies are discernible in the way local authorities currently approach and go about their regulatory and enforcement responsibilities. On the one hand, a “deterrence” strategy of “pursue and punish” is robustly pursued in many local areas in relation to individuals who infringe and contravene local regulations, notably in relation to “street scene” issues of littering, waste/recycling and materials sorting/separation, smoking in public places, parking, cycling on pavements, feeding pigeons, and so on, while, on the other, a much more positive “compliance” strategy of “counsel and conduce” is widely promoted and pursued in relation to the regulation of standards in local businesses, for example, in relation to public and environmental health/hygiene, health and safety in the workplace, animal welfare, and licensing of premises.

Why do local authorities operate with such apparent double standards? Why do comparatively minor infringements by local citizens so frequently result in the summary imposition of fixed penalties (which can be quite punitive for those on low incomes) while at the same time local businesses are mostly treated to a regulatory culture which is much more sympathetic and supportive in promoting compliance with the rules? This article draws on research conducted in different local regulatory settings which illustrates the two contrasting regimes in practice. It presents five propositions which help us to understand and explain the apparent double standards and it concludes by considering the steps that might be taken to ensure a more equitable and consistent local regulatory framework for the future.

Keywords:

• regulation
• local government
• compliance and deterrence strategies
• enforcement

Notes

¹This followed a personal experience of finding his car clamped within minutes of leaving it to obtain additional change for parking meter.

²Appeals are heard by professional lawyers, independently appointed, who consider written and oral evidence from the Councils and from the appellants the (motorists) and decide, on the balance of probability, whether or not the alleged contraventions occurred. Within London, the appeal body is the Parking and Traffic Appeals and Service'(PATAS), while elsewhere in England and Wales, the equivalent body is the Traffic Penalties Tribunal (formally known as the National Parking Appeals Service (NPAS)).

³The word partnership is described by Tombs and Whyte (2010, p. 51) as the ”notional opposite of ‘enforcement’ .”'

⁴While the notion of standard level fines (fixed penalties) might well be considered appropriate for imposition by council regulators in uncontested cases, the tribunal we are proposing here ought, we think, to be able to take into account the degree of harm and culpability involved and also the personal financial circumstances of the regulatee (individual or organizational) in deciding any sanctions to be applied.