Active in Not Being Active (AINBA): how East Asian powers accept R2P

ABSTRACT

This article explores and compares the positions of two major powers in East Asia—China and Japan—towards the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) norm. R2P calls for collective international responsibility in the event that states are unwilling or unable to protect their people. Evaluating the mainstream argument in the literature that China and Japan have recently been welcoming the R2P norm, we ask the following questions: To what extent have China and Japan aligned themselves with R2P? How do international and national factors play out to influence their R2P stance? To summarize our findings up front: unlike what much of the current literature says, China and Japan's acceptance and practice of the R2P norm are largely pro forma. We argue that they both appear active in participating in the debates but only in order to remain inactive. In other words, they are active participants in the debates and discussions on R2P, but their aim is not to further its usage but to contain its effects. Their current stance on R2P is characterized by what we will call ‘Active in Not Being Active’ (AINBA). The article discusses the key sources and rationale for their AINBA policy with regard to R2P.

KEYWORDS:

• Responsibility to Protect
• China
• Japan
• East Asia
• State Interest
• National Identity

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of the paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association in April 2015.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Sangmin Bae is professor of political science at Northeastern Illinois University (Chicago, Illinois, USA). She teaches and does research in the areas of human rights, human security, international organizations and East Asian politics. Her research focuses particularly on the role of political leadership and domestic political institutions in explaining why countries respond differently to international human rights and human security norms. Her work has appeared in various journals, including Comparative Politics, International Journal of Human Rights, Asian Affairs, Pacific Affairs, International Politics, Human Rights Review, and Zeitschrift Fuer Menschenrechte (Journal for Human Rights), among others. She is the author of When the state no longer kills: International human rights norms and abolition of capital punishment (2007) and Human security, changing states and global responses (2014).

Amy Infanzon holds a MA degree in political science from Northeastern Illinois University. With a keen interest in Latin-American studies, she has studied at the University of Buenos Aires and has taught at international schools in Mexico City. Currently, she is an educator of the Spanish language in Lake Forest, Illinois.

Michael J. Abbe is currently completing a Master's programme in international relations at Northeastern Illinois University, with a focus on Northeast Asian politics. He has recently completed a 5-month study abroad programme at Kyung Hee University in the Republic of Korea.

Notes

1. UN General Assembly. We the peoples: The role of United Nations in the twenty-first century: Report of the Secretary-General. A/54/2000. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/54/2000.

2. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The responsibility to protect (December 2011). Retrieved from http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.

3. UN General Assembly. 2005 world summit outcome. A/60/L.1, paragraphs 138–39. Retrieved from http://www.who.int/hiv/universalaccess2010/worldsummit.pdf.

4. UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, ibid.

5. UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. The responsibility to protect. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml.

6. Morris (2013, 1270–1271). Beginning with this 2009 report, Secretary-General Ban had released an annual report on R2P until 2016 in which shared consensus on pillars one and two was revisited, while acknowledging a lack of consensus on pillar three. We argue below that it is this very ambiguity coupled with the global faux pas of coercion that allows Japan and China to behave highly strategically regarding their equivocal stance on R2P.

7. United Nations Security Council. Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. SC Res 1674, S/RES/1674 (2006).

8. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml.

9. Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. I. Promoting peace and development for all mankind (November 1995). Retrieved from http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/army/a-2.htm.

10. Kulnazarova (2013, emphasis added).

11. Pang (2009); People's Republic of China. Position paper of the People’'s Republic of China on the United Nations reforms (7 June 2005). Retrieved from http://chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/4/2/685.full.

12. Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. Explanatory statement by Chinese Ambassador Wang Guangya on the vote on Security Council resolution on Darfur, Sudan (31 August 2006). Retrieved from http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/africa/darfur/t269767.htm.

13. Bellamy (2008, p. 625). The only exception was China's support for the Libyan sanction. Garwood-Gowers, however, states that ‘[it] should not be viewed as evidence of a dramatic shift in Chinese attitudes towards R2P.’ See Garwood-Gowers (2012).

14. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Statement by H. E. Mr. Kinichi Komano, Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Japan in charge of human security. Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, Ottawa (18–20 May 2005). Retrieved from http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0505.html.

15. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Co-Chairs’ summary: Third meeting of friends of human security (7 November 2007). Retrieved from http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/friends/summary0711.html.

16. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. International Symposium on Human Security (6 December 2006). Retrieved from http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/sympo0612.pdf.

17. Cited in Bellamy and Davies (2009, 553).

18. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Statement by Ambassador Yukio Takasu, permanent representative of Japan on the responsibility to protect. General Assembly Plenary Meeting (24 July 2009). Retrieved from http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2009/un0907.html.

19. Previously, in 2006, when speaking of the Outcome document, Takasu stated,

Japan welcomes the qualifications that the use of force should be authorized by the Security Council. This confirmation has a positive impact to build a common international understanding on the responsibility to protect. We also expect that the qualification on the use of force will settle the lingering confusion and suspicions on human security, and enable Member States to seek human security-related cooperation without having reservations on the unauthorized use of force in the name of humanitarian intervention or responsibility to protect or human security.

See also Yukio Takasu, 'Towards forming friends of human security. 8th Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network (1 June 2006). Retrieved from http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/state0606.html.

20. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Press conference by Minister for Foreign Affairs (16 May 2014). Retrieved from http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaiken4e_000070.html.

21. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, International Symposium on Human Security.

Additional information

Funding

This research was supported by Northeastern Illinois University’s College of Arts and Sciences Summer Research Grant.