When Group Influence Is More or Less Likely: The Case of Moral Judgments

Abstract

We investigated whether group influence can change judgments even for high-consensus (i.e., unambiguous) moral norms. We found that participants often matched the judgment of the other current group members even when this moral judgment was normatively incorrect (nonstandard), and this occurred more for more ambiguous issues. Moreover, this social influence on public judgments was generally followed by private agreement and re-interpreting general values to be consistent with those judgements. We also found that participants who experienced a fit between their regulatory focus and their feelings of power (i.e., promotion/high power; prevention/low power) were less influenced by the group.

Notes

Acknowledgements

We would also like to thank Stefani De Stefani, Gohar Harutyunyan, Anuya Patil, Yasmine Calil, Graham Gottlieb, and Bradley Swain for assistance with data collection.

Notes

1 This effect was still present, though weaker, when those voicing suspicions were included in the analysis (M = 36% for CTs, and M = 5% for NCTs).

2 This effect was weaker, but still present, when those who voiced suspicions were included in the analysis (b = −.21, SE = .06).

3 This effect was actually less variable when we included those who voiced suspicions in our analysis (b = −.40, SE = .14).

4 These effects were both still present when examined including those who voiced suspicion (promotion and power: b = −.32, SE = .04; prevention: .35, SE = .06).

5 It is worth reiterating that even though this range of ‘obviousness’ exists, the judgments were all rated as more obvious than not, reinforcing the pilot testing that found near unanimity in responses.