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Abstract
Breakthroughs in the global governance of terrorism depend mainly on the development on the part of the international community of thorough and effective mechanisms. At present, global governance targets terrorism via four regimes: hegemonic governance; governance by international organizations; hybrid governance; and coordinated governance by major powers. These strategies have made a contribution to counter-terrorism, but they do have shortcomings. We start with the judgment that governance entities should adhere to the logic of consequences, the logic of appropriateness, the logic of emotion and the logic of habitus, and on this basis make a preliminary assessment of the global governance of terrorism. Present terrorism governance regimes tend to be based on the thinking of the logic of consequences with only partial implementation of the logic of appropriateness and no use, so far, of counterterrorism measures based on the logic of emotion and the logic of habitus. To address both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism, international society should encourage governance strategies that implement counter-terrorism measures based on the four types of logic above and should promote coordination and cooperation based on this platform. In this course, China could promote a more significant role in global terrorism governance for such counter-terrorism platforms as the United Nations, including the Security Council, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
恐怖主义的全球治理能否取得突破性进展，主要取决于国际社会能否形成完备和 高效的治理机制。目前，针对恐怖主义的全球治理至少存在霸权治理、国际组织治 理、混合型治理、大国协调治理四种主要治理机制。上述机制为应对和打击恐怖主义 做出了重要贡献，但仍存在一定不足。从治理主体需要遵循后果性逻辑、适当性逻 辑、情感与积习四种行为逻辑开展恐怖主义治理活动这一判断出发，可对恐怖主义的 治理机制的表现进行初步评估。目前，现有治理机制主要是基于后果性逻辑的思维反 恐，只是部分落实了适当性逻辑的反恐精神，尚未系统贯彻基于情感和积习逻辑的反 恐措施。如果要实现对恐怖主义的标本兼治，国际社会应该推动相关治理机制全面落 实基于四种行为逻辑的治理措施，同时增进各机制平台之间的相互协调与配合。在此 过程中，中国可以推动联合国、上海合作组织等反恐平台在恐怖主义全球治理过程中 发挥更大的作用。
Notes
* This paper is a phased outcome of the key National Social Science Fund project, “Study of the Anti- Terrorism Situation, Mechanisms and Countermeasures Related to Xinjiang” (No.: 15AZD018), chaired by Professor Yang Shu of the Central Asian Institute of Lanzhou University, and of the key research base team-building project “Study of Belt and Road Security Issues” (No. 17LZUJBWTD002), supported by the Central University Basic Research Operating Expenditure of Lanzhou University.
1 Barak Mendelsohn, “Sovereignty under Attack: The International Society Meets the Al Qaeda Network,” pp. 45-68.
2 See Wang Tingdong, “The September 11 Attacks and Global Terrorism Governance,” pp. 50-54; Zhang Jiadong, Terrorism and Its Governance in the Era of Globalization; Samuel M. Makinda, “Global Governance and Terrorism,” pp. 43-58; Steven Lee, “International Governance and the Fight against Terrorism,” pp. 241-246; Ronald Crelinsten, “Counterterrorism as Global Governance: A Research Inventory,” pp. 210-235.
3 See Jane Boulden and Thomas G. Weiss, eds., Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11; David Cortright and George A. Lopez, Uniting against Terror: Cooperative Nonmilitary Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat; Thomas M. McDonnell, The United States, International Law, and the Struggle against Terrorism; Karen Feste, America Responds to Terrorism: Conflict Resolution Strategies of Clinton, Bush, and Obama.
4 See Beth Elise Whitaker, “Compliance among Weak States: Africa and the Counter-Terrorism Regime,” pp. 639-662; Karthika Sasikumar, “State Agency in the Time of the Global War on Terror: India and the Counter-Terrorism Regime,” pp. 615-638; Council on Foreign Relations of US, The Global Regime for Terrorism.
5 Dimitrios Anagnostakis, “Regime Theory and Global Counter-Terrorism: Some Starting Points.”
6 Most of the existing studies use “international counter-terrorism regime” rather than “global terrorism governance regime.” The former focuses more on specific attacks on terrorism, while the latter covers a broader range, including research on terrorism, legislation to prevent and combat terrorism, de-radicalization following the apprehension of terrorists, etc. Counter-terrorism regimes are undoubtedly an important part of terrorism governance regimes but not the whole story.
7 Our discussion of the basic elements of the global terrorism governance regimes draws on the discussion of the relevant issues by Karthika Sasikumar. See Karthika Sasikumar, “State Agency in the Time of the Global War on Terror: India and the Counter-Terrorism Regime,” p. 616.
8 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, pp. 1-22.
9 Helmut Breitmeier, Oran R. Young and Michael Zürn, Analyzing International Environmental Regimes: From Case Study to Database, p. 12.
10 James Reinl, “Trump's Muslim Ban Comes into Effect.”
11 Moetren Kelstrup, “Globalization and Social Insecurity: The Securitisation of Terrorism and Competing Strategies for Global Governance,” pp. 106-116.
12 Ethem Ilbiz and Benjamin L. Curtis, “Trendsetters, Trend Followers, and Individual Players: Obtaining Global Counterterror Actor Types from Proscribed Terror Lists,” pp. 39-61.
13 Anna Cornelia Beyer, Counterterrorism and International Power Relations: The EU, ASEAN and Hegemonic Global Governance; Barak Mendelsohn, Combating Jihadism: American Hegemony and Interstate Cooperation in the War on Terrorism.
14 Barak Mendelsohn, “Sovereignty under Attack: The International Society Meets the Al Qaeda Network,” p. 53.
15 Trevor McCrisken, “Ten Years on: Obama's War on Terrorism in Rhetoric and Practice,” pp. 793–797; Patrick B. Johnston and Anoop K. Sarbahi, “The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan,” pp. 203-219.
16 United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, International Legal Instruments.
17 Eric Rosand, “Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight against Terrorism,” pp. 333-341; David Cortright, George A. Lopez, Alistair Millar and Linda Gerber-Stellingwerf, “Global Cooperation against Terrorism: Evaluating the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee,” pp. 23-50.
18 See US Council on Foreign Relations, The Global Regime for Terrorism.
19 Stephen Aris, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: ‘Tackling the Three Evils.’ A Regional Response to Non-traditional Security Challenges or an Anti-Western Bloc?”, pp. 457-482.
20 Andrew Phillips, “The Wars on Terror, Duelling Internationalisms and the Clash of Purposes in a Post-Unipolar World,” pp. 77-96.
21 The concept of “hybrid governance” is derived from management studies, where it means that a company mixes elements related to market transactions with hierarchical management or adopts a model in which hierarchy is incorporated into market transactions, i.e., production activities are carried out through a mixed mode of management. See Richard Makadok and Russell Coff, “Both Market and Hierarchy: An Incentive-System Theory of Hybrid Governance Forms,” pp. 297-319; Richard L. Oliver and Erin Anderson, “Behavior- and Outcome-based Sales Control Systems: Evidence and Consequences of Pure-Form and Hybrid Governance,” pp. 1-15.
22 See Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy.
23 Yee-Kuang Heng and Ken McDonagh, Risk, Global Governance and Security: The Other War on Terror, pp. 51-78.
24 Michael Byers, “Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative,” pp. 526-545; Yee-Kuang Heng and Ken McDonagh, Risk, Global Governance and Security: The Other War on Terror, pp. 79-107.
25 See David Bosco, “Assessing the UN Security Council: A Concert Perspective,” pp. 545-561.
26 Wyn Rees, Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: The New Imperative, pp. 139-142.
27 Peter Romaniuk, Multilateral Counter-Terrorism: The Global Politics of Cooperation and Contestation, pp. 127-129.
28 Christian Thorun, Explaining Change in Russian Policy: The Role of Ideas in Post-Soviet Russia's Conduct towards the West, pp. 115-116.
29 Julia C. Morse and Robert O. Keohane, “Contested Multilateralism,” pp. 385-412.
30 Edward L. Miles, Arild Underdal, Steinar Andresen, Jorgen Wettestad and Jon Birger Skjaerseth, Environmental Regime Effectiveness: Confronting Theory with Evidence; Dai Xinyuan, “Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions,” pp. 154-158.
31 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,” pp. 405-437; Steven Bernstein, “Legitimacy in Intergovernmental and Non-state Global Governance,” pp. 17-51.
32 See David Held and Mathias Koenig Archibugi, Global Governance and Public Accountability; Jonathan GS Koppell, World Rule: Accountability, Legitimacy, and the Design of Global Governance, p. 31.
33 Jon Coaffee and David Murakami Wood, “Security Is Coming Home: Rethinking Scale and Constructing Resilience in the Global Urban Response to Terrorist Risk,” pp. 503-517; Andreas Duit, Victor Galaz, Katarina Eckerberg and Jonas Ebbesson, “Governance, Complexity, and Resilience,” pp. 363-368.
34 For a summary evaluation of “the logic of consequences,” “the logic of appropriateness” and “the logic of argumentation,” see Yuan Zhengqing, Li Zhiyong and Zhufu Xiaofei, “The Remolding of Chinese and International Human Rights Norms,” pp. 192-195; for “the logic of relation,” see Qin Yaqing, Relation and Process: Cultural Construction of China's International Relations Theory; and for “the logic of practice,” see Vincent Pouliot, International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy.
35 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” pp. 943-969.
36 As an important subject in international political psychology, the role of the logic of emotion in international relations has attracted increasing research interest since the beginning of this century. For an update on the current situation of emotion in the study of international relations, see Jean-Marc Coicaud, “Emotions and Passions in the Discipline of International Relations,” pp. 485-513; Yohan Ariffin, Emotions in International Politics: Beyond Mainstream International Relations, pp. 23-47. For the latest research on international relations phenomena using the logic of habitus, see Vincent Pouliot, International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy.
37 The four behavioral logic systems presented in this paper are similar to Weber's four types of human behavior. Weber divided human behavior into four ideal types: instrumental rational behavior, value rational behavior, emotional behavior and traditional behavior (see Max Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 24-25.) Although Weber's four types of human behavior still offer important insights, after nearly a hundred years of development, the disciplines of sociology and international relations have produced noteworthy results with regard to distinguishing human behavioral types and the specific operational mechanisms of different behavioral logics. We therefore need to replace Weber's classification of human behavioral types with recent research findings.
38 Yuan Zhengqing, Li Zhiyong and Zhufu Xiaofei, “The Remolding of Chinese and International Human Rights Norms,” p. 193.
39 Qin, Yaqing, “A Relational Theory of World Politics,” pp. 33-47.
40 Cao Dejun, “International Political ‘Theory of Relations’: Concepts, Approaches and Challenges,” p. 42.
41 See Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of Judgment of Tastes, p. 101.
42 Peter Romaniuk, Multilateral Counter-Terrorism: The Global Politics of Cooperation and Contestation, pp. 12-17.
43 Trevor McCrisken, “Ten Years on: Obama's War on Terrorism in Rhetoric and Practice,” pp. 781–801; Thomas W. Simon, Genocide, Torture, and Terrorism: Ranking International Crimes and Justifying Humanitarian Intervention.
44 Ronald Crelinsten, “Counterterrorism as Global Governance: A Research Inventory,” pp. 226-229.
45 Sudha Setty, “What's in a Name? How Nations Define Terrorism Ten Years after 9/11,” pp. 1-63.
46 US Council on Foreign Relations, The Global Regime for Terrorism.
47 David Cortright, George A. Lopez, Alistair Millar and Linda Gerber-Stellingwerf, “Global Cooperation against Terrorism: Evaluating the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee,” p. 25.
48 Monika Heupel, “Combining Hierarchical and Soft Modes of Governance,” pp. 16-21.
49 The United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism was established on June 15, 2017, to coordinate counter-terrorism efforts. http://www.un.org/zh/counterterrorism/index.shtml.
50 Jennifer S. Lerner, Roxana M. Gonzalez, Deborah A. Small and Baruch Fischhoff, “Effects of Fear and Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A National Field Experiment,” pp. 144-150; Leonie Huddy, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber and Gallya Lahav, “Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies,” pp. 593-608.
51 Khaled Fattah and K.M. Fierke, “A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East,” pp. 67-93.
52 Paul Saurette, “Are you Dissin Me? Humiliation and Post 9/11 Global Politics,” pp. 495-522.
53 Ruth Horry and Daniel B. Wright, “Anxiety and Terrorism: Automatic Stereotypes Affect Visual Attention and Recognition Memory for White and Middle Eastern Faces,” pp. 345-357.
54 Jeffrey Kaplan, “Islamophobia in America?: September 11 and Islamophobic Hate Crime,” pp. 1-33; Sabri Ciftci, “Islamophobia and Threat Perceptions: Explaining Anti-Muslim Sentiment in the West,” pp. 293-309.
55 Shamila Ahmed, “The Emotionalization of the ‘War on Terror’: Counterterrorism, Fear, Risk, Insecurity and Helplessness,” pp. 545-560.
56 Evelin Gerda Lindner, “Humiliation as the Source of Terrorism: A New Paradigm,” pp. 59-68.
57 Khaled Fattah and K.M. Fierke, “A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East,” p. 87.
58 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, p. 53.
59 Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J.D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, p. 178.
60 Emmanuel Sarfo and Ewuresi Agyeiwaa Krampa, “Language at War: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Speeches of Bush and Obama on Terrorism,” pp. 378-389; Andrew Pilecki et al., “Moral Exclusion and the Justification of US Counterterrorism Strategy: Bush, Obama, and the Terrorist Enemy Figure,” pp. 285-299.
61 Sergey B. Ivanov, “Fighting the Unprecedented Dilemma of Terrorism,” pp. 46-47. Member states that underestimate the threat of terrorism and respond to it inappropriately are often “trend followers” in international counter-terrorism operations. See Ethem Ilbiz and Benjamin L. Curtis, “Trendsetters, Trend Followers, and Individual Players: Obtaining Global Counterterror Actor Types from Proscribed Terror Lists.”
62 Stacey Gutkowski, “The British Secular Habitus and the War on Terror,” pp. 87-103.
63 Aylın Güney and Fulya Gökcan, “The ‘Greater Middle East’ as a ‘Modern’ Geopolitical
Imagination in American Foreign Policy,” pp. 22-38.
64 Stephen Aris, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: ‘Tackling the Three Evils’: A Regional Response to Non-Traditional Security Challenges or an Anti-Western Bloc?”, pp. 457-482; Ralf Emmers, “ASEAN and the Securitization of Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia,” pp. 419-438.
65 Jan A Ali, “A Sociological Analysis of Muslim Terrorism,” p. 146.
66 Ibid., pp. 131-150.