Can anti-natalists oppose human extinction? The harm-benefit asymmetry, person-uploading, and human enhancement

Abstract

This article outlines a novel philosophical position according to which people can (a) value the continued survival of humanity, and (b) oppose procreation on moral grounds. While these two propositions may appear contradictory, they need not be: life-extension technologies could enable members of a “final” human generation to live indefinitely long lives and, therefore, to avoid biological extinction. I call this position no-extinction anti-natalism. After exploring a range of arguments for (a) and (b), I turn to various challenges associated with attaining “functional immortality”. These include whether procreation can be morally justified until life-extension technologies become available, as well as whether personal identity issues associated with attaining functional immortality problematise the anti-natalist component of my position. I conclude that this view ought to be taken seriously by those who believe that procreation is immoral.