Fishery degradation in Pakistan: a poverty–environment nexus?

Abstract

Abstract The number of fishing vessels in Pakistan's coastal waters has been steadily increasing but the fish catches steadily decreasing. Press reports blame this on poverty-driven overfishing by the artisanal fishers with banned nets. Using qualitative methods and tapping into local stakeholder knowledge, this study dispels simplistic views by exploring in depth the coastal artisanal fisheries sector in Pakistan and documenting the challenges faced by it. We argue that the poverty–resource degradation nexus is mediated through a poverty–credit market nexus and that addressing this problem will resolve imperfections in both the credit and product markets. Further, we argue that fishery degradation also has other causes and that addressing these and empowering communities will ease the poverty–resource degradation nexus.

Résumé Le nombre de navires de pêche dans les eaux côtiéres du Pakistan n'a cessé d'augmenter, alors que les captures de poissons sont en baisse constante. Des rapports de presse rejettent le blâme sur la pauvreté incitant la surpêche avec des filets interdits, par les pêcheurs artisanaux. En utilisant des méthodes qualitatives et en puisant dans les connaissances des intervenants locaux, cette étude dissipe les points de vue simplistes en explorant en profondeur le secteur de la pêche artisanale dans les zones côtiéres du Pakistan et en documentant les défis soulevés par celui-ci. Nous soutenons que le lien pauvreté – dégradation des ressources est connecté à travers un lien du marché pauvreté-crédit et que résoudre ce probléme permettra d'adresser les imperfections dans les marchés du crédit et des produits. En outre, nous soutenons que la dégradation de la pêche a également d'autres causes et que résoudre ces problèmes et favoriser l'autonomisation des communautés réduira le lien pauvreté-dégradation des ressources.

Keywords:

• Artisanal fishery
• poverty–resource degradation nexus
• ecology
• local institutions
• Pakistan

Introduction

The rapid decline in marine fisheries is a global phenomenon. Pauly and Chuenpagdee (2007) explain why the size and quantity of catch is decreasing globally even as subsidised capacity has been increasing.1 The reasons include overfishing based on evolving fishing technology and associated increased capacity, and also environmental degradation. Salayo et al. (2008, p. 692) report that, due to overfishing, coastal fishing stocks in South and Southeast Asia have been depleted to between 5 and 30 per cent of unexploited levels.

Data from Pakistan also reveal fishery degradation. Table A.1 (see Appendix) 1 shows an increase in fishing vessels of all kinds between 1993 and 2003 in Pakistan's two coastal provinces (Sindh and Balochistan). Tables A.2 and A.3 (see Appendix) show trends in fish catches in coastal waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which extends up to 200 miles from the coast. Increased catches initially were due to greater ingress by foreign trawlers, facilitated by both a change in zoning policy and the liberalisation of licenses. However, despite the increase in vessels, there was a decline in catches across the board between 2000 and 2003 from 438,000 to 402,000 metric tons. This decline seems to have continued; on 21 April 2010, the director general of marine fisheries reported to a prominent daily newspaper that sea food catches had declined by 29 per cent over the last decade.2

Not only have stocks fallen radically, some species of fish have been wiped out entirely, such as gallo and kalaki fish in Pasni, Balochistan Province, zardum, paplet, and kalgun in other areas of Balochistan and palla in Sindh Province. The size of fish has also become smaller. Our research indicates that an Indian mackerel from Sindh, where overfishing is much more intense, is much smaller in size than one found in Balochistan.

While there has been no academic research on the subject, press reports blame the artisanal fisheries sector for stock depletion. For example, the chairman of the Pakistan Fisheries Export Association blamed declining stocks on overfishing with the use of banned nets, including during breeding months.3 This is not unlike the broader debate in the ecological economics literature referred to as the ‘poverty–environment nexus’. The hypothesis is that poverty forces the poor to overuse natural resources that they depend on for a living, causing resource degradation. The authors have explored this literature and the hypothesis as applied to the forest-rich Swat District of Northern Pakistan (Khan and Khan, 2009) and did not find empirical support for the poverty–environment nexus. Other income groups were no less resource dependent than the poor, and we showed that resource degradation is not associated with poverty. Our historical and institutional analyses provided alternative explanations for resource degradation.

In a similar vein, using qualitative methods and tapping into local knowledge, this study dispels simplistic views by exploring in depth the marine fisheries sector in Pakistan and documenting the challenges faced by it. Further, we argue that degradation has complex and multiple causes and that the policy response needs to be equally complex and multi-faceted and needs to be informed by local knowledge.

In the rest of the article, we start with a review of the literature on sustainable community fishery management, which we view as important for ensuring sustainable livelihoods for fishers in coastal Pakistan. Next, we provide brief background information on marine fisheries in Pakistan and explain how we gathered the information on which this qualitative analysis is based. We then present the findings of our fieldwork concerning fishery degradation. After that, we consider other causes of fisheries degradation before concluding with some policy suggestions.

Literature review: community resource management

The three related themes in this review are the importance of using local stakeholder knowledge; empowering communities whose livelihoods depend on the resource that needs to be sustained through some form of participatory governance; and state induced fishing commercialisation that undermines the livelihoods of these communities.

Beddington and Rettig (1983) argue that regulations aimed solely at conserving biological stock will not address complex socio-economic problems of those dependent on fisheries. Similarly, Aguero and Costello (1986) note that the problems associated with fisheries are seldom solved by focusing simply on fishery management plans.

Ostrom (1990) has shown that conservation of natural resources is easier where local communities are actively involved in the process.4 Similarly, Bromley (1992) argues that individuals will co-operate to conserve an open-access resource (OAR) when they are able to design, monitor and enforce rules regulating how members utilise and allocate natural resources. Tokrisna and Duangsawasdi (1992, p. 537) view the communities as:

[having] necessary information on the resources and their exploitation such that, within the rights they have been granted, they can perform the necessary management functions such as limiting entry, fishing gear regulation, collection of resource rent, and benefit distribution.

Wlatner-Toews et al. (2006) reflect on the case for, and method of, relying on local knowledge for fishery preservation, in the context of a high income country. The various readings compiled by Neis and Lawrence (2000) discuss integrating local knowledge into science and management in various contexts. The benefits they identify include anticipating and pre-empting stock declines rather than merely explaining them ex post.

Involving communities in participatory governance can take various forms including community-based governance and co-management. Pauly and Chuenpagdee (2007, p. 178) acknowledge that the virtual consensus on community-based management is based on solid reasoning and evidence, but sound a word of caution. They argue that without formal property rights, fisher-folk behave as do owners of large fleets run according to maximisation principles. Kalikoski and Allison (2010) suggest that co-management is likely to be more effective if the approach is adaptive, builds on social integration, is sensitive to local power structures to prevent capture and devolves power in addition to responsibilities. Béné (2009) suggests, based on a review of two decades of participatory initiatives in fishery management in Sub-Saharan Africa, that the real issue is ‘downward accountability’, without which participatory approaches are meaningless.

The opening up of deep sea waters to commercial fishing is fairly recent in South Asia. Sann (1998) assesses the consequent threats to fishing communities and documents the marginalisation of traditional fisher-folk. Among the reasons for the degradation of fisheries globally and in Pakistan is the pressure to boost exports. Ibarra et al. (2000) and Thorpe et al. (2000) discuss over-capitalisation and overfishing in Latin America as driven by neo-liberal export promotion. Young (2001) recognises in this context that the state pursues conflicting aims of short-term growth maximisation and long-term resource conservation. It is of course the latter which maximises the net present value by making fishery sustainable, but the state deviates from such policy of conservation due to short-term pressures to secure foreign exchange or political collusion with vested interests. Young (2001, p. 284) cites the concept of the ‘tragedy of incursion’ as being more relevant for resource degradation than fisher-folk-induced ‘tragedy of the commons’ when referring to state-induced outside encroachment on local fishing grounds. The issues indentified in this brief literature review play out in this study of fishery degradation in Pakistan.

Marine fisheries in Pakistan

The marine fishing sector in Pakistan directly supports 125,000 people, and indirectly – if one includes dependants – close to one million. Fishing communities, whose way of life has survived for generations, are dispersed along a 682-mile coast line, lying between Sir Creek in Sindh Province and Jiwani in Balochistan Province respectively (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Coastal map of Pakistan.

Balochistan has 477 miles of the coast line and the remaining 205 miles are in Sindh. The latter has 17 large and hundreds of small creeks (Figure 2), which are branches of the larger creeks. Some 30 aggregations of fishing communities live along this coast line. A few of the large aggregations are permanent; the smaller groups come together during the beginning of the fishing season and vacate their habitations at its end.

Figure 2. Sindh coastal creeks.

Four harbours and nine important landing sites and jetties are situated along the Sindh–Balochistan coast (for more details, see Birwani et al. 1999). The bulk of the fishing population resides in Karachi, Sindh Province. Karachi is also Pakistan's largest industrial city, with an estimated population of about 18 million.5 The other concentrations are in Thatta, Sindh; and Gwadar and Pasni, Balochistan.

More than 15,000 vessels of various sizes engage in fishing, from small- to medium-sized boats, large launches and trawlers. The small boats are between 18 and 25 feet in length and are used to fish the coastal waters. The fishermen use shrimp nets (thukri, phat) which they hand cast. The medium-sized boats ranging in size from 25 to 35 feet in length, use gill nets (rach lara, lathay ka ban). Almost one-third of these vessels are shrimp trawlers; the bulk of them are owned by investors outside the community. Boat and shore fishing is done in creeks and within the 12-mile territorial limit, which falls under provincial jurisdiction. The larger launches go farther off shore into deeper waters on extended fishing excursions, some ranging as far as Somalia's coast.

Most of the fish catch is exported to Europe, the US, the Far East and the Middle East. Pakistan exports fish with little value addition. The bulk of the exports comprise a few fish species, mainly shrimps, which constitute approximately 66 per cent of total fish exports. The other species exported are Indian mackerel, ribbonfish, tuna, sole and crab.

Official trade figures (Government of Pakistan, 2004) show annual fish exports between 1993/1994 and 2002/2003 increased steadily from USD 77 million in 1993 to USD 131 million in 2003.6 While this is a low and declining percentage of total exports (from 2.6 per cent in 1993–1994 to 1.2 per cent in 2002–2003), in absolute terms fish exports generate a significant amount of foreign exchange earnings.

Research method

This paper draws on qualitative information gathered on site in July 2005. Our methods included a semi-structured household survey, focus group discussions, stakeholder interviews, participant observation and interviews conducted by the lead author with officials of the relevant agencies charged with managing fisheries. The household survey gathered information on income, assets, credit, indebtedness, technology, marketing and other local institutions. The fieldwork was conducted in fishing villages in Karachi (Sindh) and Gwadar and Pasni (Balochistan).

The fishing villages selected in Karachi were Ibrahim Hyderi and Rehri Goth. The selection was made on the suggestion of the Pakistan Fisher-folk Forum (PFF), which considered these two adjacent villages ideal for the type of information we were seeking.7 Both villages combine to form the largest marine fisher-folk settlement in Sindh. Similarly, the majority of Balochi fishermen live in Gwadar and its surrounding villages/towns of Pasni, Surbandar, and Jiwani, and hence we selected this area for study. Our guides classified fishing households by income and we interviewed 10 low-income, 10 middle-, and 4 high-income households in each of the two provinces, for a total of 48.

Six focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted by the lead author. The provincial distribution was four in Sindh and two in Balochistan, with the size of the groups varying from 10 to 15. The villages were in Mubarik, Hawks Bay, Ibrahim Hyderi and Rehri Goth in Karachi District and Surbandar and Pasni in Gwadar District.

Twelve stakeholder interviews were conducted, including with representatives of the fishing communities, mole-holders (auctioneers), PFF, Fishermen Co-operative Society (FCS), 8 Balochistan Coastal Development Authority (BCDA), Marine Fisheries Department (MFD), Balochistan Planning and Development Department (BP&DD), fish processing units, SGS (Societe Generale de Surveillance), the policy community and academics.9

Findings on fishery degradation

In this section we first document how changing fishing methods and technologies are contributing to fishery degradation. The information is based on interviews with representatives of the Pakistan Fisher-folk Forum, members of the fishing community and officials in the Sindh Fisheries Department. The information on traditional fishing methods is drawn mostly from the first two sources, with the fisheries department weighing in on the newer harmful practices. Subsequently we turn to the main focus of this paper, the poverty–resource degradation nexus.

Unsustainable fishing methods/technologies

A stated reason for unsustainable harvesting is the rapid influx of new fishing methods and technologies which have begun to replace traditional practices. This influx reflects a policy–market nexus as well as livelihood concerns. Efforts to maintain livelihoods in the face of indebtedness and declining catches appear to force local fishermen into using inappropriate methods.

Traditional fishing methods were environmentally friendly, defined as those which sustain stocks and do not harm the eco-system or sea beds. Nets, made of silk (resham) or a cotton variety (latha) were used for stationary fishing and had a sufficiently wide mesh (2.4–6 inches) to release small fry. These included the thukri, a shrimp net used in small boats (18–25 feet) and for hand casting. A similar type of net used for the same purpose is called phat. Another type of casting net is called the ‘bin’ net. This net is used to catch fish along the coast line. The dori is used for creek fishing. Rach lara, lathay ka ban (gill net) is used on medium sized boats (25–35 feet) and launches, which fish the buffer zone (between 12 and 35 nautical miles from shore).10 Yet another type of environmentally friendly net, the jhaari, is no longer in use. In addition, fishermen use the common hook and line method – for example, a line baited with a single, a few or many hooks.

Environmentally harmful nets have been introduced in an effort to increase fish catches. These are made of nylon, have a fine mesh, and catch small fry. The translucent nylon allows fishing both by day and night time. These nets are prone to rip off coral that subsequently washes up on the beach. The mechanisation of boats and launches has permitted mobility and the increasing use of winches has accelerated the pace of fishing and encouraged the use of bigger nets.

Examples of the destructive nets now being used includes the bhulo gujja (tidal trap net) which is a fine mesh cone net made of nylon with the mesh getting finer towards the cone. The net is tied by wire cords to two iron rods, which are embedded in the creek mouth. While the net is meant for shrimp, small fry get trapped in the fine mesh and decompose. The net was introduced by migrant Bangladeshi fishermen but the uptake by local fishermen has been rapid. A variant is the chappal gujja, which is tied along the seashore near mangroves and catches juvenile and small shrimp. The dooboo fishing method, whereby fish are caught during the time of day they breed and feed, leads to hampering the growth of stock.

Launch gujja is a larger version of the bhulo gujja and is used on medium size and large boats and launches (35 feet and larger). It is a drag or trawling net made of thicker nylon but the mesh is still fine and traps fry. The net scrapes the ocean floor and damages the fish habitat. According to Mohammad Ali Shah, chairman of the PFF, this net was first introduced here in 1951 but is only now rapidly replacing the gill net. The use of these nets and winches has earned these traditional launches the pseudonym ‘mini deep sea launches’. Qatra (fine mesh net, also referred to as a wire net) is used in medium- and large-sized boats and launches to catch trash fish, mostly sardines, which are converted to chicken feed. This has also been a factor in fish stock depletion because sardines are a source of food for larger fish.

‘Plastic nets’ is the term used for fine mesh nylon nets used in Balochistan. They come in all sizes and are used in small- and medium-sized boats. They were originally introduced at the turn of the century by the migrant Bangladeshi community, working under contract to the processing plants to catch Indian mackerel, ribbon fish and sole for export largely to the Far East. In time, they have been assimilated more widely.

Our interviewees informed us that deep sea trawlers use a variety of nets including trawl liners, bag-type trawl nets and hooked rope nets (used by long liners). Foreign trawlers are issued licenses by the Federal Government to fish beyond 12 nautical miles offshore. The combination of wire nets and winches to carry out bottom dragging for up to a month at a time destroys coral reef systems and marine life on the sea bed. After indiscriminately catching all species, since bottom dragging does not allow for targeted fishing, only the desired fish (often those not subject to duty) are kept and the rest (up to 90 per cent of the total catch) thrown back into the water.

Poverty–resource degradation nexus

As indicated earlier, poverty is viewed by some scholars as contributing to resource degradation, and vice versa. The concept referred to in the literature as the poverty–environment nexus has been applied to resource degradation in poor coastal fishing communities (Cavendish, 2000, Dasgupta et al., 2005) as well as to communities dependent on forests. We view this nexus as being more complex and the degradation as emanating from local institutions of credit and marketing rather than from poverty per se.

In the absence of readily available institutional credit, the fisherman's only recourse is the informal credit system. A combination of technology upgrades and rising costs have made local fishermen increasingly dependent on loans to finance their capital expenditures (boats, launches, nets and engines) and running expenses (boat, net and engine repairs, ice, fuel and food). The loan repayment conditions require the fisherman to pay a commission on his catch until he pays off his entire debt. This commission does not result in a reduction of the principal, which is required to be paid separately.

This system has several variants, all of them exploitative but in differing degrees. The exploitation in this context has two components. First, it results from the inter-related imperfections in the credit and product markets. Thus, there is a differential between the interest paid on loans, because the credit market is imperfect, and the lower interest rates fishermen could get if there were more sources for loans – in other words, a more perfect credit market. Second, the market value of the fish would be higher if the fisher-folk were not constrained to sell to creditors. The various credit arrangements are briefly explained below.

In the commission system, the nakhuda (launch or boat captain) owns his vessel and equipment (net and engine), but borrows from the mole holder (fish auctioneer, mole for short) or beopari (middleman) to meet running expenses. He is not compelled to sell to the same mole or beopari but must pay interest (varying from 5 to 10 per cent of the value of the catch) as repayment for the loan until the principal is paid off.

In the gaatu system the nakhuda does not own a fishing vessel and equipment or have funds for the running costs. He secures both through a loan from a mole or a beopari, who provides the upfront capital and loans for operating expenses. When a mole lends money to a fisherman, the latter is constrained to auction his catch through him and pay him a higher commission (7%). The mole also under-weighs the catch, as explained by Brohi (2004). Baskets of various sizes are used for bringing the catch to the auction. It is up to the mole to guess the weight of the basket, which is subtracted from the weight of the fish auctioned. All this is done on the basis of a rough estimate. The fishermen complain that they sustain losses as a result of a deliberately faulty estimate.

In the pati system (pati means share), the nakhuda hires khilasis (fishermen) to assist him with various chores while out at sea, including rowing, steering, fishing, cleaning and salting. The trips can be short (a single day) or, in the case of large launches, may extend up to two months. The net earnings (after deducting costs) are divided into patis. If the nakhuda is the owner, he gets 4.5 shares (one for the boat, one for the engine, one for the net and 1.5 for his expertise). If the boat is leased from an investor, the lessor gets three patis, while the nakhuda gets 1.5 patis. The khilasis get 1 pati each. The monetary value of the share naturally varies with the volume and price of the catch. The term for loss is lada. If, for instance, a trip costs Rs50,000/- and the catch sells for Rs40,000/- the lada amounts to Rs10,000/-.

Pathans (immigrants from north-west Pakistan) engage in the practice of loan-sharking and charge extortionate interest rates (up to 10 per cent a month) for running expenses, often deducting a portion up front as advance repayment. The loan shark is the lender of last resort, since rates are extortionate and repayments time-bound. Prevented from being market players, fishermen locked into this nexus of dependence get the lowest effective returns on their catch.

The situation in Sindh is more stressed than in Balochistan. Rising capital and running costs, and the increasing frequency of ladas, have combined to create a situation where fishermen are unable to repay their running costs, with the result that their debts mount. There has also been a surge of investments in boats and launches in recent years, both by investors and local beoparis, which have contributed to over-fishing and losses.

The fish marketing system is complex, involving auctioneers (moles), middlemen (beoparis) and fishermen. The process reflects the impact of the credit systems described above. It also varies by species of fish, type of net used, and whether the fish are exported, consumed locally, or both.

Karachi is the main fish market in Pakistan, both for fresh and saltwater species, as well as the country's only legal export outlet. The Karachi harbour was inaugurated in 1951 and its marketing functions were handed over to the Fishermen Co-operative Society (FCS), which predated the harbour. The society introduced an auctioning system, to be managed by its designated moles registered with the FCS. The harbour currently has about 45 moles working full time. In order to regulate marketing, the system has been made mandatory in both Sindh and Balochistan. The Gwadar harbour currently has 11 active moles, but these fall under the jurisdiction of the harbour authority. Moles are present in smaller numbers at the jetties in the smaller coastal villages and they also play the role of salaried munshis (managers) for prosperous and influential individuals, referred to in local parlance as seths (businessmen, investors) or waderas (landlords). While the initial membership fee for a mole is nominal (Rs15,000), a sufficiency of capital is required to become a mole in order to provide loans to fishermen for their running expenses.

A mole is allotted a space in the auction hall where he auctions the fish unloaded at the jetty by boats and launches. The beoparis bid for lots and may sell successful bids to the processing plants or in the local market to both retailers and wholesalers. The mole also doubles as a commission agent, collecting money from beoparis and paying it to the fishermen for a commission. In this regard, the mole can inject stability into the process by ensuring that fishermen get paid.

Other parallel marketing systems are also in place that bypass the mole. In Sindh, a category of small beopari called vichaatey purchase fish directly from fishermen. The vichaatey work on behalf of large beoparis who in turn supply processing plants exporting fish and shrimp. Alternatively they convert trash fish into chicken feed. The vichaatey charge the large beoparis a commission between 5 and 10 per cent. In Gwadar, the processing plants have designated beoparis who buy fish directly from the fishermen.11

The presence of these marketing systems suggests different pricing arrangements whereby exploitation varies directly with indebtedness. The vichaatey assure competitive prices by virtue of their numbers; our informants expressed no concern about price collusion. The vichaatey charge their costs to the beopari – who they often work for. This is the closest to a fair return to poor local fishermen. However, the vichaatey are illegal and their ability to operate depends on patronage.

The option of going through the mole is less preferred because of the mandatory commission and the delayed payments. Under the mole system, fair returns to fishermen are only possible for those who are debt free or are able to repay their loans within the season. Indebtedness ensures a steady supply of fish for the mole, the fishermen being constrained to auction their fish through him. In this case, the fishermen get a lower actual price for the fish due to the deductions (commission and debt repayment).

Alternatively, fishermen take loans directly from the beoparis (backstopped by the processing plants). In general, this is a preferred arrangement as it means an avoidance of commission payments and also immediate cash payments to fishermen upon delivery. This practice is prevalent in Gwadar for fish that are frozen and exported to the Far East, including Indian mackerel, ribbon fish, sole and crabs. As it is a ‘demand pull’ arrangement, the beopari does not impose extortionate terms. However, this arrangement co-exists in an uneasy relationship with the mandatory auction system.

Fishermen become very vulnerable when the debt to the mole exceeds a certain limit, because further loans can be discontinued. The fishermen then turn to the beoparis, who are still willing to provide loans but they ensure repayment through a lower price for the fish they purchase. This growing cycle of indebtedness and distress pricing is becoming increasingly evident in Sindh, especially among the small fishermen, who are struggling to cope in a regime of declining fish catches and mounting debt.

There is also a contract fishing system prevalent in the large creeks in Sindh that are controlled by the sea lords. These were landlords who lost their lands to sea incursion and asserted water claims on the basis of their prior land holdings (Figure 2, above). Their designated beoparis provide fishing permits and loans to fishermen, secure the catch and pay them without any reference to market conditions.

Numbering significantly among these are marginalised Bangladeshi fishermen. They are more vulnerable because, as illegal migrants, they do not enjoy open access to the sea. Permission to fish the creeks translates into low returns for the catch, a situation further compounded by loan repayments. Alternatively, they are captives to the processing plants or the maritime agencies. The environmentally destructive practices they have introduced, in particular the bhulo gujja, the qatra (plastic net) and off-season shrimp fishing, are an effort to stay afloat under highly adverse conditions. These conditions combine distress prices for their catch, declining fish catches and illegal payoffs.12

There is an obvious empirical link between poverty and indebtedness. The debt to income ratio for the low-, middle- and higher-income groups in our sample were 3.27, 1.46 and 0.38 respectively. Even the smallest boats require substantial capital and running cost outlays. For example, the poorest fisherman, who owns a small boat, first spends Rs200,000/- to Rs300,000/- to construct the boat and spends Rs500-600 on every fishing trip. During the fishing season, he makes at least 20 such one-day trips, averaging about Rs10,000 per month. Rising costs and decreasing catches have resulted in falling income levels and increased indebtedness. Fisher-folk livelihoods are also threatened because of the lack of compliance of the final product with international food safety and sustainable harvesting standards. Food safety standards cover both pre-processing and processing activities. While processing plants tend to comply with food safety standards, primarily due to the threat of loss of market share, there is a lack of information and training provided to those further down the value chain.13

As fish stocks in the Sindh waters have dwindled, launch owners have begun to intrude into Balochistan's territorial waters. This practice is facilitated by the Fisheries Department and the Maritime Security Agency. Not only do these launches catch fish illegally, their drag nets cut the smaller stationary nets of the boat fishermen. On occasion, communities have resorted to violent action to assert their resource rights. For instance, the Pasni fishermen reported violations to the authorities and, in the absence of a response, they impounded the fishing nets of the Sindhi launches, claiming they were asserting their rights under customary law.

Existing fishing policies make matters worse for marginalised fisher-folk. The Maritime Security Agency now requires prior security clearances before granting access to waters around the port. Federal and provincial fishing policies, through both intent (zoning laws) and default, support commercial interests at the expense of environmental and livelihood concerns.

Changes in fishing policy and practice have also marginalised women. Previously they participated fully in the fishing activities of the community, thanks to the absence of imposed gender distinctions. When fishing was productive and catches were close to shore, women used to go out in the boats, fish and return before nightfall. On occasion, they even camped overnight on the offshore islands. However, as the fertile fishing grounds have been pushed further seaward, security concerns have confined them to the shore. As traditional fishing methods have given way to mechanised ones, and transactions become commercialised, the women's role in making and mending nets, taking the catch to market and other supportive functions has been reduced.14 Having noted this, we also observed in the field research the enormous contribution women make to the resilience of fishing communities in the face of economic disempowerment.

Other causes of fishery degradation

To complete the picture, three additional causes of fishery degradation deserve mention: destruction of mangroves; water pollution; and flawed regulatory policy.

Destruction of mangroves

The Indus River with its tributaries is the lifeline of agriculture in Pakistan. The Indus delta ecosystem is degrading from a combination of salt-water intrusion up to 30 kilometres inland and reduced silt and nutrient flows due to upstream dam construction. The ravages to the ecosystem have been exceptionally severe to the mangroves and this is likely to be one of the major causes of the reduction in fish stock. IUCN-CIDA-MoE (1992, p. 44) claim that the mangroves sustain fisheries through their role as breeding grounds.

The National Commission on Agriculture observed that mangrove forests were more seriously threatened than any other forests in the country.15 Stedman-Edwards's (2000) report for the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) claimed that Pakistan has lost 1,700 square kilometres of its mangrove forest area in the past 50 years. The report noted that the Indus delta originally had eight different species of mangroves, most of which are not found in Pakistan today.

Pollution

There are multiple sources of water pollution: oil spills at the ports and harbours; household and industrial waste; and effluents and agricultural run-off. Karachi and the surrounding industrial estates (Korangi, Landhi and SITE) are the main source of household and industrial wastes and effluents. Untreated waste flows into the sea at Kemari and Minora in violation of regulations.

Agricultural run-off, which used to spill into inland lakes (Manchar, Haleji, Dhabeji), is now being diverted to the lower Sindh coast through the donor-funded Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD), with a parallel drain on the right bank of the Indus on the anvil. Aftab et al. (2000) have quantified the magnitude of the pollution and estimated that 70 per cent of Karachi's wastewater flows into the marine environment.

Institutional and policy shortcomings

The Ministry of Fisheries, Agriculture and Livestock (MINFAL) issues licenses only to vessels of a certain type and has no check on local large-sized mechanically propelled launches fishing in the Exclusive Economic Zone. These launches are registered with Mercantile Marine Department (MMD) but operate without a deep sea license, since the deep sea fishing policy does not limit the number of traditional fishing launches fishing in the EEZ. Consequently, the number of these large launches has been increasing continuously. The provincial government also does not limit the number of boats (small- or medium-sized) fishing in territorial waters. As a result their numbers have also increased significantly in past 10 to 15 years. Fisher-folk have been lobbying to stop this over-capacity with little success.16

A second aspect of policy failure pertains both to arbitrary changes in zoning laws as well as to weak enforcement. The seasonal ban (June–August) to protect spawning fish coincides with the monsoon squalls that make fishing difficult. In this case, nature to some extent comes to the aid of policy. We observed this in the shape of empty fish auction halls, inactive processing plants and grounded fishermen repairing boats and nets. While the ban applies to sea-going vessels, it does not prevent shore fishing by locals, including in the shrimp breeding grounds. Also, foreign trawlers are permitted to continue fishing during these months.

The federal government's key policy thrust over the past two decades has been on the commercial aspects of marine fishing. The new deep sea fishing policy of 2001 is more inclusive. However, various stakeholders we interviewed expressed disappointment that there had been no substantive implementation of the range of proposed policy measures designed to improve the wellbeing of artisanal fishers. Also, the new deep sea fishing policy has many conceptual shortcomings. To begin with, it gives short shrift to traditional resource rights of the local fishermen.17 Instead, the policy defines fisheries as an open access resource. Equally important, it only recognises over-exploitation in shrimp catching but does not acknowledge overfishing as a widespread problem. This leads to the misguided recommendation of diversifying into fin fishing. This is at variance with the reality of fish catches dropping across the board. Furthermore, the policy chalks out no strategy or plan for long-run sustainable development, conservation and management of marine fisheries. Finally, it does not address the overlapping jurisdiction between the provincial and federal government, which induces paralysis in policy implementation.

Conclusion and suggestions

Our research indicates that one cannot rule out the ‘poverty–resource degradation’ nexus as one of the causes of marine fishery degradation in Pakistan. The poor are indebted and pushed into using destructive fishing methods, which reinforces their poverty. However, the policy response cannot be simplistic bans. Since destructive fishing methods are a response to poverty, until that is addressed the powerful motivation to do what is necessary to sustain families will remain.

We found that the poverty–resource degradation nexus in this case is mediated through a credit market–poverty nexus, with feedbacks into the product market. Thus, the more promising alternative is to address the problem of the imperfect credit market that results in the indebtedness and the more intensive exploitation of fishery resources. State-supported, community based micro-credit is spreading fast in Pakistan, and there is clearly a case for extending it to the fisher-folk. This would not be a case of ‘manufacturing entrepreneurship’, the products of which may or may not have a market, since entrepreneurship is intrinsic to artisanal fisheries.

Through community mobilisation, an accord could be reached with the fisher-folk that gives them a policing role to reverse unsustainable practices. As indicated in our literature review, communities are better able to police and sustain resources that their livelihoods depend on. Participatory approaches or co-management frameworks tapping local knowledge have been found effective.

The vulnerability of the Bangladeshi community needs to be addressed. As a practical measure, the state can check entry – but it should grant dignity and security to those already present, thus also removing a source of pressure on fisheries.

Once the credit and vulnerability issues are addressed, the imperfections in the product market can also be resolved. Monopsonistic market power results from credit dependency and, once that problem is resolved, the institutions to ensure a fair market price are already present.

While the poverty–resource degradation nexus is one source of the problem, others such as pollution, fresh water capture and mangroves degradation, unsustainable foreign exchange driven fishing policy and jurisdictional overlaps would also need to be addressed. Addressing policy responses in these cases is beyond the scope of this paper, but if these sources of degradation are successfully addressed, it will also simultaneously attenuate the poverty–resource degradation nexus.

There is obviously no panacea. In other contexts, options such as marine parks and Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) have been attempted to promote fishers rights and conservation. It is tempting to endorse marine parks (MPs) since only 0.6 per cent of the world's oceans are protected, compared to a target of 10 per cent by 2012 under the Convention on Biological Diversity (Mwaipopo, 2008). The International Collective in Support of Fish-workers (ICSF) commissioned six studies in Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa, Tanzania and Thailand to explore the social dimensions of MPs.18 However, findings suggest that MPs might be a biological success but a social failure. There have been considerable costs to traditional fishers from exclusion, and, apart from in Brazil, communities are expected to implement management plans but have not been part of the process of designing the plans causing resentment and resistance. Diegues (2008, p. 32) points out that in principle the new policy governing MPs in Brazil announced in April 2007 has recognised the need for greater participation by affected fishers and to marry scientific with local knowledge.

Individual Transferable Quotas have been tried in North America and much success claimed for them. However, Ecotrust Canada (2009) has sounded a note of caution, particularly that leasing quotas promote absentee sea-lords. This goes against the spirit of conservation through good stewardship by fishers and against the spirit of equity, since there is a divorce of returns and effort. ITQs also require sound science to set the quotas, good governance for monitoring and a legal framework in which to embed functioning markets. In low-income countries there may be a deficit on these counts, and so relying initially on local knowledge and some form of participation might be preferable.

Acknowledgements

The authors gratefully acknowledge invaluable comments on an earlier draft from Aaron Cosby, David Boyer and Faisal Haq Shaheen. Our thanks also to all the stakeholders with whom we engaged during the fieldwork. We are particularly indebted to the fishing communities for letting us into their lives and inspiring us with their courage in the face of adversity. Finally, we would like to thank three anonymous referees whose insightful and helpful comments substantially altered this paper. In addressing their comments, we borrowed freely at times from the particularly appropriate ways in which they phrased an issue. We remain responsible for remaining deficits in the paper.

Notes

Hutchings and Myers (1994) show overfishing to be the cause of the much studied collapse of the Atlantic Cod.

Shahid Shah: ‘Pakistan's seafood catch has declined by 29 pc in a decade’, The News International, 21 April 2010.

Shahid Shah: ‘Pakistan's seafood exports fetch 17 pc higher unit price’, The News International, 21 July 2010.

Indeed, political scientist Elinor Ostrum won the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics for demonstrating the ability of communities to manage and safeguard common property resources more effectively than do state sanctions.

There has been no population census since 1998 but one is planned in 2011.

The average exchange rate between July 2005 to April 2006 (covering the period of our fieldwork) of the Pakistani rupee for $1 was Rs. 59.81 (Government of Pakistan 2006, Statistical Supplement, p.86).

The Pakistan Fisher-folk Forum (PFF) was formed in May 1998 to address the threats to livelihoods of local fishing communities. It is a representative body of fisher-folk working in the coastal areas of both Balochistan and Sindh. It is actively engaged in awareness raising, mobilising and organising the communities for the protection of their livelihoods and sustainable management of fisheries.

The Fisherman Co-operative Society was founded in 1945, originally as the Karachi Fishermen's Co-operative Purchase and Sale Society Ltd. It is situated at the Karachi Fish Harbour. The objectives of the Society are to ensure the welfare of, and provide benefits to, the poor fishermen by supplying them with basic amenities (for example, nets) at cheaper prices. The Society's board of directors consists of 15 directors, seven of whom are elected by members and eight are nominated by the government. Under the terms of the FCS agreement, moles generally receive a 6.25 per cent commission on the auction of the catch, half of which they pay to the FCS.

The semi-structured questionnaire for household interviews, checklists for focus group discussions and stakeholder interviews and the list of interviewees can be provided on request.

The buffer zone was established to protect fish stocks in territorial waters.

At Sorbandar, a fishing village in Balochistan, Iranian power boats enter Pakistani waters and buy fish directly off the fishermen at sea. This marketing phenomenon is an outlier. In this case the fishermen get a competitive price for their catch and are not required to pay a commission, but the volume of fish sold in this manner is extremely small.

Near the Indian border, local fishermen pay coastal rangers a fee to avoid harassment.

The EU banned seafood exports from Pakistan in April 2007 (delisted all 28 fish processing units). An EU mission was expected (16–27 November 2010) to inspect the Karachi Harbor and consider lifting the ban but the visit was unexpectedly cancelled and at the time of writing (November 2010) the ban was still in effect. Shahid Shah: ‘EU team to inspect fish harbor in November’, The News International, 31 October 2009.

Globalisation or commercially induced displacement of women in fishing activities is a common phenomenon in artisanal fisher-folk communities. There are several examples in a thematic issue of Development on gender and fisheries (volume 51, issue 2). In particular, Porter et al. (2008) document how, in Tanzanian coastal communities, men took over octopus trapping from women as the commodification of a subsistence product made it more profitable.

Also refer to ADB/IUCN (2003, p. 27).

Fishermen for cancellation of deep sea trawlers' permits [online]. Available from http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/jul2005-daily/05-07-2005/metro/k9.htm [Accessed 8 June 2005].

PFF has prepared a draft on sustainable fisheries policy based on local voices and geared towards addressing the problems of local fishermen. It is the only comprehensive document of its kind in Pakistan presently.

All the studies are available online from http://www.icfs.net.

Appendix

Table A.1. Number of registered fishing vessels (1993–2003)

Table

Vessels (Categories)	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Sindh Trawlers	2,028	2,245	2,252	2,310	2,427	2,522	2,564	2,570	2,611	2,677	2,702
Gill-netters	1,604	1,865	1,871	1,945	2,015	2,236	2,305	2,317	2,432	2,489	2,510
Motorised-cum-sailing vessels	3,211	3,424	3,430	3,526	3,611	3,695	3,755	3,923	3,998	4,202	4,388
Sail boats (marine)	5,651	5,884	5,895	5,922	6,253	6,285	6,358	6,504	6,713	6,718	6,809
Total	12,494	13,418	13,448	13,703	14,306	14,738	14,982	15,314	15,754	16,086	16,409
Balochistan Trawlers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gill-netters	765	860	941	1,019	1,111	1,162	1,295	1,329	1,389	1,680	1,508
Motorised-cum-sailing vessels	3,313	3,552	3,826	4,022	4,195	4,250	4,279	4,314	4,372	4,227	4,463
Sail boats (marine)	142	89	23	26	39	39	25	29	34	33	25
Total	4,220	4,501	4,790	5,067	5,345	5,451	5,599	5,672	5,795	5,940	5,996
Total marine	16,714	17,919	18,238	18,770	19,651	20,189	20,581	20,986	21,549	22,026	22,405
Progressive addition		1,205	319	532	881	538	392	405	563	477	379

Table A.2. Marine catch by Province (thousand metric tons).

Table

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2003
Sindh	26	46	102	175	229	260	281	294	271
Balochistan	11	16	37	58	94	107	123	130	127
EEZ	–	–	–	–	10	2	2	14	3
Total	37	62	139	233	333	370	406	438	401
Source: Government of Pakistan (2005). Note: EEZ = Exclusive Economic Zone.

Table A.3. Declining yearly catch by fish species (metric tons).

Table

Local name	English name	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Boi	Mullet	21,620	18,439	16,567	16,622	17,678	16,392	11,367
Tarli	Indian oil Sardinella	73,960	50,543	45,231	42,611	44,410	38,110	25,100
Padon	Thryssas	29,260	18,111	17,564	14,091	16,113	13,165	15,154
Palli	Clupeoidei nei	40,210	31,198	21,615	21,982	20,100	19,209	21,103
Kiddi	Kiddi shrimp	18,210	15,121	12,289	13,171	15,912	13,854	12,121
Source: Government of Pakistan (2002).