The Evolution of the Federal Role in Supporting Community Recovery After U.S. Disasters

Abstract

Problem, research strategy, and findings: The process of long-term recovery, if done well, can minimize post-disaster disruption, address problems that existed before the disaster struck, and improve the future resilience of a community. The U.S. government, however, historically has lacked a systematic approach to supporting community recovery. This study describes the history of federal policies for supporting community recovery after disasters, with particular attention to the roles of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). We conclude by considering the new National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF). This historical review suggests that the federal government needs to emphasize the following: providing resources for community recovery planning; facilitating increased flows of information after disasters; streamlining FEMA assistance to public agencies; explicitly working to reduce the barriers between FEMA and HUD; and incorporating equity into recovery policies. Recovery policies also need to include incentives to achieve substantive goals of rebuilding in a way that is sustainable, equitable, cost-effective, and timely, and that reduces the chances of future disasters.

Takeaway for practice: Local community planners can draw several lessons from this historical account. First, they should become aware of the various post-disaster programs now, before disaster strikes. Second, knowledge of post-disaster policies and programs will enable planners to use them creatively and effectively if disaster strikes. Third, in the midst of reconstruction, planners need to continually seek opportunities to promote betterment and resilience to natural hazards.

Keywords:

• post-disaster recovery
• recovery planning
• recovery management
• community-level recovery

Notes

1 To understand the size of the NFIP debt, by 2012, nearly six million policyholders were paying $3.6 billion in annual premiums (King, 2013).

2 The Individuals and Households Program provides short-term assistance for up to 18 months through grants to renters and displaced homeowners (FEMA, 2013a). Although primarily a program for short-term relief, it also helps households get started on long-term recovery. Government-provided housing units or rental vouchers are provided for temporary housing. Homeowners can qualify for grants to cover costs not covered by insurance to repair damage or replace their primary residence. The Public Assistance (PA) Program reimburses state and local government agencies, private nonprofit organizations, and federally recognized tribal organizations for work required as a direct result of the disaster (FEMA, 2013c). In addition to paying for emergency work and debris removal, the program also reimburses for permanent work that puts the damaged facility back to its pre-disaster design. Following large disasters, the costs can be quite high, and the reimbursement process often extends for many years. Although the PA program is designed primarily to replace rather than improve, it also provides for relocation or improvement, albeit subject to reductions in the federal share of the estimated costs. The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) provides post-disaster grants to state and local governments to offset the costs of mitigating hazards to prevent future damage (FEMA, 2013b; Godschalk, Beatley, Berke, Brower, & Kaiser, 1999). Section 406 of the 1988 Stafford Act (as amended by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000) authorizes that additional funds up to 20% of FEMA post-disaster funding for a presidentially declared disaster be dedicated directly to both state- and local-level projects that substantially and cost-effectively reduce potential damage from future disasters.

3 Godschalk et al. (1999), in a comprehensive study of the implementation of the HMGP, evaluated its effectiveness in promoting hazard mitigation. Their recommendations called for changing the policy culture within FEMA and the states to be more proactive about mitigation, and to place it within the larger concepts of sustainability and resilience. They also asked for a greater emphasis on mitigation plans at the local level, which in fact subsequently became a requirement under the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000.

4 The resulting departmental reorganizations shuffled staff into new and unfamiliar roles, added new personnel with military backgrounds who were unfamiliar with the previous emergency management system, and ultimately may have led to the departure of many of FEMA's senior and middle managers who had risen through the ranks during the agency's previous decades (Gall & Cutter, 2007).

5 ESF-14 had its origins in FEMA recovery planning assistance provided in Arkadelphia (AR) after a 1997 tornado and Princeville (NC) after flooding caused by Hurricane Floyd in 1999 (M. Campbell, personal communication, October 9, 2008). After being formalized in the NRP, it was used on a trial basis in 2004 in Florida after Hurricanes Charley, Frances, and Jeanne, and in Utica (IL) after a tornado. Following the 2005 hurricanes, FEMA applied ESF-14 broadly along the Gulf Coast. In October 2005, FEMA and Louisiana launched ESF-14, requiring each affected Louisiana parish (county) to consult with the community and prepare an ESF-14 plan (Olshansky & Johnson, 2010). The Louisiana Recovery Authority then linked the allocation of $700 million in federal CDBG disaster recovery funds to parishes with LRA-accepted, long-term recovery plans, most of which were initially developed through the ESF-14 process.

6 According to the Congressional Research Service, post-disaster CDBG began in 1993 with P.L. 103-50, The Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1993, which provided $45 million of CDBG funds to communities affected by Hurricane Andrew, Hurricane Iniki, or Typhoon Omar, as well as an additional $40 million that could also be used for other disaster-affected communities (Boyd, 2010). In 1993, Congress appropriated $200 million for recovery activities following the Midwest floods of that year, including money for floodplain buyouts and for immediate recovery needs not reimbursable by FEMA (Boyd, 2010). In 1994, Congress appropriated $500 million to cover both the 1993 floods as well as recovery following the 1994 Northridge earthquake in Los Angeles; this was followed by an additional $225 million in 1995 specifically for the cities of Los Angeles and Santa Monica in their ongoing post-earthquake recovery. The CDBG funds were critical to the recovery of Los Angeles from the earthquake, as they were strategically designed to provide targeted assistance to the most heavily affected parts of the city (Olshansky et al., 2006). Congress appropriated CDBG funds for disasters virtually every year thereafter, including $39 million for the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, $50 million for floods in 1996, $500 million that included the Grand Forks (ND) flood of 1997, and $380 million in two appropriations for various disasters in 1998 and 1999 (Boyd, 2010). In the next decade, the amounts increased dramatically, with $3.48 billion provided via three 2002 appropriations to support economic revitalization of lower Manhattan after the 9/11 terrorist attack (Boyd, 2010; Mammen, 2011). This was subsequently dwarfed by $19.7 billion in three appropriations in 2006 and 2007 for recovery from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, primarily directed at the states of Louisiana and Mississippi. More than $8.6 billion of this was for Louisiana's “Road Home” program alone, “probably the most concentrated infusion of money by any HUD program in history” (Green & Olshansky, 2012, p. 76), which provided direct payments to nearly 124,000 flooded homeowners in an unprecedented use of federal funds for disaster recovery. Just three years later, Congress provided $6.8 billion in two appropriations, primarily for Hurricanes Gustav and Ike and associated widespread flooding in 2008. After Hurricane Sandy struck New York, New Jersey, and nearby areas, Congress appropriated $16 billion in CDBG funds to support long-term community recovery efforts.

7 ”Challenges in the development of PA projects included difficulties 1) determining the amount of damage that was disaster-related, 2) using PA program flexibilities to rebuild in a way that meets post-disaster needs, 3) assessing project scope including whether to repair or replace damaged structures, 4) estimating project costs, and 5) having sufficient resources to initiate projects” (U.S. GAO, 2008, p. 3).

8 Congress has sometimes increased the flexibility for use of CDBG funds after certain disasters by allowing HUD to waive some of the program requirements, such as lowering the normal CDBG requirement that at least 70% of the funds benefit low and moderate income people (Boyd, 2010).

9 A few times, the White House has taken an active lead in disaster recovery. Probably the most significant example was after the 1927 Mississippi flood, when the executive branch of the federal government led a coordinated recovery effort, involving multiple levels of government, the Red Cross, and the private and nonprofit sectors (Butler, 2007; Kosar, 2005). President Calvin Coolidge created a quasi–government commission that included members of his cabinet and the Red Cross and named his Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, to lead it. Hoover had “near-absolute authority” to call upon all these agencies and resources, and Congress appropriated $10 million for relief efforts and another $300 million for flood control along the lower Mississippi River (Butler, 2007; Kosar, 2005). The Red Cross managed most of the relief provided to the 640,000 displaced persons (Kosar, 2005) and carried most of the burden of recovery (Butler, 2007). Although the relief effort was massive, reconstruction efforts were quite modest (Kosar, 2005). The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers repaired the levees, but support for household and business recovery was more limited. The devastation caused by the enormous 1964 8.4 magnitude earthquake in Alaska—granted statehood only five years earlier—also prompted executive branch actions. Within days after the earthquake, President Lyndon Johnson established the Federal Reconstruction and Development Planning Commission for Alaska, and charged its federal-only members with coordinating plans for federal programs and actions contributing to the reconstruction (Bea, 2007). Several federal agencies, including the SBA, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Federal Housing Administration, worked together, long-term, on Alaska's recovery. Following several major disasters in the 1990s, FEMA was directed by President Bill Clinton to organize and lead federal interagency task forces for long-term recovery, including the 1997 Red River flood. Shortly after the president and leading federal officials visited the devastated city of Grand Forks (ND), Clinton announced the creation of a federal long-term recovery task force, composed of Cabinet-level agencies and led by FEMA Director Witt (Natural Hazards Center, University of Colorado, 1999). Congress then provided a $500 million appropriation for the Midwest flood as part of the 1997 emergency supplemental appropriations, which included $171.6 million for Grand Forks in one of the largest CDBG disaster awards ever made to a single jurisdiction at the time (Natural Hazards Center, University of Colorado, 1999). After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck the Gulf Coast in 2005, many political leaders and members of the public called for the creation of a top, federal-level “czar” or centralized authority—such as the Tennessee Valley Authority—to administer and oversee relief and rebuilding (Kosar, 2005). The White House responded on November 1, 2005, by appointing a federal coordinator for Gulf Coast Recovery, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Chairman Donald E. Powell. While familiarly referred to as the “federal recovery czar,” Powell's authority and oversight were limited. Rather than answering directly to the president—and having authority over multiple federal agencies—the office was instead housed within DHS. Following his resignation announcement in March 2008, Powell said “he wished his office had more power” (Hammer, 2008).