Poverty discrimination under the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act: A transformative substantive equality approach

Abstract

This article considers the implications of a transformative substantive equality interpretation of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (the Equality Act) for the interpretation stage of a claim of poverty-based discrimination. It draws from the work of the critical social and global justice theorist, Nancy Fraser, to briefly develop and extend existing transformative accounts of substantive equality that are faithful to the constitutional text and its legislative expression in the Equality Act. The article shows that the Equality Act could be interpreted to capture poverty discrimination that manifests along three intersecting axes, namely ‘misrepresentation’, ‘maldistribution’, and ‘misrecognition’. These axes highlight the political marginalisation, material disadvantage and pervasive prejudices, violence and stigma that characterise the disadvantages of poverty. The article then proposes three inquiries of an unfair discrimination analysis under the Equality Act that provide adjudicators with a critical legal framework to interpret the various stages in line with a transformative substantive equality approach.

Keywords:

• Poverty discrimination
• Equality Act
• transformative substantive equality

Acknowledgements

This article is based on my unpublished LLM thesis, entitled ‘Poverty as a ground of unfair discrimination in post-apartheid South Africa’ (Stellenbosch University, 2022). My thanks go to professors Liebenberg and Botha for their meticulous supervision and guidance, as well as Dr Mahomedy for her insightful comments on previous drafts. I also express my gratitude to two anonymous reviewers for their suggestions. The remaining errors that are found herein are mine alone.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 For the seminal text of the transformative vision of the Constitution, see K Klare ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 146.

2 S Sibanda ‘When do you call time on a compromise? South Africa’s discourse on transformation and the future of transformative constitutionalism’ (2020) 24 Law, Democracy & Development 384.

3 PT Mellet The Lie of 1652: A Decolonised History of Land (2020); T Madlingozi ‘Social justice in a time of neo-apartheid constitutionalism’ (2017) 28 Stellenbosch Law Review 123.

4 R Moletsane & V Reddy ‘The National Development Plan as a response to poverty and inequality in South Africa’ in C Soudien, V Reddy & I Woolard (eds) The State of the Nation (2019) 235, 235–237.

5 S Fredman ‘The potential and limits of an equal rights paradigm in addressing poverty’ (2011) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 566, 574–576.

6 Section 34(1).

7 Section 34(1)(a)–(b). In addition, there are no changes made to ‘socio-economic status’ as a directive principle in the recent Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 Amendment Bill of 2021, GN 143 in GG 4402 of 26-03-2021.

8 Section 34(2)(a)–(c) read with s 16 of the Equality Act.

9 Section 1(1)(xxviii) for the full definition, and the discussion below.

10 See G Basson ‘Poverty as a ground of unfair discrimination in post-apartheid South Africa’ LLM thesis Stellenbosch University (2022) for judicial competency and legitimacy issues and the limits of litigation (146–165), a transformative reading of the subsidiarity principle (68–69, 71–74) and for remedial principles and appropriate remedies as they apply to poverty discrimination (155–165).

11 N Fraser & A Honneth Redistribution or Recognition? (2003).

12 C Albertyn & B Goldblatt ‘Equality’ in S Woolman & M Chaskalson (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (2002) 35-4-5.

13 N Fraser ‘Social exclusion, global poverty, and scales of (in)justice: Rethinking law and poverty in a globalizing world’ (2011) 22 Stellenbosch Law Review 452.

14 Preamble of the Equality Act; AR Coddou & MC Manus ‘A Fraserian theory of anti-discrimination law’ (2020) 20 International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 89, 89–91.

15 Social Justice Coalition v Minister of Police 2019 4 SA 82 (WCC) (SJC).

16 Mahlangu v Minister of Labour 2021 (2) SA 54 (CC) (Mahlangu).

17 SJC (note 15 above) para 2.

18 Mahlangu (note 16 above) para 74.

19 Sections 2, 3 and 4.

20 As confirmed in Qwelane v South African Human Rights Commission 2021 (6) SA 579 (CC) (Qwelane) paras 48–49.

21 Ibid paras 48–66.

22 Harksen v Lane 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) (Harksen) para 53.

23 Ibid para 53.

24 Ibid para 53. Courts will not easily consider a limitation inquiry as the discrimination will be unjustifiable for the same reasons that it will be unfair: National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) (NCGLE II) para 56. The result is that impact and justification factors are often merged, which may result in giving a too restrictive scope to complainant’s rights.

25 Section 13 of the Act.

26 Sections 14(2) and (3).

27 Section 14(2)(b) read with s 14(2)(3).

28 Albertyn & Goldblatt (note 12 above) 35–80. For the implications of onus of proof for the discrimination inquiry, see s 13(1)(a)-(b), and for the unfairness inquiry see s 13(b)(i) of the Act.

29 For some discrimination cases that depart from substantive equality as a subset of transformative constitutionalism, see Mahlangu (note 16 above) paras 77–79; King v De Jager 2021 (4) SA 1 (CC) (King) paras 47, 77, 165.

30 C Albertyn ‘Contested substantive equality in the South African Constitution: Beyond social inclusion towards systemic justice’ (2018) 34 South African Journal on Human Rights 441.

31 Ibid 451.

32 Ibid.

33 S Moyn Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World (2018) 295–359, where he criticises the sufficiency-based human rights discourse visible in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (Grootboom).

34 N Fraser ‘What should socialism mean in the twenty-first century?’ (2020) 56 Socialist Register 295. For critical reflections within a discrimination paradigm where the constitutional values of freedom and equality must be read together to navigate the tensions between ‘equality of the graveyard’ and ‘vineyard’ (NCGLE II (note 24 above) para 77), see Basson (note 10 above) 38–42.

35 Fraser (note 13 above) 455.

36 Basson (note 10 above) 23–28 for a discussion on the meaning of transformation as ‘non-reformist reform’ within Fraser’s critical social theory, and the limits and possibilities of poverty as a ground of discrimination to constitute a transformative praxis under prevailing capitalist conditions in South Africa.

37 Fraser & Honneth (note 11 above) 23.

38 Ibid 74–78. For a further exposition of how transformative substantive equality would guide the power asymmetries in participation within the litigation and remedial processes, see Basson (note 10 above) 29–30, 33, 156–166.

39 C Albertyn & B Goldblatt ‘Facing the challenge of transformation: Difficulties in the development of an indigenous jurisprudence of equality’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 257–260.

40 M Pieterse ‘What do we mean when we talk about transformative constitutionalism?’ (2005) 20 SA Public Law 155–166.

41 United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights (2012) UN Doc A/HRC/C/21/39.

42 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 41.

43 There is a recent upsurge in political assassinations of impoverished activist: N Xolo ‘Abahlali activist is killed at home in eKhenana’ (6 May 2022) New Frame.

44 For a recent judicial holding that poor people’s political influence is eroded by their material deprivation, see in Right to Know Campaign v City Manager of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality 2022 (5) SA 570 (GJ).

45 N Fraser ‘Legitimation crisis? On the political contradictions of financialized capitalism’ (2015) 2 Critical Historical Studies 176; MR Myambo ‘Capitalism disguised as democracy’ (2011) 63 Comparative Literature 64.

46 Preamble, guiding principles and the judicial facilitation of participation of affected communities.

47 Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) para 235.

48 Klare (note 1 above) 154.

49 H Botha ‘Equality, plurality and structural power’ (2009) 25 South African Journal on Human Rights 1, 10–16; H Botha ‘Representing the poor: Law, poverty and democracy’ (2011) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 521.

50 Section 1.

51 MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) (Pillay) para 56.

52 Section 2(c) of the Act.

53 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 490 (CC) (Van Heerden) para 22.

54 S Fredman ‘Substantive equality revisited’ (2016) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 712, 731–732.

55 The Equality Act’s preamble.

56 JM Modiri ‘Law’s poverty’ (2015) 18 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 224, 242.

57 For an exposition of the difficulties in conceiving impoverished people as a group, and how a transformative conception of substantive equality should respond, see Basson (note 10 above) 56–59.

58 For how a transformative conception of substantive equality could come to terms with the reality of having to understand group disadvantage but at the same time be aware of differences in lived inequalities, see Basson (ibid) 56–59.

59 B Goldblatt ‘Intersectionality in international anti-discrimination law: Addressing poverty in its complexity’ (2015) 1 Australian Journal of Human Rights 47.

60 S Atrey ‘The intersectional case of poverty in discrimination law’ (2018) 18 Human Rights Law Review 411.

61 Fraser (note 34 above) 298.

62 N Fraser ‘Contradictions of capital and care’ (2016) 100 New Left Review 99, 116.

63 N Fraser ‘Expropriation and exploitation in racialised capitalism’ (2016) 3 Critical Historical Studies 163, 165.

64 Modiri (note 56 above) 224; S Terreblanche A History of Inequality in South Africa (2002) 297–353; C Bundy ‘Post-apartheid inequality and the long shadow of history’ in C Soudien, V Reddy & I Woolard (eds) The State of the Nation (2019) 79, 79–92.

65 The Act also centres the ground of disability in s 9, which is a critical intersection of poverty discrimination but beyond the scope of this article.

66 Sections 7 and 8.

67 Grootboom (note 33 above) para 36.

68 AM Fischer Poverty as Ideology (2018) 74–90; The UNHRC Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights: The Parlous State of Poverty Eradication UN Doc A/HRC/44/40 para 169 criticising survivalist poverty lines.

69 A Chakrabarti, S Cullenberg & KD Anup ‘Rethinking poverty: Class and ethical dimensions of poverty eradication’ (2008) 20 Rethinking Marxism 673, 679.

70 N Fraser ‘Talking about needs: Interpretive contests as political conflicts in welfare-state societies’ (1989) 99 Ethics 291.

71 J Wolff ‘Beyond poverty’ in V Beck (ed) Dimensions of Poverty (2020) 1, 2, 30.

72 Chakrabarti et al (note 69 above) 679.

73 Ibid 304–306.

74 Ibid 306. The Constitution guarantees the right of everyone to ‘have access to’ various socio-economic rights in ss 28(1)(c), 26 and 27. It provides a significant opening for poverty as a ground of unfair discrimination to contest the systemic barriers to ‘have access to’ fundamental rights.

75 S Liebenberg & B Goldblatt ‘The interrelationship between equality and socio-economic rights under South Africa’s transformative Constitution’ (2007) 23 South African Journal on Human Rights 335.

76 Fraser (note 13 above) 455–457.

77 G Budlender ‘20 years of democracy: The state of human rights in South Africa’ (2014) 25 Stellenbosch Law Review 439, 441.

78 Section 14(1) of the Equality Act; South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 (6) SA 123 (CC) (Barnard) paras 29, 33, 35.

79 J Whiteman ‘Tackling socio-economic disadvantage: Making rights work’ (2014) 12 Equal Rights Review 95.

80 Section 153(a) of the Constitution that places the constitutional duty on local governments to give priority to the ‘basic needs of the community’.

81 Section 13(2) of the Equality Act.

82 K Möller ‘Proportionality: Challenging the critics’ (2012) 10 International Journal of Constitutional Law 709, 710–712.

83 S v Manamela 2000 (3) SA 1 (CC) para 32.

84 Section 5(1) read with s 6 of the Equality Act.

85 King (note 29 above) para 204.

86 Ibid paras 113, 169, 184; S Mpofu-Walsh The New Apartheid: Apartheid did not Die, It was Privatised (2021) 92.

87 For an elaboration of the different duties, the porous boundaries between the public and private sphere due to neoliberal governance models and the democratic implications of positive duties, see Basson (note 10 above) 75–84.

88 Section 7(2). The Equality Act does not cluster these duties but is reflected numerous times in the text.

89 S Fredman Human Rights Transformed (2008) 145–149.

90 Ibid 156–167.

91 See the Court’s recognition of this overlap in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (NCGLE I) paras 61–62.

92 Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (Khosa) para 44 is one example.

93 Section 9(2) constituting the restitutionary equality right that has an ‘indivisible’ relationship with the entire equality right as acknowledged in Van Heerden (note 53 above) paras 28, 136.

94 Sections 2(c), 3(1)(a), 4(1)(d), 21(2)(h) and Chapter 5 of the Act. Although Chapter 5 is not yet into force, it should be instructive in the interpretation of the Equality Act that the remedying of unfair discrimination would require positive and redistributive measures.

95 For a critical analysis of why poverty has similar aspects but are distinct from, for example, ‘social origin’, ‘social condition’ and other similar grounds, see Basson (note 10 above) 35–38, 84–86.

96 Section 1(1)(xxvii).

97 A Kok ‘The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act: Why the controversy?’ (2001) 2 Journal of South African Law 294, 294–295.

98 S Liebenberg & M O'Sullivan ‘South Africa’s new equality legislation: A tool for advancing women’s socio-economic equality?’ (2001) Acta Juridica 70, 93.

99 Larbi-Odam v MEC for Education 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC) para 19.

100 Section 1(1)(xxiii) (a) and (b)(i)(iii) of Equality Act. Although the SJC judgment (note 15 above) effectively cemented poverty as a ground of discrimination under the Equality Act, it remains a High Court decision with an unclear binding effect on other provincial jurisdictions.

101 SJC (note 15 above) para 63.

102 Ibid para 64.

103 Ibid para 65.

104 S Kilcommins, E McClean, M McDonagh, S Mullally & D Whelan ‘Comparative perspectives on the prohibited grounds of discrimination’ (2004) Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Dublin, Ireland, research paper 86–87.

105 For some recent examples, see Tshabalala v S 2020 (5) SA 1 para 92; Mahlangu (note 16 above) para 85; Sithole v Sithole 2021 (6) BCLR 597 para 31.

106 NCGLE II (note 24 above) para 40.

107 SJC (note 15 above) paras 2, 48, 78.

108 Ibid paras 88–89.

109 WLC Amicus Curiae Submission <https://sjc.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/WLC_as_Amicus_Heads.pdf> paras 78–81.

110 SJC (note 15 above) para 92.

111 Mahlangu (note 16 above) paras 17–18.

112 Ibid para 188.

113 Ibid para 189.

114 Ibid para 193. Insertion in original text.

115 Section 1(1)(xxiii)(a)(viii) of the Act.

116 City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC) (Walker) paras 31–41.

117 Ibid para 43.

118 Ibid para 31.

119 SJC (note 15 above) paras 23, 44–47.

120 SJC Applicants’ Heads of Argument <https://sjc.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/SJC_Heads.pdf>.

121 SJC (note 15 above) para 51.

122 Ibid para 45.

123 Ibid para 45.

124 Mahlangu (note 16 above) paras 75, 191.

125 C Albertyn, B Goldblatt & C Roederer (eds) Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 41–48.

126 SJC (note 15 above) para 67.

127 Albertyn et al (note 125 above) 34–35.

128 Ibid 35.

129 S Jagwanth ‘What is the difference? Group categorization in Pretoria City Council v Walker’ (1999) 15 South African Journal on Human Rights 200, 204.

130 This is a real danger, as South African courts have made downward comparisons creating the impression that impoverished claimants’ rights are not violated as there are other poorer people who are worse off: Basson (note 10 above) 57–59, 101–106, 117–118.

131 Pillay (note 51 above) paras 44, 164; Albertyn et al (note 30 above) 35.

132 Albertyn & Goldblatt (note 12 above) 35–45.

133 Pillay (note 51 above) paras 44, 164. The SJC and Mahlangu judgments reveal throughout the unfair discrimination analyses that comparators could help understand structural disadvantage: Basson (note 10 above) 104–106.

134 President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) (Hugo) para 41.

135 Albertyn & Goldblatt (note 12 above) 35-44-33-45; ss 3(3) and 14(2)(a) of the Act. Basson (note 10 above) 115–119 for critical analyses of context in discrimination jurisprudence.

136 Albertyn & Goldblatt (note 39 above) 257–259.

137 Pillay (note 51 above) paras 39–79, 168.

138 Section 14(3)(c) of the Equality Act.

139 Ibid s 14(3)(e).

140 Section 14(3)(c).

141 Hugo (note 134 above) para 112.

142 M Heikkilä & M Mustaniemi-Laaksa ‘Vulnerability as a human rights variable’ (2020) 20 African Human Rights Law Journal 777.

143 Section 14(3)(a).

144 NCGLE II (note 24 above) para 44.

145 SJC Applicants’ Heads of Argument (note 120 above) para 266.

146 Ibid para 275.

147 Mahlangu (note 16 above) para 42.

148 Ibid para 110.

149 Ibid para 112.

150 Khosa (note 92 above) paras 71, 125.

151 Section 14(3)(d).

152 SJC Applicants’ Heads of Argument (note 120 above) para 265.

153 Ibid para 267.

154 SJC (note 15 above) para 88.

155 Mahlangu (note 16 above) para 65.

156 Ibid para 84.

157 Mahlangu (note 16 above) para 195.

158 Ibid para 195.

159 Khosa (note 92 above) para 74; Mahlangu (note 16 above) para 95.

160 SJC Applicants’ Heads of Argument (note 120 above) paras 269–275.

161 Mahlangu (note 16 above) para 57.

162 Albertyn et al (note 125 above) 42.

163 Pillay (note 51 above) para 69.

164 S Woolman & H Botha ‘Limitations’ in S Woolman & M Chaskalson (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (2002) 34–94–104.

165 Ibid 34–100.

166 Ibid 34–101.

167 Section 14(3)(f) of the Equality Act.

168 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (Makwanyane) para 131.

169 NCGLE I (note 91 above) para 38.

170 Albertyn et al (note 125 above) 44–45.

171 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) para 34.

172 SJC Applicants’ Heads of Argument (note 120 above) para 284.

173 Ibid para 286.

174 Ibid para 287.

175 Ibid.

176 Ibid.

177 Mahlangu (note 16 above) para 127.

178 Ibid paras 127–129.

179 See further below on the implications of reasonable accommodation.

180 Section 14(g) of the Equality Act.

181 SJC Applicants’ Heads of Argument (note 120 above) para 292.

182 Ibid para 292.

183 SJC (note 15 above) para 88.

184 Section 14(2)(c).

185 Liebenberg & O’Sullivan (note 98 above) 99.

186 Section 14(3)(h) of the Equality Act.

187 For a first holding that other cases follow, see Makwanyane (note 169 above) para 107. However, see Brink v Kitshoff 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) para 49, where the Court held that the purpose of the discrimination could be achieved by a provision that does not discriminate.

188 SJC (note 15 above) paras 86–87.

189 Ibid paras 47–49.

190 Section 14(3)(i) of the Equality Act.

191 Pillay (note 51 above).

192 Ibid para 75.

193 Ibid para 73.

194 Ibid para 74.

195 Ibid para 76.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Gideon Basson

Gideon Basson, lecturer, Department of Public Law, HF Oppenheimer Chair in Human Rights Law, Law Faculty, Stellenbosch University