This land is my land: the Ethio-Sudan boundary and the need to rectify arbitrary colonial boundaries

ABSTRACT

Ethiopia and Sudan share a common boundary of over 1600 km which was drawn through a series of treaties between Ethiopia and the colonial powers of Britain and Italy. To date, this boundary has not been clearly demarcated. In 2007, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, the current ruling government, entered into a secret agreement with the Sudan to make adjustments on the border. This paper identifies the major factors that have frustrated efforts to address the Ethio-Sudan boundary problem and also proposes solutions on how Ethiopia and Sudan could resolve their differences. The analysis reveals that political, social and cultural factors; the decision to adopt the western concept of the boundary; and the failure to recognise the historic and cultural constructs have contributed to the frustration of negotiations on the border. The paper proposes that Ethiopia and Sudan embrace the African Union Border Program, which encourages mutual cooperation, regional integration and the building of communities with strong economic and cultural ties.

KEYWORDS:

• Ethio-Sudan boundary
• border demarcation
• African Union Border Program
• cultural construct of border
• colonial boundaries in Africa

Acknowledgements

I want to thank Professor Assefa Mehretu of Michigan State University for reviewing a draft of this paper and providing helpful comments and Professor Misun Hur of East Carolina University for drafting the maps. I also want to thank the many individuals who provided me with information on local farmers and their perceptions of the border, and on the technical and political challenges of addressing border problems. Space does not permit me to list their names here. My special thanks to Mr Agenehu Mekonnen for sharing with me sectionalised copies of the signed 1902 Treaty.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Note on contributor

Mulatu Wubneh is a professor of planning at East Carolina University, Greenville, NC. He is the author of A Spatial Analysis of Urban-Industrial Development in Ethiopia (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University, 1983) and Ethiopia: Transition and Development in the Horn of Africa (Co-author) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988). His articles have appeared in a number of journals including Cities, Northeast African Studies, Regional Development Dialogue, African Development Review, Journal of Developing Areas and Urban and Regional Development Studies. Wubneh has also served as Program Officer at the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF/World Bank) and as Chair of the Planning Program at East Carolina University for many years.

Notes

1. Although the two countries have largely maintained these divergent positions, there were times when they flip-flopped from their stand depending on the political climate of the time. In the case of Ethiopia, depending on the political climate the government has taken a stand which can be characterized as at best ambiguous, and at worst, contradictory. For instance, in 1964, Foreign Minister Ketema Yifru declared that Ethiopia would not recognize the demarcation made by Major Gwynn (see Ethiopian Herald, 9 July 1964 and note 8). In 1967, Ethiopia and Sudan agreed to accept the 1902 and 1907 treaties, but not Gwynn's demarcation, and let the status quo continue on occupied farms in each other's territories (see Brownlie 1979, 882–883). In 1972, the Ethiopian government took a position which was a complete volte-face from the 1964 or 1967 positions. In an Exchange of Notes, the Ethiopian government indicated that Ethiopia would accept the 1902 and 1907 treaties and the demarcation by Major Gwynn provided certain rectifications: including maintaining the status quo that allows farmers and settlers on both sides to continue farming until a final resolution is reached, and redrawing the boundary line on the crest rather than at the base of the mountains with 3 km arc into the Ethiopian territory. Under the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), Prime Ministers Meles and HaileMariam publicly declared that Ethiopia is negotiating with the Sudan and plans are underway to put boundary posts on the ground. See Sudan Tribune, (14 June 2007, 3 December 2013).

2. The question of how much land has been ceded to Sudan is not clear. The government maintains that it has not given any piece of Ethiopian land to the Sudan except returning farms that belonged to Sudanese farmers which were occupied by Ethiopian farmers in 1996 (Sudan Tribune, 22 June 2015). Despite the government's denial that no land had been ceded to the Sudan, many of the local farmers are sceptical of the government's explanation due to the secrecy under which the negotiation was conducted. Also, since many of the ‘old’ farmers are now dislocated from the area and instead the government has settled on it its ex-fighters and other supports of the government, it is difficult to clearly isolate how much land has actually been lost to the Sudan. Regardless of the controversy, several news sources have reported that thousands of acres of land have been returned to the Sudan. For instance, in July 2007, the Sudan Tribune reported that a joint Sudanese Ethiopian committee agreed to handover agricultural land to 17 Sudanese villages located on the border (4 July 2007). Similarly, on 5 June 2008, citing a former regional officer in Gambela area, Alisha Ryu of the Voice of America (VOA) reported that as many as 2000 people have been displaced in Gambela area as a result of clashes between residents and Sudanese soldiers (AbbayMedia.com, accessed 4 April 2014). In January 2014, in an interview by Andnet Radio (a Washington, DC, Amharic radio station), a youth group member from Welqayit who participated in a workshop on the border for youth groups organized by the local government, reported that as much as 65,000 hectares of land had been ceded to the Sudan (Andenet Radio Interview, 21 January 2014).

3. On 3 December 2013, the Sudan Tribune reported that the Ethio-Sudan Border Joint Committee had reached an agreement to end the dispute over the ownership of agricultural land on the border, particularly in the Al-Fashaqa area.

4. For an illustrative discussion on the consequences of the arbitrarily drawn colonial boundaries on Ethiopia's border with Somalia, see Woldemariam (1964) and with Eritrea, Boundary Commission (2002).

5. For more on this concept, see Asiwaju (1984, 2013) and Anale (2013).

6. For an historical assessment of the Ethio-British negotiations, see Marcus (1963), Abir (1967), Ullendorf (1967) and Zewde (1976). I have also benefited from a draft Amharic report prepared by a special committee under the Chairmanship of Professor Mesfin Woldemariam (see Woldemariam et al. 1981).

7. For more on this, see the opinions rendered by a legal sub-committee established by the Ethiopian government in 1966 (Ministry of Interior Archive No. 2002/1657, cited in Woldemariam 1981, 18–19).

8. A good example of the early position of the Ethiopian government regarding the unilateral demarcation by Major Gwynn is the following statement by Ato Ketema Yifru, Ethiopia's Foreign Minister. In 1964 in the Ethiopian Herald (9 July) Ketma Yifru said: ‘The 1902 Treaty delimited the frontier between the two countries (Sudan and Ethiopia) … The Sudan Government had sought the recognition of the ‘Major Gwynn line’. Major Gwynn was a British civil servant who placed large heaps of stones arbitrarily in demarcating the Ethiopian – Sudanese territory. …  Major Gwynn represented only one side, since he had not been delegated with any authority by the Ethiopian Government to demarcate the boundary on its behalf’.

9. The rectification was made because Martinelli, the Italian Commissioner in Eritrea, complained that trade routes between Ethiopia and Eritrea would be disrupted if the boundary commenced at the junction of Khor Um Hajer and the Setit River. This rectification is also known as the “Talbot-Martinelli demarcation line”. For more on this issue, see Brownlie (1979, 868–869) and Boundary Commission (2002, 59–67).

10. In his report to the Sudan's Civil Secretary on deflections of the Treaty line, Gwynn notes:

I have received no definite instructions as to the limit of deflections which might be made from the Treaty line, though it was obvious in certain places deflections would be necessary as it would be impossible to demarcate some of the long stretches of straight lines forming the boundary, notably between Setit and Gallabat. I therefore assumed that I was entrusted with a pretty free hand to make the best boundary I could devise in the interests of both parties … . (See Cromer to Landsdowne, Enclosure No. 5, 6 July 1903, cited in Ali Taha 1983, 83)

11. When Menelik complained to Harrington, ‘if the British Government is trying to take my land I will defend it’, Harrington is believed to have said: ‘we are not like the Italians; if we wanted to take your land, we would have pushed for the unity of the Nile’ – a statement meant to demonstrate the military might of Britain. See Harrington's letter to Rodd, 18 September 1889, FO 403/204 (cited in Woldemariam 1981).

12. Menelik had promised Rodd that he would maintain a position of neutrality in his relationship with the Mahadi vis-à-vis the British; but when the British captured Khartoum they found letters of friendship written after Rodd's visit from Menelik and his dignitaries, Ras Mengesha, Negus Teklehaymanot and Bitwoded Mengesha Atikem (Woldemariam 1981).

13. There are several reports from local administrators and government experts that refer to cross-boundary movements of people cited in the document prepared under the chairmanship of Professor Mesfin Woldemariam. See Ministry of Interior Archive No. 2002/1657, Woldemariam (1981).

14. Among the well-known shambels (captains) of the area were Fitawrari Sereba Lema of Humera; Demas Kefale and Abelneh Nadew of Quara; Alemu Layew, Biru Layew and Melesse Bogale of Armachiho; and Ayalneh Mengesha of Adagn Ager. In return, the militia was exempted from paying agricultural taxes and from military service obligations during a national call to defend the home land as in the case of the Adwa war. They were also given rifles by the central government for protection. I want to thank Mr Adane Atanaw who grew up in the area and is knowledgeable about the region for the information on the organization of the militia and the names of the shambels from the different areas.

15. Some of the farmers farming close to the Gwang River with mechanized farming of 5-10 gasha. (1 gasha = approx. 40 hectares) were:

In Delelo area – Atanaw Wasie, Zege Eshete, Eshete Ferede, Eshete Wolde, Tiruneh Layew, Getu Kefale, and Dr. Melaku Tegene, to name a few. In Metema area – Atanaw Wasie, Getahun Asegu, Gete Alemu, Adane Jemberu, Col. Asnake Engida, Col. Imiru Wonde, Banti Reda, Alemu Tessema, Ferede and Tiruneh Zerihun, Association of Retired Army Veterans, Woiz. Abekyelesh Yimer, to name a few. There were about 200 farmers in Metema area alone. (Personal communication with a family member of one of the farmers, October 13, 2014)

16. The areas identified are strictly from the Ethiopian farmers’ side.

17. Based on the Nigeria–Cameroun border demarcation experience, Asiwaju (2013, 136–140) has summarized the salient elements of the AUBP, which also can be a good lesson to draw from for other African countries.