Making borders and identities in South Sudan

Abstract

In newly independent South Sudan, the state's not yet fully demarcated territory plays an intriguing and in certain aspects contradictory role in shaping and defining personal and group identities. While neighbouring states’ armies and their proxies interfere with South Sudan's international sovereignty, Juba is itself active beyond its borders by supporting Sudanese rebels. Nonetheless, the ruling elite hold onto the model of the unified and centralised territorial nation-state with clearly demarcated borders. Alas, the state's failure to territorialise its authority creates hybridity with regard to territorial control, which impacts negatively on the state's domestic legitimacy but also weakens attempts to propagate a national identity that transcends ethnic ties. Instead, the current civil war and calls for a decentralised federal structure are evidence of the continued salience of subnational loyalties while those non-state actors, like localised militias, that fill the areas void of government presence are generally themselves sources of insecurity.

Keywords:

• South Sudan
• territorialisation
• nationbuilding
• hybrid governance
• decentralisation

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this article was presented in the panel ‘Territory and Community’ at the European Conference on African Studies (ECAS) in June 2013 in Lisbon. I am grateful for comments and criticism that were raised during the discussion as well as to those pointed out by the anonymous reviewers.

Note on contributor

Ole Frahm recently completed his Ph.D. at Humboldt University Berlin, in which he developed a novel typology of statebuilding and nationbuilding in Sub-Saharan Africa and focused especially on the case of newly independent South Sudan. His research interest include nationalism, fragile statehood and transition processes and he currently pursues a comparative research project on post-conflict justice and reconciliation and its effects on long-term nationbuilding. In addition, Ole regularly works as a consultant on crisis countries for governmental and non-governmental institutions.

Notes

1. Nicki Kindersley provides yet another angle on the result: she describes how during the referendum different districts competed to achieve 100% vote shares for independence. The official count of 98% in favour of secession has since become an integral part of national lore, ‘a founding myth of national loyalty and unity for the new state’ (Kindersley 2012, 41).

2. It is important to note that South Sudan is not only home to a large number of ethnic groups (an estimated 67) but also lacks a numerically dominant ethnic group, which could become the kernel of a unitary national identity. Only less than a quarter of the population is Dinka, the largest ethnic group, and many ethnic groups, for example the Shilluk, are concentrated in specific parts of the territory.

3. In January 2013, then-Vice-president Riek Machar appealed to the British government to release colonial-era maps for the benefit of border demarcation. Similar steps were taken in May 2013 regarding the Kenya-South Sudan border.

4. For frequently updated information on anti-government militias operating in South Sudan, the Small Arms Survey's website is an excellent resource available at: http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/.

5. There are currently efforts underway to change land legislation and grant more rights and control over land to the government but there is a lot of public resistance to these proposals (Interview with the head of the South Sudan Land Commission, Juba, 18 October 2013).

6. According to the Transitional Constitution, which has been the guiding document for the country since independence in July 2011, South Sudan is officially a republic that ‘shall have a decentralised system of government’, though governance has in reality been conducted in a strongly centralised manner.

7. JEM is also alleged to have helped South Sudanese government troops against Riek Machar's rebels during the first half of 2014. After the town of Bentiu was overrun by rebel troops in April 2014, the rebels ‘retaliated’ by massacring all Darfuri residents they could get hold of.