Using Land Swaps to Concentrate Redevelopment and Expand Resettlement Options in Post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans

Abstract

Problem, research strategy, and findings: Although many researchers frame post-disaster reconstruction as an opportunity to build safer communities less vulnerable to natural hazards, widespread land use change and relocations are rare in the United States. Residents often resist relocation and attempt to recreate the city as it was before the disaster. In this study, I examine the potential of land swaps to encourage post-disaster redevelopment that is more concentrated and less vulnerable to hazards, while expanding resettlement options for displaced residents. This article is based on a case study of an innovative land swap program developed in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina by a nonprofit housing organization, Project Home Again (PHA). PHA's land swap program concentrated redevelopment during a time of uncertain population return and expanded resettlement options for nearly 100 low- and moderate-income households devastated by Hurricane Katrina's floodwaters. I describe the operation of PHA's land swap program and identify three conditions that can increase the viability and impact of land swaps in other disaster recovery settings: the incorporation of land swaps into housing recovery policy; cross-sector collaboration in the implementation of land swaps; and coordination with public or quasi-public land banks.

Takeaway for practice: Land swaps can be a useful tool in disaster recovery by helping to guide redevelopment while expanding resettlement options for displaced residents. Increasing the range of relocation and resettlement tools available to planners is essential as repeated extreme weather events, sea level rise, and coastal erosion threaten the habitability of more and more cities and communities.

Keywords:

• disaster recovery
• relocation
• land swaps
• New Orleans

Acknowledgments

The author thanks PHA staff, PHA residents, and redevelopment officials who gave their time, effort, and expertise for this research. The research also benefited from the insightful comments and suggestions of Renia Ehrenfeucht, the editors, and anonymous reviewers.

Notes

1 For a detailed review of the multiple recovery planning processes, see Nelson, Ehrenfeucht, and Laska (2007), and Olshansky and Johnson (2010).

2 The Road Home Program also included a rental assistance program. However, the lion's share of resources were dedicated to the Homeowners Assistance Program, reinforcing pre-Katrina housing inequities in New Orleans where more than half (54%) of occupied housing units were renter-occupied before the storm.

3 Louisiana was ultimately able to use HMGP funds as elevation grants for residents who chose to rebuild in place. Delays in determining how HMGP funds could be used, weak oversight, and poor program design resulted in far fewer elevations than were expected.

4 Road Home Program closings as of September 2014 indicate that 88.9% of Orleans Parish participants chose to repair or rebuild their homes, 7.8% chose to relocate to another residence within the state, and 3.3% elected to relocate out of state.

5 In Louisiana, each parish or county was responsible for providing the state with a disposition plan for all of the properties acquired through the Road Home Program that were being transferred from the state to the parishes for redevelopment. Orleans Parish submitted their plan in December 2007.

6 A key limitation of this study is that interviewees were asked to reflect on policy decisions and resettlement choices that had been made years earlier, potentially affecting the accuracy of responses. In addition, interviews with the two individuals who qualified for the program but chose not to participate, or with those who wished to enroll but could not, would have strengthened this analysis, but current contact information for these individuals was not available.

7 PHA, with assistance from the MIT team, developed the idea of a land swap around the time UNOP planners introduced the concept of clustering and Blakely first proposed his idea for land swaps.

8 New Orleans has 73 officially designated “neighborhoods” organized into 13 planning districts.

9 Total development costs often exceeded appraised values in many flooded neighborhoods.

10 According to published sources (U.S. DOE, 2011) and estimates from area developers, post-Katrina construction costs for code–minimum construction ranged from $120 to $150 per square foot.

11 Lots received through the land swap had to be large enough to accommodate a PHA house, given required setbacks.

12 Calculated by the author with decennial census data from the Data Center (2014).

13 The high participation of residents who lived in Gentilly prior to Hurricane Katrina reflects PHA's recruitment strategy, which initially focused on displaced Gentilly residents. PHA broadened efforts to include displaced homeowners from throughout the city. To recruit participants, PHA worked with a neighborhood recovery center to reach out to displaced residents and inform them of the program. PHA also promoted the land swap through media ads, neighborhood groups, and churches.

14 PHA's disposition strategies included donating properties to other nonprofits, selling properties at a discounted price to abutting homeowners, selling lots to small local developers or individuals, and leasing properties to individuals or organizations as community gardens. In St. Anthony and Milneburg, PHA sought to reduce blight by building homes on double vacant lots and selling excess properties that they would not build on to abutting property owners. As one staff member noted, “We knew we were playing a reverse game of musical chairs with too many chairs and not enough people to sit in them.”