Assessing the EU’s Transatlantic Regulatory Powers Using the Choice of Policy Instruments as Measurement of Preference Attainment

Abstract

To what extent is the European Union (EU) exercising global regulatory power? This article investigates this question through a comparative study of two significant global policy fields: data-protection and banking with a special focus on the choice of policy instruments. Both cases suggest that the actual role of the EU is more complex than either exercising or being subjected to global regulatory power. This concerns not only the relationship between the EU and the member-states. The article suggests that the EU is in a better position to conclude global regulatory deals when the negotiating competencies sit with one EU institutional actor.

Keywords:

• data protection
• banking regulation
• transatlantic regulation
• policy instruments

Notes

¹ For general discussions on the EU–US privacy disputes cf., Bennett and Raab, 1997; Bach and Newman, 2007; Charlesworth, 2000; Mendez and Mendez, 2009; Newman, 2011; Shaffer, 1999, 2000; Suda, 2013. For discussions on the Safe Harbor Agreement, cf., Kobrin, 2004; Regan, 2003; Soma, Rynerson, and Beall, 2003. The Passenger Name Records (PNR) dispute has been studied by, e.g., Argomaniz, 2009; Asinari and Poullet, 2004; Papakonstantinou and De Hert, 2009.

² PNR is the nonspecific term given to those files which airlines generate for each trip any passenger books. They are stored by the airlines for flight reservation and passenger control purposes.

³ Joined Cases C-317/04 & C-318/04, Parliament vs. Council [2006] ECR I-4721.