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ABSTRACT
A distinction between hard-to-shake but rational convictions, on the one hand, and the rationality that calculates causal and logical consequences, on the other hand, can generate questions for the history of ethics. Most moral thinkers draw some such distinction but the contours of the line differ greatly, and, in drawing the line, past moral thinkers tend to be influenced by their own deeply held principles, which in turn tend to reflect their social world. Questions about where the line between values and instrumental calculation are drawn and about the effect on this of the moral thinkers own social world are applied by way of illustration to Thomas Aquinas and Kant. The paper attempts to use Weberian social theory to elucidate a theme in the history of ethics, making every effort to keep the two kinds of theory distinct.
KEYWORDS:
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Notes
1 Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 5th ed., ed. J. Winckelmann, 3 vols. (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1976), i. 12.
2 See here the insightful paragraphs of Terence Irwin, The Development of Ethics. A Historical and Critical Study III: From Kant to Rawls (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 163.
3 Q. Skinner, Foundations, i, 121.
4 See D. L. d’Avray, Rationalities in History: A Weberian Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Whether or not this is the correct interpretation of Weber does not in fact matter for our purposes, so long as the distinction as defined generates good questions.
5 For an interesting analysis by a modern philosopher, see D. Papineau, ‘The Evolution of Means–Ends Reasoning’, in his The Roots of Reason: Philosophical Essays on Rationality, Evolution, and Probability (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 83–129.
6 An anonymous reader for the journal perceptively suggested that communicative rationality, as defined and explained by Jürgen Habermas, can be regarded as a subset of instrumental rationality. Personally, I find this insight convincing, but matters are complicated by Habermas himself whose reading of Weber is different from mine and who specifically distinguishes between ‘instrumentelles Handeln’ and ‘kommunikatives Handeln’: Theorie des kommunikativen Handels (Frankfurt am Main, 1987, 2016) 2 vols., i. Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung, 381–5. Correcting or reformulating Habermas’s understanding of instrumental rationality to show that it can – contrary to his own view – accommodate his concept of communicative action is a level of complication too far for present purposes. The same (as I see it) over-narrow understanding of Weber’s concept of instrumental rationality makes Jari I. Niemi, ‘Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Rationality: The Foundational Distinction Between Communicative and Strategic Action’, Social Theory and Practice 31 (2005), 513–32, unusable for present purposes.
7 Max Weber, Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen: II. Hinduismus und Buddhismus, repr. in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, ii: (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 1988), 149, my translation, from Rationalities in History: a Weberian Essay in Comparison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 127.
8 This is not the place for a sociological analysis of ‘value’, for which see d’Avray, Rationalities in History, chapters 2 and 3. For other approaches, from which I have derived stimulus, see S. A. Satris, ‘The Theory of Value and the Rise of Ethical Emotivism’, Journal of the History of Ideas 43 (1982), 109–28. (For a different perspective, see H. Joas, The Genesis of Values (Cambridge: Polity, 2000) – remarkably little overlap.) On fact and value, see, notably, B. Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); D. Davidson, ‘The Objectivity of Values’, in his Problems of Rationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 39–57, at 49: ‘we should expect people who are enlightened and fully understand one another to agree on their basic values. An appreciation of what makes for such convergence or agreement also shows that value judgements are true or false in much the way our factual judgements are’; it should be added that Davidson is very optimistic about the possibility of consensus, and also that the argument about ‘fact and value’ continues: see, e.g. J. J. C. Smart, ‘Ruth Anna Putnam and the Fact–Value Distinction’, Philosophy 74 (1999), 431–7. See also the issue of Revue française de Sociologie, 47–4 (2006) devoted to the sociology of values (with special reference to Europe), and, for an original approach, D. Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value (New York: Palgrave, 2001). For remarks by Weber which clarify his own idea of value – ‘that problem child of our discipline’ [‘jenes Schmerzenskindes unserer Disciplin’] as he called it – ‘Die Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis’, in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, ed. J. Winckelmann (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1988), 146–214, at 209–10 – see ibid. 210–2.
9 As with W. G. Runciman, A Critique of Max Weber’s Philosophy of Social Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 14. Conversely, not all ends are values: one can choose an objective by inclination without attaching any special worth to it, as in ‘girls just want to have fun’ (Cindy Laeuper).
10 Cf. Rationalities in History, 62, 68–9.
11 For a different view, see Gavin Langmuir, who uses the phrase ‘nonrational thinking’ to mean what Weber calls ‘value rational’: contrast Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, i. 12, with G. I. Langmuir, History, Religion and Antisemitism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 152 n. 18. They are clearly talking about the same thing but Langmuir does not regard it as rational. But on this line of thinking, convictions about, say, the equal rights of men and women must also be denied the designation of ‘rational’, as they are not easily demonstrable by simple logic or empirical testing, but, rather, convince us because of their coherence with our general Weltanschauung.
12 Cf. J. I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); R. J. Fogelin, A Defence of Hume on Miracles (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 20, 34; compare the similar powers of resistance to empirical refutation of the Azande system of poison oracles as studied by Evans-Pritchard when it was still in operation: E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic under the Azande, abridged with an introduction by Eva Gillies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 141–2.
13 G. Obeyesekere, The Apotheosis of Captain Cook: European Mythmaking in the Pacific (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992, 1997); he was attacked by M. Sahlins, in How ‘Natives’ Think: About Captain Cook, for Example (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). For a good overall sense of the debate, see R. Borofsky et al., ‘CA Forum on Theory in Anthropology: Cook, Lono, Obeyesekere, and Sahlins [and Comments and Reply]’, Current Anthropology 38 (1997), 255–82.
14 Cf. R. C. S. Walker, The Coherence Theory of Truth: Realism, Anti-Realism, Idealism (London: Routledge, 1988).
15 This section abridges the discussion in Rationalities in History, 138–140 (epieikeia); see also d’Avray, Medieval Religious Rationalities: A Weberian Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 116.
16 The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. J. Barnes, ii (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 2188.
17 Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Barnes, ii, 1796.
18 Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Barnes, ii, 1743–4.
19 A. W. Wood, Kantian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 47.
20
Apud omnes enim hoc rectum est et verum, ut secundum rationem agatur. Ex hoc autem principio sequitur quasi conclusio propria, quod deposita sint reddenda. Et hoc quidem ut in pluribus verum est: sed potest in aliquo casu contingere quod sit damnosum, et per consequens irrationabile, si deposita reddantur; puta si aliquis petat ad impugnandam patriam. Et hoc tanto magis invenitur deficere, quanto magis ad particularia descenditur, puta si dicatur quod deposita sunt reddenda cum tali cautione, vel tali modo: quanto enim plures conditiones particulares apponuntur, tanto pluribus modis poterit deficere, ut non sit rectum vel in reddendo vel in non reddendo.
Sic igitur dicendum est quod lex naturae, quantum ad prima principia communia, est eadem apud omnes … Sed quantum ad quaedam propria, quae sunt quasi conclusiones principiorum communium, est eadem apud omnes ut in pluribus … (Summa Theologica (Madrid: La Editorial Catolica, S.A., 1961–1965), 1–2. q. 94.art. 4, Respondeo section. [This edition is follows the text of the critical edition by the Leonine Commission.])
21
… cum de legibus ageretur, quia humani actus, de quibus leges dantur, in singularibus contingentibus consistunt, quae infinitis modis variari possunt, non fuit possibile aliquam regulam legis institui quae in nullo casu deficeret: sed legislatores attendunt ad id quod in pluribus accidit, secundum hoc legem ferentes; quam tamen in aliquibus casibus servare est contra aequalitatem iustitiae, et contra bonum commune, quod lex intendit. Sicut lex instituit quod deposita reddantur, quia hoc in pluribus iustum est: contingit tamen aliquando esse nocivum, puta si furiosus deposuit gladium et eum reposcat dum est in furia, vel si aliquis reposcat depositum ad patriae impugnationem. (2-2 q. 120 art. 1, Respondeo section)
22 ‘ … lex humana, si sit recta, oportet quod consonet legi naturali et legi divinae … Sed in lege divina et naturali nullus homo potest dispensare. Ergo nec etiam in lege humana’ (1–2 q. 97. art. 4: 3).
23 ‘legem publicam’.
24
… lex naturalis inquantum continet praecepta communia, quae nunquam fallunt, dispensationem recipere non potest. In aliis vero praeceptis, quae sunt quasi conclusiones praeceptorum communium, quandoque per hominem dispensatur: puta quod mutuum non reddatur proditori patriae … Ad legem autem divinam ita se habet quilibet homo, sicut persona privata ad legem publicam cui subiicitur. Unde sicut in lege humana publica non potest dispensare nisi ille a quo lex auctoritatem habet, vel is cui ipse commiserit; ita in praeceptis iuris divini, quae sunt a Deo, nullus potest dispensare nisi Deius, vel si cui ipse specialiter committeret. (1–2 q. 97. art. 4 ad 3)
25 I use for convenience the Supplementum to the Summa Theologica. This was put together after the death of Aquinas, but cut and pasted verbatim from his Sentence Commentary.
26 Suppl. q. 65 arts. 3–5.
27 Suppl. q. 65 art. 5 Respondeo section.
28 Suppl. q. 65 art. 2 Respondeo section.
29 ‘in hoc a solo Deo dispensatio fieri potuit per inspirationem internam’ (Suppl. q. 65 art. 2 Respondeo section).
30 1–2 q. 108 art. 4 Respondeo section.
31 Ibid.
32 ‘ex indispositione aliquorum’.
33 In this sentence, Aquinas wavers between singular and plural.
34 ‘affectus’.
35 1–2 q. 108 art. 4 ad 1.
36 Cf. d’Avray, Medieval Religious Rationalities, 111–2, where this passage is discussed together with two others, which are closely related.
37
… praesupposito tali fine, paupertas maior vel minor est religioni accommoda: et tanto erit unaquaeque religio secundum paupertatem perfectior, quanto habet paupertatem magis proportionatam suo fini. Manifestum est enim quod ad exteriora et corporalia opera vitae activae indiget homo copia exteriorum rerum: ad contemplationem autem pauca requiruntur … . Sic igitur patet quod religio quae ordinatur ad actiones corporales activae vitae, puta ad militandum vel ad hospitalitatem sectandam, imperfecta esset si communibus careret divitiis. Religiones autem quae ad contemplativam vitam ordinantur, tanto perfectiores sunt, quanto eorum paupertas minorem eis sollicitudinem temporalium ingerit. Tanto autem sollicitudo temporalium rerum magis impedit religionem, quanto sollicitudo spiritualium maior ad religionem requiratur. Manifestum est autem quod maiorem sollicitudinem spiritualium requirit religio quae est instituta ad contemplandum et contemplata aliis tradendum per doctrinam et praedicationem, quam illa quae est instituta ad contemplandum tantum. Unde talem religionem decet paupertas talis quae minimam sollicitudinem ingerat. (2-2 q. 188 a. 7 respondeo section, transl. as in d’Avray, Medieval Religious Rationalities, 111–2)
38 Bernard of Clairvaux, Tractatus de praecepto et dispensatione, 1.2, in Sancti Bernardi opera, iii, ed. J. Leclercq et al. (Rome, 1963), 255–6.
39 M. A. Stiegler, Dispensatio: Dispensationswesen und Dispensationsrecht im Kirchenrecht (Mainz: Franz Kirchheim, 1901), and J. Brys, De dispensatione in iure canonico, praesertim apud Decretistas et Decretalistas usque ad medium saeculum decimum quartum, Universitas Catholica Lovaniensis Dissertationes ad gradum doctoris in facultate theologica consequendum conscriptae, II/xiv (Bruges & Wetteren: J. De Meester et Filii, 1925); cf. also A. Van Hove, De privilegiis, de dispensationibus, Commentarium Lovaniense in Codicem Iuris Canonici I/v (Mechlin: Dessain, , 1939), esp. 293–330.
40 On Bernard, Dispensation, and epieikeia, see d’Avray, Medieval Religious Rationalities 109–10.
41 I. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, ed. T. Valentiner (Reklam: Stuttgart, 1984), Zweiter Abschnitt, 59–60.
42 Kant, Grundlegung, Zweiter Abschnitt, 60.
43 Cf. Wood, Kantian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 63.
44 ‘nicht eine Erlaubnis zu Ausnahmen von der Maxime der Handlungen’ (I. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, ed H. Ebeling (Stuttgart, 1990) Einleitung zur Tugendlehre, VII, 265).
45 ‘Enschränkung einer Pflichtmaxime durch die andere’ I. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, ed. H. Ebeling (Stuttgart: Reklam, 1990) Einleitung zur Tugendlehre, VII, 265.
46 Ibid., 266. On Kant and casuistry, with recent bibliography, see Soo Bae Kim, ‘The Formation of Kant‘s Casuistry and Method Problems of Applied Ethics’, in Kant-Studien: philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant Gesellschaft 100 (2009), 332–45, and H.-D. Kittsteiner, ‘Kant and Casuistry’, in Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe, ed. Edmund Leites (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 185–213 (I owe this reference to Emily Corran). Kittsteiner tends to play down Kant’s interest in casuistry, seeing him as part of a move away from Lutheran casuistry, a move to which his contribution added impetus. Presumably, Kittsteiner wants to present the casuistry one finds in Kant as a left-over. To me, however, it looks as though Kant took casuistry more seriously as time went by.
47 I. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, ed. H. Ebeling (Stuttgart, 1990) Einleitung zur Tugendlehre, VII, 265; cf. Soo Bae Kim, ‘Formation’, 342; Allen W. Wood, Kantian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 63–4, 152–3.
48 ‘nicht bestimmt angeben könne, wie und wieviel durch die Handlung zu dem Zweck, der Zugleich Pflicht ist, gewirkt werden solle’ (Kant, ibid., 265).
49
‘Ist es z. B. zur Zeit der Schwangerschaft, – ist es bei der Sterilität des Weibes (Alters oder Krankheit wegen), oder wenn dieses kein Anreiz dazu bei sich findet, nicht dem Naturzwecke und hiermit auch der Pflicht gegen sich selbst an einem oder dem anderen Teil, ebenso wie bei der unnatürlichen Wohllust, zuwider, von seinen Geschlechtseigenschaften Gebrauch zu machen? oder gibt es hier ein Erlaubnisgesetz der moralisch-praktischen Vernunft, welches in der Kollision ihrer Bestimmungsgründe etwas an sich zwar Unerlaubtes, doch zur Verhütung einer noch größeren Übertretung (gleichsam nachsichtlich) erlaubt macht?. (Ibid., ,Tugendlehre‘, 1. Teil. 1. Buch. 1. Hauptstück, 2. Artikel. #7, Kasuistische Fragen, 308)
50 Irwin, Development, 66.
51 Irwin, Development, iii., 66–7.
52 Ibid., 68.
53 Lectures on Moral Philosophy, Winter Semester, 1784–5, according to notes taken by Georg Ludwig Collins: (Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, ed. Peter Heath and J.B. Schneewind, translated by Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 134–5.
54 Ibid., 135.
55 Kant, Lecture on Baumgarten’s practical philosophy, Winter Semester, 1785, according to notes taken C. C. Mrongovius, ibid., 235.
56 Lectures on the metaphysics of morals, begun 14 October 1793, according to notes taken by Johann Friedrich Vigilantius, ibid., 312.
57 Ibid., 362.
58 Ibid., 362–3.
59 Ibid., 428.
60 Kittsteiner, in Leites, Conscience, 191–2.
61 Kittsteiner, in Leites, Conscience, 191.
62 Kittsteiner, in Leites, Conscience, 190–1.
63 Kittsteiner, in Leites, Conscience, 190.
64 Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten ‘Tugendlehre‘, 1. Teil. 1 Buch. 1. Hauptstück. 1. Artikel # 6, Ebeling edn. 305.
65 Cf. Wood, Kantian Ethics, 64. Suicide may be another area where Kant’s views evolved, as he seems ‘from remarks in his lectures’ to condemn it unequivocally: ibid., 173. Incidentally, suicide is one of the issues where Wood feels he understands Kantian ethics better than Kant (ibid.).
66 ‘Die Kasuistik ist also weder eine Wissenschaft noch ein Teil derselben; denn das wäre Dogmatik und is nicht sowohl Lehre, wie etwas gefunden, sondern Übung, wie die Wahrheit solle gesucht werden’ (Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, Einleitung zur Tugendlehre. XVIII, Ebeling edn., 291).
67 Cf. Emily Corran, Lying and Perjury in Medieval Practical Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
68 A. J. La Vopa, ‘Thinking about Marriage: Kant’s Liberalism and the Peculiar Morality of Conjugal Union’, Journal of Modern History 77 (2005), 1–34, at 11. La Vopa comments that Kant’s ‘“rationalist disdain” for sexuality not only places him squarely in a long tradition of spirit-body dualism; it also resonates with centuries of Christian asceticism’ (12).
69 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, quoted by La Vopa, ‘Thinking’, 11.
70 La Vopa, ‘Thinking’, 28.
71 Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten., Tugendlehre, I. Ethische Elementarlehre, 1. Teil. 1 Buch. 1 Haupstück. 2 Artikel. # 7, 306–7. It is clear that masturbation must be what he is talking about in this section on ‘Selbstschändung’.
72 M. Kuehn, Kant: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 40: so one must take with a pinch of salt the interpretation in, say, R. Norman, The Moral Philosophers: An Introduction to Ethics, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 70.
73 Allen W. Wood, ‘General Introduction’, in Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology, ed. and trans. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), xi–xxiv, at xxiii.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., xvi.
76 Kant, ‘Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion’, Second part: ‘Moral Theology, First section: On the Moral attributes of God’, in Wood and di Giovanni, Immanuel Kant: Religion, 407–8.
77 For a reading of Kant’s role in the conflicted period following the death of Frederick the Great, see S. Lestition, ‘Kant and the End of the Enlightenment in Prussia’, Journal of Modern History 65 (1993), 57–112.
78 La Vopa, ‘Thinking’, 23.
79 Ibid.
80 As La Vopa’s important paper shows – he is certainly not trying to explain Kant’s attitude to sex simply as a rationalization of a private psychological problem.
81
Eben dasselbe gilt auch von der Ehe and der linken Hand, um die Ungleichheit des Standes beider Teile zur größeren Herrschaft des einen Teils über den anderen zu benutzen; den in der Tat ist sie nach dem bloßen Naturrecht vom Koonkubinat nicht unterschieden und keine wahre Ehe. [81] (I. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, ,Rechtslehre, 1. Teil, 2. Hauptstück, 3. Abschnitt, # 26, ed. Ebeling, 127)
82
Eheverbot wegen Ungleichheit des Standes.§. 30. Mannspersonen von Adel können mit Weibspersonen aus dem Bauer- oder geringerem Bürgerstande keine Ehe zur rechten Hand schließen. §. 31. Zum hohem Bürgerstande werden hier gerechnet, alle öffentliche Beamte, (die geringern Subalternen, deren Kinder in der Regel dem Canton unterworfen sind, ausgenommen;) Gelehrte, Künstler, Kaufleute, Unternehmer erheblicher Fabriken, und diejenigen, welche gleiche Achtung mit diesen in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft genießen. §. 32. Zu ungleichen Ehen eines Adlichen (§. 30.) kann das Landes-Justiz-Collegium der Provinz Dispensation ertheilen, wenn der, welcher eine solche Ehe schließen will, nachweist, daß Drey seiner nächsten Verwandten desselben Namens und Standes darein willigen. Allgemeines Landrecht die Preußischen Staaten von 1794, ed. H. Hattenhauer et al. (A. Metzner: Frankfurt am Main, etc., 1970), I, II.1 Zweyter Theil, Erster Titel, Erster Abschnitt, #31, 346.
83 I. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, ed. Ebeling, Anhang zur Einleitung in die Rechtslehre I, 72, passage beginning: ‘Hieraus folgt auch, daß ein Gerichtshof der Billigkeit … ’ and ending ‘ . . . dagegen jede Frage Rechtens vor das bürgerliche Recht … gezogen werden muß’.
84 D. L. d’Avray, Medieval Religious Rationalities: A Weberian Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 151–63, with further references.
85 E.g. Allgemeines Landrecht die Preußischen Staaten von 1794, ed. H. Hattenhauer et al. (A. Metzner: Frankfurt am Main, etc., 1970): Zweyter Theil, Erster Titel, Erster Abschnitt:
# 23. Doch soll dergleichen Dispensation vor Ablauf Dreyer Monathe, nach getrennter voriger Ehe, niemals ertheilt werden … . # 32. Zu ungleichen Ehen eines Adlichen (#. 30.) kann das Landes-Justiz-Collegium der Provinz Dispensation ertheilen, wenn der, welcher eine solche Ehe schließen will, nachweist, daß Drey seiner nächsten Verwandten desselben Namens und Standes darein willigen. # 33. Kann er dergleichen Einwilligung nicht beybringen, oder findet sich von Verwandten, die mit den Consentirenden gleich nahe sind, ein Widerspruch: so kann die Dispensation nur von dem Landesherrn unmittelbar ertheilt werden. (346)
86 ‘piatoso, fedele, umano, intero, religioso’ (Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Principe, ed. G. Inglese (Turin: Einaudi, 1995), ch. XVIII [13], 118).
87 ‘saper entrare nel male, necessitato’ Ibid. [15], 118.
88 Q. Skinner, Foundations of Modern Political Thought, I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 156–7.
89 Skinner, Foundations, I, 183.
90 A. Macintyre, After Virtue (London, 1981), 42–5, 53; 190–8. Macintyre has a wonderful ‘macro’ sense of how philosophy fits into history, but his analysis of Kant is not his finest work.