Contested National Identity and Political Crisis in Bangladesh: Historical Analysis of the Dynamics of Bangladeshi Society and Politics

Abstract

This paper develops the theme that the ongoing political polarization and political crisis in Bangladesh since its independence from Pakistan in 1971 reflect the fundamental weaknesses of the pillars of Bangladeshi society and national identity. The paper adopts an historical approach to explain why and how Muslim nationalism, which was the basis for the establishment of Pakistan, has re-emerged in contemporary Bangladeshi society and politics and is competing against Bengali ethnicity, language, culture and secularism (‘Bengali nationalism’) within an emerging ‘two-party’ political system. However, instead of establishing a stable political system following the Hotelling–Downs principle of democracy, the Bangladeshi society/polity has been polarized and divided almost vertically on the question of national identity and political philosophy and created sustained political instability and uncertainty. This has stifled the formation and consolidation of a national identity based on ethnicity/language/culture or religion/territory/political history or that have elements of both. Neither ethnicity/language/culture/secularism-based nationalism (Bengali nationalism) nor predominantly Muslim-territorial nationalism (‘Bangladeshi nationalism’) alone can dominate and flourish in Bangladeshi society and polity; instead, the objective conditions in the country dictate that a competitive democratic system of politics which accommodates aspects of secularism, language, Muslim identity and Islamic ethical–moral codes remains the feasible political discourse for forming and consolidating the country's multi-racial, multi-religious national identity over the long run and its survival as a sovereign state.

Keywords:

• Bengali Ethnicity/Language/Culture
• Muslim Nationalism
• Secularism
• Bangladeshi Society and Polity
• Political Polarization
• Political Crisis

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank two anonymous referees and the Editor of this Journal for their constructive comments and valuable suggestions for improving this paper. He also thanks his colleague Gregory Bauer for reading the draft and making suggestions for improving the final draft.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 Nationalism is a difficult concept to define and interpret. The idea of the nation-state became popular in Europe after the French revolution. In the literature, nation and nationalism have been defined and interpreted in different ways, based on varying combinations of ethnicity, religion, language, culture and political discourses (Brass, 1991; Gellner, 1983; Geertz, 1973; Hobsbawm, 1994; Haas, 1986). One modern approach to defining ‘nation’ is the idea of ‘imagined communities' (Anderson, 1991) constructed from popular processes and expressed in the popular media, through which residents imagine, share and identify with symbols and myths that bind them together. For further discussion on nation and nationalism, see Seal (1968), Seton-Watson (1977) and Smith (1991, 1995).

2 The name of modern autonomous Bangladesh is used to represent its earlier names: East Bengal, when it formed the eastern half of the Bengal region before its secession from India to become East Pakistan from 1955, leaving then West Bengal, now Paschimbanga, as an Indian state. These three names are used interchangeably in this paper, as needed for discussion of Bangladesh's ongoing search for a national identity that remains contested despite its overwhelmingly (90 per cent) Muslim population.

3 At the time of its independence in 1971, Bangladesh announced its identity as a secular nation state with ‘Bengali’ ethnicity, culture and language. In retrospect, this was done hastily, without constraining territorial boundary; without pre-consideration of the potential problems originating in significant ethnic groups who did not accept the suggested identity of the majority people of the country as ‘Bengalis’; and, importantly, by discarding religion as a marker of identity. On the early debate on ethnicity, language and religion in the formation of national identity of Bangladesh, see Ahmed (1990), Khan (1985) and Rashiduzzaman (1977). The problem remains that the concept of Bengali nationalism, articulated by Swami Vivekananda and Bankim Chandra Chatterjee and developed since then, remains closely linked to Bengali Hindu nationalism (Ahmed, 1994; Basu, 2002; Bose, 1977). Furthermore, the concepts of Bengali, Bengal and cultural traits have shifted over time across religious–ethnic groupings (Chatterjee, 1973; Chatterji, 1994; Jones, 2008, 2011).

4 In economics, Hotelling's law suggests that in many markets it is rational for producers to make similar products. This is referred to as the principle of minimum differentiation. The principle was developed by Hotelling (1929). In politics, the idea was used by Downs (1957) to develop conditions which may lead to political stability.

5 Because of the present token presence of the former Muslim League that fought for the creation of Pakistan, the BNP has become the de facto political party that has the potential to represent the beliefs and aspirations of the Muslim masses within the present political entity of Bangladesh. On the basis of the results of the parliamentary elections held since the late 1970s, it is estimated that the BNP has about 30–35 per cent voter support while the Awami League's voter support is at most within the same range (Hossain, 2000a, 2012).

6 The concept of ‘Islamic state’ did not represent the idea of a theocratic state based on shariah (Islamic law and injunctions). It represented a Muslim-majority country, established based on Muslim nationalism, where the state laws and regulations were expected to be compatible with Islamic religious-moral and ethical standards. Religious and other minorities were expected to be treated as equals and with fairness according to Islamic traditions as existed and practised under Muslim empires for many centuries. This was the theme of the speeches of M. A. Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, once Pakistan became a reality (Bolitho, 1981; Choudhury, 1959, 1974; Saeed, 2013).

7 Islam (2003) has suggested that the Awami League's six-point campaign platform, as the basis of constitution of Pakistan, was intended to make Bangladesh a separate state.

8 As the Pakistani army (mostly from West Pakistan) behaved like a colonial army, the people in East Pakistan closed ranks and provided material support to the freedom fighters. There was, however, no debate or consensus on the form of the state that might emerge after the war. The ideological basis of the state was imposed once the country became independent (Ahmed, 1978, 1984).

9 Jinnah's two-nation theory represented the view that the Hindus and Muslims in India constitute distinct communities having different philosophies, social customs, religious traditions, political heroes, littérateurs, and even food and dress (Bolitho, 1981). (For a critical analysis of Indian nationalism, see Seal, 1968.)

10 India was accepted as an example of a secular country although the Hindu religion, not language or ethnicity, remained the source of Indian nationalism. Indian secularism, equidistance from all religions, is different from what most European countries mean by the separation of religion from the state. Nevertheless, in the eyes of secularists in Bangladesh, the emergence of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its religious organs, that champion Hindu religion and nationalism, did not diminish the status of secularism in India. For discussion on secularism in the Indian context, which was established as the 42nd amendment of the Indian constitution in 1976, see Acevedo (2013) and Smith (2011).

11 Bangladeshi society has a close resemblance to Indonesian and Malaysian societies—multi-racial/ethnic and multi-religious. Complex power-sharing, political participation and desire for economic prosperity have provided the foundations for the economic, social and political stability of these countries. These countries appear to have moved away from the idea of secularism as an ideology for creating a multi-racial/ethnic, multi-religious composite national identity that is formed through participation of consensus-oriented politics within a democratic system. Contrary to an impression given by authors such as Hossain and Khan (2006), it is difficult to conceptualize a Bengali race to represent the people of Bangladesh and the formation of a nation based on race whichever way it is defined.

12 This was not a new idea. When the question of a united independent Bengal was floated in 1945 by some nationalist Bengali politicians, such as A. K. Fazlul Huq, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, Sarat Bose and Kiran Ray, and was supported by conservative Muslim League leaders, such as Nurul Amin and Khawaja Nazimuddin, and was even acceptable to both Jinnah and Gandhi, the Bengali Hindu elite, who vehemently opposed the partition of Bengal in 1905, changed their tune, under the influence of the Hindu Congress politicians such as Sarder Patel and Jawaharlal Nehru, who preferred a divided Bengal rather than being ruled by the Muslim majority. Nehru regarded an independent Bengal as a potential addition to Pakistan and declared that the Congress would agree to a united Bengal if it chose to remain within India (Ahmed, 1984; Husain, 1995).

13 The Bengali Muslim middle class, which was dominated by Talukders and Jotedars (large landowners), originated in the 1930s or somewhat earlier. They benefited economically from the rising demand for cash crops, especially jute, and later mobilized under the leadership of some charismatic Muslim leaders, such as A. K. Fazlul Huq, H. S. Suhrawardy and A. H. Khan Bhashani. The establishment of Dhaka University in 1922 in particular, despite strong opposition from the Hindus, helped to spread higher education among Muslim students. They spearheaded the Pakistan movement in East Bengal and consolidated the Bengali Muslim identity (Husain, 1995; Mallick, 1961; Raju, 2015).

14 Traditional Bengali culture is an historical artefact pre-dating Islamic civilization and has its roots in early animism/Buddhism/Hinduism. It is an animistic culture practised by a tiny minority carrying on its traditions today. While some cultural activists have attempted to popularize some animistic and Hindu traditions since the 1990s, the Muslim masses have found them offensive and idolatrous as they are starkly in conflict with Islamic beliefs, customs and traditions.

15 Most Hindus of East Bengal did not support the creation of Pakistan. The focus on Bengali ethnicity, language and culture upstaged the Hindu religion-derived social and cultural activities in the name of Bengali identity. They undermined Islamic practices and traditions in a Muslim-majority country. Muslims faced a trade-off: political emancipation under a yet-to-be-defined ethnic-cultural identity and the loss of Muslim identity that was developed for many centuries (Ahmed, 1978, 1984; Maniruzzaman, 1990).

16 There is no Bengali race per se. Bangladeshi people are a mixture of different races and ethnicities, including some tribal minorities. Furthermore, according to prominent Hindu Bengali writer Nirad Chaudhuri's description, ‘people who dress, look, and behave differently are ethnically different’ (Novak, 1993: 84). Accordingly, religion has been used as a criterion to classify the people for social and political analyses. Such classification helps to understand and predict community behaviour on social, cultural, economic and political developments. Therefore, it is misleading to put different religious and ethnic communities under the same banner to achieve social and political goals which are often in conflict.

17 Eaton (1987), notes that forest-clearing and land-reclamation in the active delta produced extremely complex land tenure chains, extending from the zamindars (landlords) at the upper end to the actual cultivators at the lower end, with many talukdars (large landholders) and semi-talukdars (small landholders) in between.

18 Socialist and communist parties have existed in Bengal and Bangladesh since the early twentieth century. Only an insignificant proportion of people support these parties. At elections, they use Islamic slogans and form alliances with the Awami League, which maintains links with some Islamic parties not in coalition with the BNP.

19 The Permanent Settlement System of land administration and taxation of 1793 and other British agricultural policies created a class of exploitative zamindars (landlords, largely Hindus) and a concomitant dispossessed Muslim community comprising the bulk of the Muslim aristocracy and peasantry (Hashmi, 1994, 2006; Mallick, 1961; Raju, 2015).

20 Sir Syed Ahmed Khan was often called the father of the two-nation theory. For discussion of the social and political environment that induced him to develop the idea of Muslim nationalism, see Al-Mujahid (1999). On the Hindu side, the two-nation theory was propagated by V. D. Savarkar, Bhai Pramanand, Lala Rajpat Rai and M. Golwalkar. By observing the socio-cultural differences between Hindus and Muslims, Khan argued that these two communities were too far apart to be assimilated and that they would never join wholeheartedly in anything. He then advocated for partition of India. After the anti-Muslim riots in Bombay in 1893, he questioned that if under British rule, the Hindus could put so much pressure on the civic rights of Muslims, what could be the state of affairs when the British had left India and the reins of power had passed into the hands of Hindus. Other prominent Muslim leaders expressed a similar view.

21 For an historical discussion on the introduction of Hindi by the Hindus to replace Urdu, which was considered by Muslims an Indian language, rather than a Muslim one, see Al-Mujahid (1999). The debate had been intense on the language issue since the mid-nineteenth century, so that the political leadership in Pakistan was apprehensive of the inclusion of Bangla as a national language as it was viewed as being close to Hindu languages and connotations.

22 Only a small number of people who lived in areas that constituted Pakistan spoke or used Urdu. Therefore, Muslim immigrants from India were the potential beneficiaries of Urdu as the state language of Pakistan. It appears that Jinnah's proposal was in the spirit of nation-building and had a long-term perspective. It was not intended to undermine regional languages, including Bangla. Although Urdu speakers might have some edge at the early stage, this would most likely have diminished with the passage of time. Furthermore, the introduction of Urdu could have created large numbers of jobs for many youths, Madrassa-educated in Urdu, in schools and colleges across the country.

23 Khan (1990: 174) has pointed this out: ‘to suggest that a definite link existed between the Language Movement and the nationalism of 1971 which helped to achieve an independent Bangladesh is perhaps overstretching of a myth to justify an event after it had occurred’.

24 Ayub Khan captured state power through a military coup and ruled the country from 1958 to 1969.

25 Through an 11-point statement, students and industrial workers raised radical economic demands, such as land reform, waiving of land taxes up to 8.3 acres, and the nationalization of heavy industries and banks and insurance companies that were not in Mujib's six-point programme. Sheikh Mujib later incorporated these demands into the political manifesto to widen his party's support base by reaching the working class and peasantry (Ahmed, 1978).

26 The withdrawal of the Agartala conspiracy case does not mean that there were no elements of truth in it (Ahmed, 1984; Husain, 1995).

27 The Awami League won 167 out of 169 seats in East Pakistan. Although it did not gain any seats in West Pakistan, its win in East Pakistan gave it a majority in the 300-seat National Parliament of Pakistan. In effect, the Awami League became a regional party. This set the scene for a clash with the West Pakistani military–political leadership, which did not want to transfer power to a regional party despite its numerical dominance in the national parliament.

28 The writings of some Bengali historians and literary figures, such as Romesh Chandra Dutt, Jadunath Sarkar, Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay, Sarat Chandra Chattapadhyay and Nabinchandra Sen are full of anti-Muslim rhetoric. In particular, see Sarat Chandra Chattopadhyay's ‘Bartaman Hindu-Mussalman Samasya’ in Chatterji (2004: 269–274). Some of Rabindranath Tagore's writings are considered anti-Muslim, but only in a subtle way.

29 Since no official inquiry was implemented, the number of deaths and the circumstances of each of them, including why and how they were killed, remain hidden although the public has a right to full information. This lacuna in the public records of Bangladesh has led to divergent interpretations of events. For a compilation of the reports prepared by the various human rights organizations and media, see http://deshrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/dhakamassacre_final.pdf (accessed 18 May 2015). Also, see a fact finding report on the massacre by Odhikar, http://odhikar.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Fact-finding_Hefazate-Islam_English.pdf (accessed 18 May 2015).

30 In the mid-2013 city-council elections, the BNP-supported candidates won in all five participating cities. Most analysts suggest that the Hefazat-e-Islam galvanized support for the BNP candidates. The Shahbag movement, sponsored by the Awami League, turned out to be a liability. The Awami League has now dissociated from Shahbag and has lobbied the Hefazat-e-Islam, otherwise a non-political movement, to establish a ‘covert coalitional relation’.