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Abstract
In recent years Myanmar underwent drastic political changes. While many see these changes as first tentative steps towards democratization, we argue that the current political transformation is not a deliberate process of liberalization, but a survival strategy of the military regime. Using arguments of the ‘new institutionalism’ as a theoretical foundation, this article explores the hypothesis that the high degree of professionalization of the Burmese military creates the incentive to institutionalize power-sharing among the ruling elite. Our empirical analysis finds evidence for both a highly professionalized military and institutions that by securing the military's continuing dominance serve the purpose of institutionalizing military power- sharing. These results imply that further democratization is unlikely as it must be initiated from within the still dominating military itself.
Notes
[1] Being aware of the controversy which surrounds the name ‘Myanmar’, we wish to confirm that our use of this name does not imply any political statement.
[2] Following Geddes (Citation2009) as well as Boix and Svolik (Citation2011) we use the terms military council and ruling coalition interchangeably. The same applies to the analytical terms regime leader, military ruler and dictator.
[3] In fact, nearly 50 per cent of all one-party regimes in the period 1950 to 2010 emerged from a military dictatorship (Magaloni and Kricheli, Citation2010: 132).
[4] There is some uncertainty about the correct number of SLORC members. Win Min (Citation2008: 1024) and David Steinberg (Citation2010: 82) identify 19 members, whereas Andrew Selth (Citation2001a: 51, 59) mentions 21 members for SLORC and 19 for SPDC.
[5] Since Saw Maung was considered incapable to lead the SLORC, his dismissal should not be understood as an internal power struggle. Many sources assume that Saw Maung was in fact affected by a mental disease (Min, Citation2010: 111).
[6] Thein Sein became second secretary in 2003 and first secretary in 2004. In 2007 Thein Sein became Prime Minister. Shwe Mann took on Tin Oo's place, after his death in a helicopter crash. Additionally, he took on the newly created office of Joint Chief of Staff, overseeing Army, Navy, and Air Force. Tin Aung Myint Oo became Quartermaster General in 2001. In 2007, he replaced now Prime Minister Thein Sein as first secretary of the SPDC.
[7] Further reorganizations followed in 2005, 2006 and 2008 (Min, Citation2008).
[8] There is considerable disagreement among scholars regarding discipline within the tamadaw during the research period. For example, Mary P. Callahan states that after 1988, discipline and morale were at an ‘all-time low’ (Citation2005: 218; see also Kim Citation2008: 66), while Bruce Matthews (Citation2001) recognized a ‘loyal acceptance of an unbending hierarchical chain of command’.
[9] The second generation included Win Myint and Tin Hla; the third generation Shwe Mann, Soe Win, Thein Sein, Tin Aung Myint Oo, Khin Maung Than, Ye Myint, Maung Bo, Kyaw Win, Aung Htwe, and Tin Aye (Min, Citation2008: 1026).
[10] Including Myint Swe, Myint Hlaing, Ye Myint, Maung Oo, Htay Oo, Thar Aye, Ko Ko, Ohn Myint, Thura Myint Aung, and Min Aung Hlaing (Min, Citation2008: 1027). Eventually Myint Swe, Ye Myint, Thar Aye, Ko Ko, Ohn Myint, and Min Aung Hlaing did become members of the SPDC (ALTSEAN-Burma, Citation2011). By this time, they were, however, fully integrated in the centre.
[11] The newly established Military Affairs Security (MAS) was first headed by Myint Swe and later by Ye Myint, follower of Maung Aye (Callahan, Citation2008: 38; Min, Citation2008: 1030).
[12] Than Shwe and Maung Aye are both in their 80s. Than Shwe is known to suffer from diabetes and Maung Aye received treatment for prostate cancer. Thein Sein and Shwe Mann are both in their 70s and other influential members of the old regime, Min Aung Hlaing, Myint Swe, and Tin Aung Myint Oo are now in their 60s, too.
[13] Some 25 per cent of both parliamentary chambers are reserved for members of the military and the executive branch is under control of a president, who is required to have a military background.
[14] Its splinter group, the National Democratic Front (NDF), took part in the elections and won a third of the contested seats in the Upper House and 18 per cent of the Lower House. However, after the elections the government freed many political prisoners including Aung San Suu Kyi, allowing them to run in the by-elections in 2012 (Holliday, Citation2013).
[15] To run in the elections, Thein Sein and other military officers laid down their military offices and participated as civilians.
[16] Cited after TNI (Citation2013: 8).