ABSTRACT
The protracted conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has drawn sharp criticism regarding the model of liberal peacebuilding employed in the country. Critics emphasise the importance of local ownership of peacebuilding mechanisms at sub-national as well as national levels. This raises questions in relation to the popular legitimacy and efficacy of local mechanisms. Drawing on field research conducted in the relatively affluent province of Bas-Congo in Western Congo, this article highlights a lack of popular legitimacy for provincial-level political authority within the province stemming from an acute marginalisation of the population from local structures of power and wealth. The article also demonstrates the inefficacy of more local, village and neighbourhood-based political structures which, aimed at conflict mitigation rather than transformation, ignore the structural roots of local conflicts and do little to counteract the growing social distrust, conflict and disintegration within local communities.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by grants from Dublin City University, the Royal Irish Academy and Trócaire. The author would also like to thank Léa Valentini, Carol Ballantine, Christine Mansiantima, Guylain Lukalansoni, Dieudonné Nzita and Julie Bavuma for logistical assistance for her fieldwork in Bas-Congo.
Notes on the contributor
Niamh Gaynor is a lecturer in the School of Law and Government in Dublin City University, Ireland where she specialises in politics and development in sub-Saharan Africa. She is the author of Transforming participation?: The politics of development in Malawi and Ireland (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) and has published in a wide range of journals, including the Review of African Political Economy; Journal of Southern African Studies; Development Policy Review; Globalizations; Politics and Society; Development in Practice; and the Community Development Journal.
Notes
1 Interviewees were randomly selected on transect walks across the sites as the third adult man/woman encountered.
2 Unlike elsewhere, the existing territorial boundaries of the province have been retained within the (contested) new territorial reconfiguration.
3 See http://biofreshblog.com/2011/11/23/dr-congo-and-south-africa-sign-pact-to-implement-40000-mw-grand-inga-dam/; see also Showers (Citation2009).
4 This phenomenon consists of traces of land in the tens of thousands of hectares being appropriated from local residents, fenced off and protected by armed security. Although provincial authorities report that the land is being used for crops and livestock production, residents are sceptical. The frequency of helicopter and airplane traffic onto these sites together with the frequency of President Kabila's visits to the province are leading to growing unease and tension locally as residents fear similar consequences to the land and resource disputes in Eastern DRC.
5 Sun City, in South Africa, is where peace negotiations were brokered in 2002.
6 Interview officials within the National Assembly, 18 January 2013.
7 See http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/10/31/ffrttyyyjjjkkllmmmm/ for more background on this.
8 COREF – Comité d'Orientation de la Reforme des Finances Publiques.
9 Although this may also be influenced by the willingness of other sources (state and external funders) to contribute also. However, a fuller analysis of the data (conducted by the author but not included here due to space constraints) reveals that the Province has committed to full (100%) funding of some programmes yet no (0%) funding of others which have attracted no funds from elsewhere either, thereby indicating that some priorities are identified independent of other funders at provincial level.
10 While the national Vice Minister of the Interior (in charge of Decentralisation) claimed that these would take place in 2013 (2013 interview), more sceptical commentators (2013 interviews) have been proven correct and local (sub-provincial) elections are still pending.
11 As noted previously, there is little international donor intervention in Bas-Congo. Consequently, local NGO presence is similarly somewhat scarce. NGOs which do operate in the province follow the broader trend outlined by Bilak (Citation2009) of service provision rather than more political interventions aimed at addressing the broader structural causes of poverty and marginalisation (2013, interview with César Ngimbi, CRONG – Coordination Regionale des ONGs de Développement).
12 Société Nationale d'Electricité/National Electricity company.
13 If issues are brought to local authorities, a public resolution procedure ensues whereby all parties to the dispute/issue have a right to present their side within a public forum.
14 See, in particular, the 2013 special issue of Review of African Political Economy – 40(135).
15 ‘Calumny’ is the deliberate maligning of somebody's character by spreading damaging stories/lies/rumours about them. It is reported to be particularly prevalent among women.
16 See ‘Arrestation de vingt membres de « Bundu dia Mayala »’, 15 February 2013, http://www.acpcongo.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6459:arrestation-de-vingt-membres-de-l-bundu-dia-mayala-r&catid=35:nation&Itemid=56; see also ‘RDC : Ne Muanda Nsemi se rapproche de Tshisekedi'. Accessed 16 December 2010. http://afrikarabia2.blogs.courrierinternational.com/archive/2010/12/16/rdc-ne-muanda-nsemi-se-rapproche-de-tshisekedi.html.