Refashioning Rawls as a True Champion of the Poor

Abstract

Rawls champions the cause of the poor because of his strong moral sentiments about the eradication of poverty. I present these sentiments, which he converts into normative elements of his theory of justice. However, the conceptual framework and intellectual resources that he uses to articulate these sentiments are inadequate. His sentiments against poverty cannot be accommodated neatly, simply, and coherently in his liberal theoretical framework. Also, I point out that his definition of the identification of poor people as the least advantaged members of society is not adequate. Therefore, his theory is refashioned so that it can properly account for the fundamental interests of poor people. An alternative conception is presented, revising Rawlsian liberalism to enable it to adequately champion the cause of the poor. I provide an alternative definition of poverty and apply Mill's analysis of the relation between justice and utility to Rawls' theory of justice.

Notes

G.A. Cohen (2008, p. 126) has a clear understanding of what the basic structure is about, as his concern is with the ‘pattern of benefits and burdens on society.’ He sees the basic structure as ‘neither a structure in which choice occurs nor a set of choices, but the upshot of structure and choices alike.’

Amartya Sen (1990, p. 114) refers to a person's capability to ‘achieve various alternative combinations of functionings, or doings and beings.’ For Sen this means their ‘actual freedom’, which he describes as ‘the freedoms they actually enjoy to choose between different ways of living that they can have reason to value.’ Note the crisp way that Cohen (1989, p. 944) distinguishes between people's possession of resources and the use they make of it: ‘What goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with them…’

The debate about the exact link and alignment between the role of the difference principle in shaping ‘institutional design’ and also ‘govern[ing] personal conduct’ (Pogge, 2000, p. 154) does not have any direct impact on the issue being discussed here. The outcome of the debate as to whether the difference principle, ‘which condemns inequalities that contradict the interests of the worst off, applies not only to the actions of the state but also to the choices of individuals that are beyond the reach of the state’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 8) will not significantly change the need for some kind of theoretical adaptation of Rawls's theory of justice which I argue for. See also Pogge (2000), Cohen (2008), and Murphy (1999).

In his defence of the priority of liberty, Taylor (2003, pp. 263–264) discusses the need for a threshold of wealth before the priority of liberty can apply. He says that the priority of the first principle of justice ‘would be meaningless in a society that could not even establish the basic liberties themselves due to social and economic conditions.’ However, like Rawls, Taylor does not want to modify the two principles and the lexical priority Rawls assigned to their implementation. Like Rawls, he prefers to ‘simply stipulate’ the implementation of the first principle ‘until all primary goods that are necessary for the advancement of our highest-order interest in rationality can be made available.’ A very convenient dismissal of a major issue of social justice, I think.

In my discussion I do not focus on all possible aspects of critique against the difference principle. As Arneson (1989, p. 700) says, the ‘criticisms are legion.’ I am only focusing on its inability to definitively protect any human being against the ravages of poverty.

DiQuattro (1983, p. 62) argues that the difference principle ‘does tolerate—indeed requires—limited differentials, and even after state activity takes its toll in narrowing initial class inequalities, there may remain disparities of life prospects among members of the different classes sufficient to raise doubts about the justice of such an arrangement.’

Cohen defines a normative principle as ‘a general directive that tells agents what (they ought, or ought not) to do’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 229).

The idea is that a basic equal distribution of primary social goods is too important to leave to the status of some kind of precondition to be fulfilled before the implementation of the priority of liberty. This matter should rather be addressed by means of a principle of justice, or, as in the case of Henry Shue and Alan Gilbert, by means of the idea of basic rights. For Gilbert (1989, p. 235), basic rights protect ‘the preconditions for human agency’, which includes ‘not only life, moral and physical security, but subsistence, adequate shelter and health care, and a decent environment.’ The fact that Rawls ignores the fundamental importance of the role of the environment as a life-giving and life-enhancing factor that we ought to consider in the original position will not be discussed in this essay.

Stuart Hampshire (1989, p. 90) argues that all moral judgements and arguments presuppose that the great evils experienced by human beings must be avoided. Although background to all moral theorizing, Hampshire says the concept of justice in particular can only be fully understood when the ‘forces of destruction’ that justice intends to avert are taken into account (Hampshire, 1989, p. 68). For this reason Hampshire thinks that justice, in one sense, is a negative virtue, as it aims to prevent negative and harmful acts and experiences. In agreement with Michael J. Sandel (1982, pp. 30–35), Hampshire argues that justice comes into play to resolve conflict peacefully where friendship, kinship or shared communal values break down (Hampshire, 1989, p. 55). Justice is thus necessary to human associations in order to prevent minor conflicts escalating into major disasters.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Hennie Lötter

Department of Philosophy, University of Johannesburg, South Africa.