Education and politics: student activism for elite recruitment in Kenya

ABSTRACT

African states have undergone dynamic political processes ever since their struggle for independence. Students have played an important role in political developments and triggered processes of democratisation. In the course of recent waves of protests and political activism, however, students took a more ambivalent stance against both the state and the political elite. This report is based in parts on field research. It discusses the relation between student activism and the political elite in Kenya. During the overall change in the meaning and function of higher education, universities and student activism have played an important role in political development. This report analyses the education system on the basis of (qualitative) research on education and student activism in Kenya. The paper focuses on the education system as an important factor in the recruitment of political elites.

KEYWORDS:

• Middle class
• political elite
• student protests
• education
• Kenya

Introduction

Over the last decades, Africa has experienced dynamic political processes in the context of both the anti-colonial struggles for independence and newly independent African nation states. These united a number of different stakeholders. In the 1960s, students as well as other formally educated Africans played a significant role as agents of political change. Since the mid-1980s, numerous states in the Global South have been facing the so-called third wave of democratisation (Huntington 1991a, b, c). This process has included students, other urban minority groups, and the social middle class as actors (Tetzlaff 1992, 1f.). These have alternately been described as the ‘emergent elite’, ‘intelligentsia’, ‘western educated elite’, and sometimes as ‘African bourgeoisie’. More recently, however, students in several African countries have rather been considered as an integral part of the ‘rising middle classes’ (Maupeu 2012; Melber 2013, 2016; Neubert and Stoll 2015).

These various terms and categories implicate normative messages and focus on particular characteristics of the stakeholders and certain aspects of political processes. They assume a special perspective on these groups as well as their social position and social or political contribution or impact. While some researchers use the term ‘elite’ to describe positions of power and leadership in contexts of social and political development, others prefer the term ‘(middle) class’ to highlight certain aspects of social stratification and inequality. In some cases, they may even refer to the same individuals and describe them as the elite or middle class. Lentz (2016, 19) underlines the terminological implications: ‘Elite and (middle) class are terminological tools that open particular windows on the society that we study; while they help us ask some questions, they conceal other issues.’

The question of how these terms relate not only to each other but also to political protest in Kenya is at the centre of this article. What role does tertiary education play in terms of social status and political activism? In what way does activism elicit a certain dynamic among students and encourages them to act as political players that are able to affect political elites?

I focus on the example of Kenya and give an overview on the country’s educational and political processes, the students’ position and function, and the meaning of education and student activism for political ‘elites’ and ‘(middle) class’.

The Kenyan case study is part of my comparative PhD research on student activism, student movements, and organisations in Mali and Kenya, and their political influence and impact between 1960 and 2018 (Deutschmann 2014, 2020). The project included the collection of data in Kenya in 2013, comprising observations, qualitative interviews, group discussions with (former) student activists from different Kenyan universities, particularly the University of Nairobi (UoN), and interviews with experts from the educational sector.¹

Higher education in Kenya

Formal education in Kenya was established by missionaries in 1850, and took the form of mainly locally organised initiatives (Bergenthum 2004, 52). Until the country’s political independence in December 1963, the education system was modelled on the British system. At Independence, there were 150 secondary schools and 28,764 students in Kenya (Eshiwani 1990, 2). In 1986, the state decided that every child should receive elementary education and thus introduced a new education system, the so-called 8-4-4 model, in which eight-year elementary education is followed by four years of secondary and four years of tertiary education (Eshiwani 1990, 15). The new system, introduced by Minister of Education Ng’eno, extended primary education, increased the need to recruit more teachers and required more classrooms to cover another school year. President Moi became personally involved and organised academics to develop new textbooks. The World Bank helped with the financing and in 1989, adult literacy rates had increased from 20% at the time of independence to 64% (Hornsby 2012, 124f.). The World Bank encouraged government in 1988 to implement plans for the so-called ‘cost sharing for education’. As a result, students from poor families left school (Hornsby 2012, 446ff.). Since 2000, elementary school has been free of charge and access to secondary schools facilitated. On average, the population had obtained 6.5 years of schooling and was in second position in Africa following Ghana, but the transition from secondary to university education, which was 6.5% in 2010, remained relatively low (World Bank 2016, 11).

Tertiary education served the purpose of educating small groups of elites and was strongly interwoven with politics:

The vision for imperial control involved the creation of a small, malleable class of educated East Africans who would act as the agents and allies of the British in the post-independence era. The plan included the creation of an exclusive regional university for East Africa, the University of East Africa, which would produce elite class. (Kithinji 2016, 21f)

The oldest and, for a long time, also the only university in Kenya, the UoN, was founded in 1950 as part of the University of London. After the country’s independence, it was part of the University of East Africa until it finally became the first Kenyan university. From the very beginning, the university was of political importance. The direct influence of the state in decisions concerning the university was already evident in its founding, which was itself politically motivated. At the administrative level, there was extensive state influence and control, documented among others in the role of the vice-chancellor, who plays an important and symbolic role in the Anglophone system (Teferra and Altbach 2004, 29). Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, held this position at the UoN (Oketch 2004, 120) and directly shaped university policies:

Kenyatta’s creation of an ethnocratic university leadership at the first national university had important implications for the development of a Kikuyu political and economic patronage. Politically it meant steering the university in specific political directions that supported the state’s political agenda. (Munene 2013, 50)

Only the third president of Kenya, Mwai Kibaki (in office between 2002 and 2013), gave up the position as chancellor at all state universities in 2003.²

The number of students as well as the working conditions of scholars were determined by the state, which also influenced also the research agenda; until 1997, ministers could ban publications in the interest of public order and safety (Bergenthum 2004, 131–133). According to Hornsby (2012, 448), ethnicity also played an important role, such as in the admission of certain groups of students or in the appointment of university staff. The preferential treatment of specific ethnic groups reflected their political influence (Melchiorre 2020).

Access to elite positions via university education was more or less guaranteed as long as there were only small numbers of graduates. In the 1960s, students benefitted from financial support and political activism was scarce (Amutabi 2002, 162). In return, students were committed to work in the public sector for at least three years after graduation. In the 1970s, the education system still served as the ‘major recruitment channel to elite status’: ‘In the competition for the best positions, University College, Nairobi, graduates have an edge over their compatriots returning from abroad, particularly those coming from American or other non-British universities,’ wrote McKown (1975, 223).

In the 1980s, additional public universities were established and various colleges re-evaluated: in 1984, Moi University was founded in the Rift Valley, the home of President Daniel Arap Moi. It was followed by Kenyatta University (KU) in 1985 and Eagerton University in 1987. The number of students multiplied in this period (Bergenthum 2004, 107–109). At the time of independence, there were 571 students, with numbers growing steadily ever since. In 1990, there were already 45,572 students registered (Amutabi 2003, 138). Their number at the UoN increased from 6,506 in 1986 to approximately 60,000 in 2016 (Luescher 2016, 32). The establishment of private universities contributed further to a rapid increase.³ Since 1972, Kenya has experienced massive growth in the higher education sector. The conditions for the development of private education in Kenya evolved in the late 1970s and 1980s, and intensified in the 1990s. Kenya's higher education sector counts a total of 70 institutions, including 33 public and 37 private institutions. This makes it one of the largest higher education systems in Africa (Munyae, Mulinge, and Wawire 2017, 13ff.).

According to the Kenyan National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), there were 97,107 students enrolled in state and 21,132 students in private universities in the academic year of 2007/2008, while in the academic year of 2012/2013 there were 201,690 students enrolled in state and 37,676 students in private universities.⁴ Following the Universities Act No. 42 (of 2012), public universities increased in number from 7 to 22, while private universities increased to 30, resulting in a 35% increase in student enrolment in 2013 (Mwaura 2015).

Tertiary education changed drastically with the introduction of tuition fees in 1991, which were related to World Bank and IMF policies. Falling state subsidies finally caused universities to introduce the so called dual-track tuition policy in 1998. This allowed self-financed students to be admitted in Module II programmes. Due to this opportunity of self-financed studies, significantly more students were admitted to the university. This created two options for access to higher education: a very limited number of students with performance-related access to the Module I programmes, who contributed about 20% of the costs, and self-paying Module II students. The UoN was the first university in Kenya to introduce these parallel programmes, and by 2002/2003 almost half of all undergraduate students had enrolled in Module II programmes (von Alvensleben, Bretz, and Blumbach 2017, 17).

With this significant increase in the number of students, the mechanisms of elite formation and the importance of tertiary education changed. Based on an elite education that was accessible to only a few, a relatively secure ascent to the elite was guaranteed. However, the expansion of the education system paved the way for wider access to education. Consequently, education could no longer guarantee secure social and professional advancement. The rate of unemployment among young people increased and became high: even compared to neighbouring countries, such as Uganda and Tanzania, where in 2017, 26.2% of the young population between 15 and 24 years was unemployed.⁵ In Kenya, unemployment is as high as 30% among those aged between 25 and 30 holding tertiary education (Zepeda et al. 2013, 266). This situation is – together with the outlined political developments – a partial framework for the understanding of student activism in Kenya. It partly explains, together with the political development of the country, the situation and aspiration of student activism as well as the developments and (political) meaning of student unions.

Political development and the role of student activism

Student activism (or ‘comrades’ power’) has undergone transformations in the history of Kenya (Macharia 2015, 26f). While university students of the 1960s were not involved in politics because they were supplied with the basic necessities during their studies and had guaranteed positions in the ranks of the emerging national establishment upon graduation, all this changed after 1970. Students began to engage systematically in political action, including protests and violent confrontations. The elitist structure of higher education was an important factor in the politicisation of students in Kenya (or more precisely, the lack thereof), because this structure tended to diminish the salience of political activity for the individual student. By assuring their occupational aspirations within a milieu of mental and physical exclusiveness, the educational system imparts a strong predisposition to accept the political world as it is (McKown 1975, 225). This attitude of students changed in the context of political and educational changes and students became politically involved. The political apex of student activism was reached in the mid-1970s and lasted until the mid-1990s, by which point student action was more likely to be accompanied by demands for democratic reforms.

During the 1970s and 1980s, student political activism was as much concerned with the deteriorating conditions in the universities as with more broadly based social and economic issues like growing social differentiation in the country and abuse of human rights. These concerns no doubt contributed to the political climate, leading to the attempted military coup d'état by members of the Air Force in 1982. Students from the UoN openly supported the coup, and some had been involved in its organisation (Nkinyangi 1991, 376). The coup failed, repression continued to increase (Mair 1998, 239–246), the university was closed for more than a year and students were arrested (Nkinyangi 1991, 170). In the wake of the failed coup, the regime became even more restrictive.

In the mid-1980s, aid payments for African states became increasingly politicised. In the course of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), the allocation of funds or loans in connection with political conditions gained in importance (Hofmeier 1990). The manipulated elections of 1988 caused unrest in Kenya. In this context, an unauthorised pro-democracy rally took place in Nairobi on 7 July 1990. The event ended in a dispute with the police and is commonly known as the ‘Saba Saba riots’ (Nasong’o 2007, 38). In the context of these historical events, student activism underwent transformations in terms of its structure and prospects. Several student organisations were founded and dissolved. According to its website, the Students Organisation of Nairobi University (SONU), experienced significant changes throughout its history – including being banned several times by both the Kenyatta and Moi governments. During the struggle for multiparty democracy in Kenya, the union supported the leaders of the political opposition and played a significant role in transforming Kenya into a multiparty state. It was, after previous disbandment, disbanded once more in 1992, and many student leaders were suspended or expelled.

The absence of SONU left a hole in Kenya’s student movement in the 1990s (Melchiorre 2020). But Kenyan university students were also politically engaged during this time and remained active in national politics, fighting for constitutional reforms or protesting against the introduction of neoliberal austerity reforms to higher education (Melchiorre 2020, 787). From 1992 onwards, Kenya’s political structures were gradually liberalised. Among the contributing factors strengthening democratic forces were the emerging criticism by the church, the Law Society of Kenya, dissidents of the state party, and civil society agents as well as students.

Although the influence of opponents increased, the authoritarian Moi regime remained in power for quite some time. When the democratisation process was reinforced by both national and international pressure in the late 1990s, however, liberalisation finally took off and political parties resurfaced (Hornsby 2012). External stakeholders, such as international donors, offered support and encouraged the preparations for free elections. The fragmentation of the opposition enabled Moi to be elected for yet another term. In 1997, his party prevailed by a narrow majority (Neubert 1999, 260). Moi’s decision to permit multiparty elections was explained, on the one hand, by his hope to nevertheless remain in power and, on the other hand, by the need to secure the continued flow of international financial aid (Branch and Cheeseman 2008).

Student leaders urged the government to lift the ban that had dissolved SONU. When reinstated in 1998, it was registered under the name SONU 98; elections were held and officials sworn in.⁶ SONU did not just open the campus to party politics and commercial forces but, in so doing, contributed to an increase in intra-student violence. This development went hand in hand with a wider trend in Kenyan politics of the 1990s (Melchiorre 2020, 792). Since then, the organisation has implemented a structure of student representation and annual elections. Compared to the 1980s and 1990s, the political participation and representation of students has increased (Klopp and Orina 2002); student leaders have become involved in the decision-making process at the university and formally serve as the link between the student body and university administration, a step that has resulted in a more peaceful climate (Macharia 2015, 29).⁷ The history of student activism at the UoN is largely undocumented in the late-1990s. What is clear, nonetheless, is that Nairobi’s student movement and university student leadership began to show signs of collaboration with, and co-optation by, external political forces, both within the ruling party as well as the opposition (Melchiorre 2020, 782). University students institutionalised representative structures, such as student organisations at different campuses.

Students and political elitism

In the 2000s, student representatives used their position as starting points for political careers (Deutschmann 2020). Both today’s student leaders and their organisations are important for mobilising strikes and protests in order to emphasise their material, social, and political demands. SONU 98 may be understood as ‘a complex, or formal organization, that identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement its goals’ (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 153). The organisation developed and changed its aims and methods in the context of its political environment, adjusting to the changing structure of political opportunities (Eisinger 1973). Student activism needs to be understood in terms of its historical and political structures. It is essential to examine the relationship between national and student politics as well as the developments of higher education in Kenya: the mere fact that many former student leaders later acquired positions in national politics explains their commitment to student politics and student activism. Student politics may be understood as the starting point for a future career in politics. A former student leader in Nairobi described student politics as a reflection of national politics and underlines the interrelation of the levels through their common actors:

Student politics and campaigning is a reflection in a big way and influences in a big way what happens on the national level in terms of managing resources, making decisions, policies or campaigning and financing the campaign […] I suspect over 40% or 50% of parliamentarians are former student leaders […]. (former student leader; interview in Nairobi 2013)

This is also a reason for the professionalisation of student politics. As a former student leader in Nairobi explained:

[…] it’s good you can have opportunities to meet very influential people in the country you know, when, for example, there comes a workshop where they want student leaders to come in a government workshop or student training on leadership trainings you know you have, you can have connections, you can get links there that can help you in your career or maybe to get a job or so. (Student leader, UoN, interview in Nairobi 2013)

At all Kenyan universities, student leaders benefit from their engagement in student politics. Correspondingly, a student leader from KU described his motivation for holding office in the student organisation at his university:

I spent around 70,000 for my campaigns and to me what the benefit is not financial. I really benefitted a lot from being in this office and it’s purely not financial. I benefitted from the connections you know […] Socialising, you know, social network […] Other student leaders, other leaders, national leaders in the corporate world or even in the political world and then with that comes your freedom to attend big seminars in the country where you interact with equally big lions and this changes you […] that’s the biggest benefit you get from such an office. (student leader, KU; interview in Nairobi 2013)

The students engaged in student organisations secured various benefits by serving as student leaders. In their position, they are able to meet influential stakeholders, such as higher representatives of the university administration, other organisations, and companies. They organise student events in collaboration with different agencies and organisations, and are able to take part in leadership training courses and other workshops. Their position as student leaders can help them to establish relations with various players and build a network to facilitate the shift from university to a professional career. Regarding especially a future political career, participating in student politics is deemed essential. Because of their position, student leaders are able to mobilise students and thus receive public attention, too. For the same reasons, national politicians follow student activism and are aware of student leaders’ important potential (and usefulness) for mobilisation, as articulated by the following interviewee:

The University of Nairobi, politicians have vested interest because if they want […] especially members of parliament, if they want to, you know, to make a point, so they use the students who come and barricade the roads and, you know, demonstrate […] Most often, it’s in the interest of a few politicians. So that is why they normally want a person they can influence to be in office. The KU is really far from the city centre […] but we have decided most of the time it’s an individual choice. I can’t lie to you. So many politicians have approached me, they want to sell their agenda […] but me, I say no […]. (Interview with a student leader from KU 2013)

Student organisations represent student interests, but they also can help to mobilise the student body, and work as a framework for the qualification and recruitment (of parts) of the future elite. This partly explains the processes of institutionalisation and professionalisation of students’ political activism, and points to the connection between student and national politics. Oanda (2016, 77) also emphasises that student campaigns are often supported by national political parties. He explains that student campaigns are frequently funded by national political parties with specific interests and that political leaders support students with genuine intentions, helping them to start political careers; others have motives such as obtaining personal favours from the students. A student leader in 2013 described it thus:

Politicians want to have a foot in the university. […] Student leaders are useful for mobilisation […] mostly it takes tribal lines, you know, it is very hard to access leaders from other communities, if you are not from their community. (Student leader, interview in Nairobi 2013)

This, again, explains the motivation of national politicians to support certain candidates for student leadership. It also shows that these relations often follow ethnicity. This points to something important: the fact that elite recruitment works by way of pre-existing networks and patron-client relationships, which may be structured according to ethnic, gender⁸ or intersectional principles, means that these categories must be considered as potentially covert principles of elite recruitment. Student organisations seem to fulfil at least two functions: firstly and historically, they started out as part of larger social movements. Student leaders were engaged and supported political oppositions or protested against governmental mismanagement and corruption. Secondly and due to political developments, student organisations then became institutionalised parts of the university structure. Based on the structure and the interaction between political leaders and student leaders, student organisations were involved in the recruitment of parts of Kenya’s political elite.

Munene (2013) describes ethnicity as the centrepiece of politics in Kenya. The analysis of student activism illustrates the connection that exists between political development, social status, the education system and student activism. In some cases, protests were the result of change in the social status of students (brought about by changes in the education system, resulting, for example, from the education expansion). As the interviews illustrated, one factor of particular importance for student leaders is their ethnic background because it is a structural principle that channels the support of national politicians. This, in turn, strongly influences their prospects for a future career since national politics are an important career option for (former) student leaders. After the country’s political independence, ‘ethnicity became the centrepiece of political competition in place of political parties with defined policies and programmes’, it ‘replaced social class as the platform by which to negotiate access to state resources and power’; and ‘political ethnicity, the politization and mobilization of ethnic consciousness, replaced parliamentary democracy, as the anchor for attaining national political and economic objectives’ (Munene 2013, 48). This, again, demonstrates the close resemblance between student and national politics. It also points to the relation between actors from both spheres and highlights the correspondence between the political structures. The politicisation of ethnic structures is a very important factor in Kenya. It is central to the recruitment of political leaders and the mobilisation of constituents, indicating that class structure might not be as relevant as the ethnic or regional origin of the actors.

Conclusion

The postcolonial structure of education initially guaranteed the few graduates a career. With the expansion of the education system, it became more difficult for graduates to find adequate employment. Still, social status is produced and reproduced by higher education. This explains the importance of education for the social status (middle class, elites) and forms the backdrop of student activism in Kenya. Moreover, student activism was also political and played a role in democratisation processes. Students can develop significant dynamics and act as political agents from the middle class that challenge political elites. At the same time, the education system plays a role in terms of mobilisation and the recruitment of the political elite. While student unrests and riots continue to characterise higher education in Kenya, students continue to complain about unsatisfactory student affairs and unfulfilled welfare needs (Muthoni, Njagi, and Wambugu 2018, 107).

Students became politically active in the context of political developments especially within Kenya’s unsteady democratisation process: the increasing importance of formal education and educational attainment during the colonial era changed Kenya’s social structures. Within the framework of independence, and especially in the process of developing postcolonial nation states, the link between the political system, the recruitment and legitimation of elites, and the public opinion about the role of elites in the country’s development went through several changes.

This report sheds light on students as specific stakeholders: on the one hand, they are often amongst the most prominent critics of their political regimes, engage in protests, and can be easily mobilised. On the other hand, they are very well aware of the fact that they constitute the potential political elite of the future. This holds particularly true for students who are actively involved in student politics or rather in student organisations. Observing consecutive generations of student activists since Kenya’s independence makes clear that the historical dimension and development of higher education are, indeed, relevant aspects, when it comes to the understanding of the relationship between tertiary education, student mobilisation, and state/political elites.

Initially, the ‘African middle class’ was celebrated as an agent of modernity and development, similar to the African elites of the immediate postcolonial period (Lentz 2016, 19; Southall 2018, 5). The concepts of ‘elite’ and ‘middle class’ are analytical categories used to study social stratification that stems from potentially competing theories (Lentz 2016). Lentz suggests keeping questions of management roles (‘elites’) and social origins (‘class’) conceptually separate but to study elites in combination with class analysis (Lentz 2016, 40). The education system is important for the analysis of both, elites and the middle class, in Kenya. For the analysis of the role that university education holds in Kenya, it is important to consider its historical and political developments with regard to the educational sector but also the (political) opportunity structure for student activism.

While tertiary education served small groups of elites in the colonial state and after Kenya’s independence, it was strongly interwoven with politic processes, especially the unsteady democratisation of the country. Access to elite positions was linked to university education and was basically guaranteed as long as there were only a small number of graduates. In fact, tertiary education functioned as the main channel for the recruitment of political (educated) elites. In the 1960s, students benefitted from financial support, which is why political activism was rare. Subsequently, with the politics of the SAPs in the 1980s, and again in the democratisation process in the 1990s, student activism became politically motivated. Due to education policies and educational expansion, the education system became more important to the rising middle class, giving education particular significance relating to social status. The role that the education system played in elite recruitment is not only relevant in terms of meritocratic aspects, but also in line with political developments.

The Kenyan case shows that student activism needs to be considered in the context of political developments. The democratisation process was actively driven by students. Originating in the sporadic political influence of student activism, student organisations became institutionalised structures of representation that served as political mobilisation and steppingstones to political careers for student leaders. In analysing social and political structures and interactions along the axis of the education system, it seems most productive to use the term ‘middle class’ to describe the social origin and status of these players, and the term ‘elite’ to focus on the political dimension of student activism and leadership. Studies confirm the importance that tertiary education holds for the production and reproduction of social status and social structure, and show how student politics create opportunities for a few student leaders to prepare for and connect with members of the political elite. The social status as member of the middle class and the ambition to move up to the political elite demonstrates that the education system as a structure and its political meaning in Kenya are closely linked to these stakeholders and their ambitions, framed (and modified) by (political) opportunity structures and the state (elites).

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the two anonymous reviewers as well as the guest editors of this Special Issue of the Journal of Contemporary African Studies for their constructive comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Anna Deutschmann

Anna Deutschmann is a social scientist with a PhD in Sociology. Her research interests include social movements, political transformations and sociology of education. She lectures at the University of Vienna at the Department of International Development and the Department of Education.

Notes

1 This research project would not have been successful without the help and collaboration of many colleagues – and especially students and (former) activists in Kenya. I am grateful for their assistance.

2 Wambua, Maria Kanini (12 December 2013): key dates in Kenya’s history; Daily Nation, online: https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Key-dates-in-Kenya-history/1056-2108572-uhnef0/index.html [24 January 2018].

3 KNBS: https://www.knbs.or.ke/download/university-enrolment/ [26 July 2018].

4 KNBS: https://www.knbs.or.ke/download/university-enrolment/ [26 July 2018].

5 World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=KE [28 July 2018].

6 SONU website online: http://sonu.uonbi.ac.ke/?page_id=50 [19 April 2018].

7 Other authors underline destructive activism and arson, for example, as form of protests (Cooper 2014).

8 Only recently the first woman was elected to head the student organisation of UoN: Mboga, J. (7 April 2019). UoN elects first woman to head students association. Standard Digital: https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001319932/uon-elects-first-woman-to-head-students-association [14 July 2019].