Counter-terrorism in Kenya

Abstract

The terrorist attacks of 7 August 1998 raised serious questions about transnational and domestic terrorism in Kenya and the Horn of Africa. What motivated terrorists to target Kenya? Why Kenya? Could these attacks have been stopped? How did Kenya and the international community respond to the attacks? Not only did the attacks target Western (US and Israel) interests but also Kenyan interests. Later Kenya was designated an ‘anchor state’ and ‘frontline’ in the ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWOT) President George Bush declared in response to the 11 September 2001 attacks in New York. This article critically examines the counter-terrorism (CT) measures that have been taken in Kenya in response to the attacks and threats made on the country. It describes the measures, attempts to explain the rationale and motivations behind them and to assess their effectiveness. It is argued that while these measures are aimed at addressing the perceived main causes of terrorism in Kenya, the assumptions upon which they are based are often flawed, do not have domestic support and are externally imposed, primarily by US, and hence are often criticised as a tool of US imperialism. Further, the price of these measures has been high in terms of the negation of the civil and human rights and freedoms.

Keywords:

• terrorism
• counter-terrorism
• human rights
• violence
• Islamic fundamentalism

Acknowledgements

Appreciation is expressed to Tessa Mkutu and Roger Southall for editing the work, the two anonymous reviewers for valuable comments.

Notes

1. The bilateral arrangements through which the US provide CT training to the military include the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF), the Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) and Africa Regional Peacekeeping Program (ARP).

2. These are the Combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and the East Africa Counter-terrorism Initiative (EACTI).

3. For example it extradited two suspects connected to the US Embassy bombing to the United States. See US Department of State 2001.

4. Kenya deported several Arab nationals working for Islamic charities and Somali refugees for allegedly having ties to terrorism (see Daily Nation 2004; SAPA/IPS 2001; News24.Com SA 2004).

5. Such laws include the Penal Code, the Banking Law, the Anti-Money-Laundering and Proceeds of Crime law, the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances control Act No. 4 of 1994, the Protection of Aircraft and the Official Secrets Act Cap (487). These laws criminalise murder, conspiracy to kill, use of explosives, money laundering, funding from criminal activities, assisting a person or an organisation to commit a felony, hijacking, harbouring criminals or refusing to prevent or report a crime which is about to be committed.

6. Parliament passed the bill in December 2009. President Kibaki assented to it in the same month.

7. These were the International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO), Mercy Relief International, the Al-Haramain Foundation, Help African People and the Al Ibrahim Foundation.

8. Susan Rice, Statement before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Africa 15 November 2001.

9. In reality this was not a coalition of the willing. The US employed economic and political conditionality as well as offers of or threat to withdrawal military support to buy support or prevent opposition to the global war on terror.

10. There is a general consensus that Kenya, despite its professed policy of non-alignment, has always been and continues to be firmly within the Western bloc politically, ideologically and economically (Makinda 1983; Volman 2003) and is one of the closest allies of Israel in the region (Naim 2005; Nadelman 1981; Oded 2000).