Democracy in South Africa: Examining the Heritability of a Debate

Abstract

Many appraisals of the quality of or how consolidated South Africa's democracy is, are dominated by a focus on political party dominance that allegedly renders the political space unfit for its critical function. Disputing South Africa's right to democratic credentials is fast becoming a consensual theoretical position. We ought to consider regularly whether partial or universal claims about the state of democracy, are entirely valid. While arguments bolstering these orthodox critiques have helped to bring into focus troubling aspects of the political order in the past, in the long term over-reliance on some presuppositions familiar to scholars and practitioners in the field of comparative politics weakens the chance of different critical perspectives on the quality of democracy receiving deserved attention.

Thoughts on the need to reconsider the appropriateness of some directions of enquiry constituting assessments of the functionality of contemporary South Africa's democracy are offered. A hypothesis that a thorough rendition of relevant political activity is not nearly as easily conceptualized as has previously been widely assumed is introduced. Political space has been inaccurately conceptualized; and there is a need for a more rigorous appraisal of the quality of democracy in the light of these insights.

Notes

For example see accounts with different foci, as diverse as: Webster (1998); Giliomee et al. (2001); Southall (2005); Gumede (2005a); Matshiqi (Business Day, 19 October 2006); and February (Cape Times, 12 April 2007).

Nineteen political parties or organisations met to commit themselves to an undivided South Africa based on political pluralism, constitutionalism, and separation of powers.

Bearing in mind the vast lineage to which this tradition of measuring democratic progress lays claim and that controversies within it constitute a field in itself, for a nonetheless useful synopsis of that theoretical tradition and some of the ways in which is has so far been applied to the South African situation see Mottiar (2002).

See Desai (2002, p. 147): ‘it seems increasingly unlikely that open confrontation with the repressive power of the post-apartheid state can be avoided.’

Incensing hopefuls among analysts again, the SACP leader added his voice to influential leaders before him in 2007, saying it would not be ideal for the alliance to break up. With his Alliance faction in the ascendant in the corridors of power that is understandable in retrospect!

Incidentally, a succinct discussion by Habib and Taylor (2001) quickly leads one to an understanding that one of the main reasons for the existence of these new social movements in the guise they began to present themselves was the changing legal (and commercial) framework within which previously reform-minded, anti-apartheld and emerging nongovernmental organizations had to learn to operate.

Not surprisingly they are simultaneously a red flag to some—not least ideologues of the ruling party and administration. But this is not the reason the heritage these straw men arguments arguably constitute ought to be interrogated, as is being suggested here. That reason lies instead in the clarity that investigation would bring to ongoing study of South Africa's democracy, if democracy is indeed even the concern.

With little doubt it was the bright idea of some ANC strategist that new state president Jacob Zuma quickly announce a ‘direct hot line’ to the presidency to temper the possible re-emergence of that perception from commentators, one feels.

Schriener (1994) alludes to this in an account of the type of corporatism that might come to exist in South Africa, and Le Pere's (Business Day, 6 March 2006) summation of the ups and downs of the relations between interested public and the Department of Trade and Industry since 1994 highlights an instance.

It has proven easy (consensual) to lampoon Mbeki's commitment to democracy given his dissident stance on HIV/AIDS and the then seemingly intractable political crisis in Zimbabwe, so critics slot such comments into the pigeonhole titled ‘Mbeki lacks respect for democracy’ very quickly. Mbeki biographer Gevisser (2007, p. 643) writes of that: ‘Mbeki believes … that the opprobrium heaped upon him after 1994 was because he did not play [the role of moderator and conciliator] as expected’. Gevisser notes further that the English-speaking liberal business establishment (and the media) were particularly affronted.

My italics.

The modern concept of civil society came to life (broadly) on the back of considerations of the ‘possibilities of a democratically organised political opposition’—then a determinedly aggressive civil society—in socialist countries, while in the West it ‘was rather used to found a new conception of radicalized democracy’ (Honneth, 1993, p. 19).

Of course some actors do this better than others.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

David Shepherd

Department of Political Studies, CC David Shepherd, PO WITS, 2050, South Africa. Email: [email protected].