![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
Gautrain, South Africa's first high-speed metropolitan transport network, is being developed at a cost of nearly R25 billion. It is being primarily justified on the basis of its close association with South Africa's hosting of the 2010 World Cup. However, the sheer scale of the costs involved, set against the larger and more pressing national transport shortages, invariably prompts questions about the rationale behind the construction of the Gautrain. Focusing on rational, cost–benefit considerations, and special interest groups on the one hand, and political symbolism on the other, the article concludes that political symbolism appears to be a major explanation for the construction of the Gautrain. As in many other aspiring developing economies, this mega-project serves to underscore the extent to which it projects South Africa as the pre-eminent modern African state.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Dr Vaughan Mostert, Department of Transport and Supply Chain Management, University of Johannesburg, for answering my many questions and for his valuable comments on an earlier draft.
Notes
1. Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs) focus high level support in areas where socio-economic conditions dictate the need for concentrated government assistance and fast track investment finance. Blue IQ is a multibillion rand investment agency of the Gauteng provincial government to invest in economic infrastructure in major projects in the areas of tourism, technology, transport and high value-added manufacturing (SAInfo, Citation2007). For a good overview of the strategic thrusts behind Gauteng's SDIs, see Donaldson (Citation2006, p. 346).
2. Initially a station was also planned at Arcadia, but subsequently discarded due to technical problems.
3. Altshuler and Luberoff (Citation2003, p. 217) cite two additional studies, noting that ‘even if policymakers could find the resources to halve transit fares, double service, and reduce times by half, transit ridership would not even double’. A study in the late 1970s revealed that ‘[D]oubling transit ridership, moreover, would offset only about one year's growth in urban motor vehicle usage’.
4. Only 48 per cent of Tshwane–Johannesburg commuters indicated they are likely to use the train, while 55 per cent of car drivers did not believe the Gautrain would reduce traffic congestion (Synovate, Citation2006b).
5. Whereas the world gauge standard was 1435 mm, the South African gauge measures 1067 mm, making it incompatible with the requirements for a high-speed train (TPC, Citation2005, 9 November 2005).
6. The most notable opposition to the Gautrain was in the form of a court challenge brought by residents to stop either the entire project or an alignment along Muckleneuk—an upmarket neighbourhood in Pretoria East or the section between Eeufees Road and Hatfield station, pending finalisation of their appeal. These residents were not so much against the Gautrain as much as to its routing, preferring another route or tunnel rather than it cutting through their neighbourhood (Mail &Guardian, 30 August 2006).
7. Not that such expectations are being doused. The official 2010 website, www.sa2010.gov.za, for example, assures visitors that the entire Gautrain line will be fully operational for the event.
8. Bombela, the private sector consortium which triumphed over the rival consortium Gauliwe in July 2005, consists of some of South Africa's largest financial and construction corporations. These include Bombardier Transporation, Bouygeus Travaux Publics, Murray & Roberts, RATP International, the SPG Group, Loliwe Rail Contractors/Rail Express, Standard Bank, Rand Merchant Bank and ABSA Bank.
9. I gratefully acknowledge the role of Vaughan Mostert for bringing this article to my attention.