Pondering the culture of violence in Lesotho: a case for demilitarisation

ABSTRACT

Lesotho's politics is characterised by a pervasive culture of violence that has historically wreaked havoc on society. At the heart of Lesotho's culture of violence lies the historical trend of militarisation of politics and politicization of the military. The political elites often enlist support of the security establishment with a view to tilt the balance of forces in their favour against their opponents. The security establishment, on its part, enters the political fray in pursuit of the individual interests of those in command and/or its corporate interest. This militarisation explains, in part, recurrent political instability and crisis in Lesotho that has invited external intervention by the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Lesotho needs to change course away towards a culture of peace through demilitarisation through either security sector reform of security sector transformation. The former entails civilian control over the army. The latter may entail disbanding the army.

KEYWORDS:

• Conflict
• demilitarisation
• democratisition
• development
• Lesotho
• violence

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributor

Khabele Matlosa is the Visiting Associate Professor in African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, University of Johannesburg. Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the African Union and/or the African Union Commission.

Notes

1 One of the global barometers of the intensity and magnitude of violence across the world is the Global Peace Index (GPI), which is produced by the Sydney-based Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP 2014). GPI measures the level of peacefulness in countries and territories worldwide along three (3) main thematic domains namely (a) the level of societal safety and security; (b) the extent of ongoing domestic and international conflict; and (c) the degree of militarization. According to the 2019 GPI covering a total of 163 independent states and territories globally, the most peaceful country in the world is Iceland occupying number one spot on the global rankings. The most violent, unstable and dangerous country is Afghanistan occupying the lowest rung at number 163.

2 The UNDP (2019) Human Development Index measures socio-economic development of 189 countries and territories worldwide, along three main domains namely (a) life expectancy, (b) education and (c) per capita income.

3 This is how the then LDF Commander used to sign off on correspondence emanating from his office ‘The RT. HON.LT.GEN.K T KAMOLI MPA(UB), PAPS(NUL), Insp,psc, MMD, MMMS, SADCM, JP COMMANDER LESOTHO DEFENCE FORCE'.

4 During his heyday, Idi Amin’s title was ‘His Excellency President for Life Field Marshall Al Hadji Doctor Idi Amin Dada, VC, DSO, MC, Lord of All the Beasts of the Earth and Fishes of the Sea and Conqueror of the British Empire in Africa in General and Uganda in particular' (see Orizio 2004). 

5 During his reign, Bokassa’s title was relatively modest compared to that of Amin above: ‘His Majesty Bokassa the Frist, Apostle of Peace and Servant of Jesus Christ, Emperor and Marshal of Central Africa' (Orizio 2004). By emulating Idi Amin and Jean-Bedele Bokassa, Kamoli’s autocratic proclivity was one of the signs of Lesotho’s slippery slope towards militarized authoritarianism reminiscent of the 1960s-80s in some parts of the African continent in general and Lesotho itself in particular. During his reign, Bokassa’s title was relatively modest compared to that of Amin above: ‘His Majesty Bokassa the Frist, Apostle of Peace and Servant of Jesus Christ, Emperor and Marshal of Central Africa' (Orizio 2004). By emulating Idi Amin and Jean-Bedele Bokassa, Kamoli’s autocratic proclivity was one of the signs of Lesotho’s slippery slope towards militarized authoritarianism reminiscent of the 1960s-80s in some parts of the African continent in general and Lesotho itself in particular.

6 The four (4) senior officers who were abducted by junior officers were Brigadier Motlalentoa Kopo, Deputy Commander of the LDF and Secretary of the Defence Commission; Lt-Col. Robert Lehloma, Senior Staff Officer, Intelligence; Lt-Col Thabo Khemi, Senior Staff Officer, Logistics and Colonel Koae Maeko, Senior Staff Officer, Operations. The junior officers who were implicated in the abduction of the senior army officers were Corporal ‘Mebe Mphutlane, Lance Corporal Sebetoane Taole, Private Cletus Mabaleka, Private Hlomohang Mabetha and Private Phakiso Sono (see Khoarai 1995).

7 The four government ministers who were held hostage by LDF soldiers were Pakalitha Bethuel Mosisili, then Minister of Education; Monyane Moleleki, then Minister of Natural Resources; Kelebone Albert Maope, then Minister of Justice; and Shakhane Robong Mokhehle, then Minister of Trade and Industry.

8 The junior LDF members who engineered the mutiny of 11 September 1998 were Corporal Seoka, Corporal Molungoa, Corporal Kaloko, Lance-Corporal Makebe, Lance-Corporal Ts’ukulu, Private Sako, Corporal Ts’epe, Private Matela, Private Motena, Private Morema, Private Masitha, Private Motlomelo, Private Mosebi, Private Phatela, Private Nketekete, Private Thulo, Private Ranchobe, Private Lefosa and Private Tumane (see Leon, Browde, and Shear 2001).

9 In January 2014, Captain Tefo Hashatsi publicly announced to the Special Forces that Lt. General Kamoli, Commander of the LDF cannot be removed from his post by anybody. He is alleged to have vowed that such a thing could happen only over his dead body. Hashatsi never denied making this statement. He also repeated his stance when testifying before the Phumaphi Commission of Inquiry in 2015. Mahao reprimanded Hashatsi over these unsavoury utterances. In a move both to protect Hashatsi and begin his declaration of war against Mahao, Kamoli instituted a court martial against Mahao, which was ultimately quashed by Prime Minister Thabane, with stiff resistance from the LDF command. When the court martial failed to achieve his objective, Kamoli then hatched up another plot; an alleged mutiny by a group of soldiers in which he implicated Mahao. Although the SADC Commission has concluded that it did not find evidence of such a mutiny, the same mutiny was used by the Kamoli faction of the LDF to abduct and arrest some soldiers and ultimately assassinate Mahao. The SADC Commission of Inquiry strongly implicated Tefo Hashatsi and Bulane Sechele in the assassination of Mahao. 

10 Key suspects in the assassination of Lt-General Maaparankoe Mahao include the former Minister of Defence, Tseliso Mokhosi, Deputy Leader of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) who is currently a fugitive of justice in South Africa. He fled the country in December 2018 after he was summoned by the police for questioning regarding his alleged involvement in Mahao’s assassination. The other suspects who are all in detention, awaiting trail are Lt-General Tlali Kennedy Kamoli, former Commander of the LDF, Captain Litekanyo Nyakane, Captain Haleo Makara, Sergeant Lekhooa Moepi, Sergeant Motsamai Fako, Corporal Marasi ‘Moleli, Corporal Mots’oane Machai, Corporal Mohlalefi Seitlheko and Corporal Ts’itso Ramoholi (see The Post, Vol.4, Issue No. 52, 13–19 December 2018). Two more suspects namely Tefo Hashatsi and Bulana Sechele were murdered immediately after they assassinated Lt-General Koantle Motsomotso, then Commander of LDF on 5 September 2017. 

11 Lt-General Koantle Motsomotso, the Commander of the LDF, was assassinated by two high-ranking army officers namely Tefo Hashatsi and Bulane Sechele in his office on 5 September 2017-two years after the Lt-General Maaaparankoe Mahao was assassinated in an army operation involving the same officers as part of the rogue elements who were determined to destabilize the country following the 2017 elections. Motsomotso’s crime which angered the rogue elements within LDF was his efforts to bring back order, discipline and respect for command and authority in an effort to allow for democratic control of the civilian authority over the LDF. His assassination prompted the deployment of the 269-strong SADC Standby Force known as the SADC Prevention Mission in Lesotho (SAMPIL) during the period 2 December 2017–28 November 2018.

12 At the present moment, the Lesotho National Assembly has five portfolio committees namely: (a) Portfolio Committee on the Social Cluster; (b) Portfolio Committee on Law and Public Safety Cluster; (c) Portfolio Committee on Natural Resources, Tourism and Land Cluster; and (d) Portfolio Committee on the Prime Minister’s Ministries and Departments. This last portfolio committee is responsible for a wide-ranging issues including Defence and National Security. This should not be the case. Defence, Peace and Security has to be a stand-alone Portfolio Committee of the National Assembly.

13 Countries with no official military forces include Andorra, Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvula and Vatican State. Countries with no standing army but limited military forces include Costa Rica, Iceland, Mauritius, Monaco, Panama and Vanuatu (Harris and Letsie 2019, 39).