Sudanese refugees in Victoria: An analysis of their treatment by the Australian Government

Abstract

Following a brief historical account documenting developments in Australian Immigration politics and refugee and asylum seeker policies, this paper seeks to explain why Sudanese refugees in Victoria have recently been implicated in an increased involvement in crime by politicians and the media. It will be argued that the alleged increase involvement in crime has been constructed by the Government and the media – in order to justify the Australian Government's policy responses to the refugee crisis, to create public acceptance of such policies, and additionally for political gain. These policies were part of the Australian Government's wider policies on maintaining a homogenous Australian identity and have negatively impacted minority groups. Ultimately such policies encouraged racism and segregation in local communities, thus tarnishing Australia's multicultural standing.

Keywords:

• humanitarianism
• Australian immigration policy
• refugees
• asylum seekers
• Sudanese migrant
• criminalization
• post 9/11 fear politics
• Federal election campaign tactics

Notes

1. The Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 4) 1994 (Cth) provided that a person who had access to protection in a safe third country would be denied entry to Australia's onshore refugee process.

2. Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1989.

3. Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1992 (No. 12).

4. A Senate Select Committee Inquiry later established that there was no evidence whatsoever to support this claim. In response, Prime Minister Howard stated that he acted on the intelligence he was given.

5. The Migration Amendment Act (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001 (Cth) set up what was known to be the “Pacific Solution,” which allowed Australia to subcontract its mandatory detention to poorer neighboring countries. The Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2001 (Cth) prohibited class actions in migration litigation. In 1997 the 45 day rule was implemented, failing which authorization to work would not be provided (Babacan & Babacan, 2009).

6. The Judicial Review Bill 1998 (Cth) abolished the fundamental common law right to seek an appeal for erroneous decisions from the Refugee Review Tribunal to the Federal Court (Babacan & Babacan, 2009). Furthermore, in 1997 legislation was passed to prohibit the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission to initiate any contact with those in detention centers (Crock, 1993).

7. These include trauma counseling, English language classes, and orientation programs (Australian Government Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 2008). Whether these settlement programs are sufficient and effective is a debate for another forum.

8. For a discussion of this issue in relation to experiences of Sudanese Australians, see: ABC News (2010) and Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission (2008).

9. Wazana (2004, p. 83) appropriately states that “[t]he fact that the vast majority of these refugees come from countries where there is no ‘queue’, where there is no Australian immigration or U.N. office, and that upon arrival in Australia, up to 97% of them are found to be convention refugee” is simply of no interest to the nation.

10. See: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C5dLnYrjwc0, for the full version of the program.

11. The term “moral panic” has been described by Stanley Cohen as a phenomenon that occurs when “[a] condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests, in Folk Devils and Moral Panics (1972).

12. See Note 5.

13. After Prime Minister Kevin Rudd lost the support of his party and stood aside on June 24, 2010, Julia Gillard became Federal leader of the Australian Labor Party, and thus the new Australian Prime Minister.