South Africa's UN General Assembly Voting Record from 2003 to 2008: Comparing India, Brazil and South Africa

Abstract

This article examines South Africa's voting history at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) over a five-year period, beginning with the establishment of the India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum in 2003, up to and including 2008. Particular emphasis is placed on the state's block voting and possible foreign policy alignment with India and Brazil. Key issues also focused on include those areas of convergence deemed most important by the IBSA members themselves, namely political coordination and cooperation. The article aims to bring to light the progress made by South Africa in its willingness to forge alliances with other emerging powers within this multilateral setting. It also seeks to observe whether members' voting patterns reflect IBSA declarations and stated goals, and thereby expose the extent or reach of this IBSA ‘brotherhood’.

Notes

South Africa perceives IBSA's spheres of engagement to be both at multilateral and trilateral levels. See Matjila, J., 2007. ‘IBSA: India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum: Brief overview of IBSA and status of preparations for 2nd IBSA Summit in SA from 15-17 October’, the DFA, 5 September 2007.

Multilateralism can be divided, according to Job (quoted in Capie and Evans, 2007, pp. 160–161), along two dimensions. The first dimension is important here and refers to the nature of the commitment undertaken by and for an arrangement's members. Such commitment may be described as ‘shallow’ or ‘deep’; the former meaning the members may commit to an undertaking of aid, consultation or the like, but nothing more serious and therefore not a deep level of commitment. Also see Mantzikos (2010).

Middle power diplomacy means a set of foreign policy behaviours which includes a preference for multilateralism, promoting international norms and good international citizenship. ‘Emerging market countries have shown a strong commitment to maintaining global norms and institutions which have formed the basis of multilateral cooperation since 1945. China, SA, India and Brazil have emerged as evangelists for a more just and equitable global order which is less subject to the whims of developed countries and based more on international compromise and democratic decision-making, with the UN system and international organisations providing the raison d’être for a reformed system' (Le Pere, 2005, p. 45).

South-South alliance building is fast becoming an avenue of interest for developing states attempting to reshape the global polity (Narlikar, quoted in Taylor, 2009, p. 45).

South African Minister of Social Development Zola Skweyiya, in 2005 at the IBSA Seminar on Economic Development and Social Equity in Brazil, expressed the belief that South Africa, Brazil and India are ‘pivotal countries’ in co-operation among developing countries (Department of Social Development, 2005).

For an interesting discussion on defining middle and/or regional powers see: ‘How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics’, by Nolte, D., GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Paper prepared for delivery at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Helsinki 7–12 May 2007.

The European Consortium for Political Research and the German Institute of Global and Area Studies offer a checklist of what constitutes a regional power, including ‘being part of a definable region with its own identity; claiming to be a regional power (self-image of a regional power) and exerting decisive influence on the geographic extension of the region as well as on its ideological construction’.

Since its inception there have been four IBSA Summits, held in Brasilia in 2006, Tshwane in 2007, New Delhi in 2008 and Brasilia in 2010 (IBSA, 2010).

The G20 + , sometimes referred to as the G21, G22 or G20, is a coalition of developing countries created on 20 August 2003. It is spearheaded by four of the most significant developing country economies: India, Brazil, China and South Africa. The G20+ emerged as a force in the 2003 WTO negotiations in Cancun and became one of the many factors contributing to the collapse of talks at the 5th ministerial held there (Bullard, 2004).

The HRC replaced the UN Commission on Human Rights in mid-2006, after resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 was adopted by the UNGA.

Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh used this phrase in his 2006 speech at the Plenary IBSA Meeting, stating: ‘We are, indeed, fortunate to count Brazil and South Africa among our closest friends’ http://www.indianembassy.org/page.php?id=834

For statistics on South Africa's trade relations with India and Brazil between 2003 and 2006, see the bilateral trade statistics compiled by the South African Department of Trade and Industry in September 2006 (DFA, 2006) and Prabir De's ‘Trade in IBSA Economic Cooperation: The Role of Transportation Linkages (2005). For a review of later trade relations between the IBSA members, see the Export-Import Bank of India's Occasional Paper No. 131, ‘IBSA: Enhancing Economic Cooperation Across Continents’, published in 2009.

For a succinct explanation of South Africa's foreign and national security policy objectives in terms of core objectives and middle-range and long-range goals in 2004, see van Nieuwkerk, 2004, p. 95. Relations with strategic countries including India, Brazil and China fall within South Africa's middle-range goals.

Later it emerged that IBSA was born as a result of former President Mbeki's initiative to create, in 1999/2000, a G8 of the South made up of South Africa, India, Brazil, China, Mexico, Nigeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. ‘For reasons not revealed’ five states did not join, leaving the remaining IBSA members (Fabricius, 2007b, p. 18).

The African Agenda is rooted in a philosophy that recognises the inseparable, triangular link between democracy and good governance, peace and security, and socio-economic development.

The global focus would cover issues such as political consultation and coordination on global issues; reform of UN and other global governance institutions; Doha Round/WTO issues; action against hunger and poverty, Millennium Development Goals; sustainable development, environment issues; disarmament and non-proliferation; Middle East peace and Africa peace-keeping, amongst others (Matjila, 2007, p. 6).

IBSA sectoral working groups include Working Groups on Trade and Investment; on Information Society; on Transport; on Agriculture; on Defence, etc (Matjila, 2007, p. 7). Also see ‘South-South Co-operation: IBSA is About More Than Just Trade’ by G. le Pere and L. White (2005).

In particular, the South African government stresses support for the UN as the most important facilitator of international peace and security (Landsberg, 2005, p. 3). Many others have adopted a similar stance since, in the absence of an alternate world body, the UN is the central site for multilateral diplomacy, and the UNGA is centre stage (Karns and Mingst, 2004, p. 97; Rieff, 2006, p. 15). Aspects of foreign policy and voting in the UNGA are closely related (Rai, 1972:589) and it is with this in mind that South Africa has ‘deliberately sought to play in the premier league of world affairs’ (Landsberg, 2004, p. 185).

Consider here Brazilian Ambassador Lucio Pires de Amorim's statement that the IBSA members shared such similarities, all being largely populated, all key democracies in their regions and all consisting of multicultural and multi-ethnic communities, which ‘makes them particularly sensitive to challenges posed by diversity’ and makes it beneficial to work with one another on key areas (Pires de Amorim, 2007, p. 6).

The UN Security Council in particular is not reflective of modern international relations. The Council therefore needs reform in the form of expanded permanent and non-permanent categories. The decisions of the Security Council should be seen as serving the interests of the global community (New Delhi Agenda for Cooperation, 2004).

By 2008, Brazil had been elected nine times, India six times and South Africa once to the Security Council as non-permanent members (UN, 2010).

Concerning the situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, Brazil and SA abstained and India voted No. In Committee 6 in the 59th session, South Africa abstained and Brazil and India voted no on a resolution on the United Nation's Declaration on Human Cloning. In the fourth committee, on the question of Western Sahara South Africa voted yes in the 59th and 61st sessions, whereas Brazil and India chose to abstain. Brazil voted yes on assistance to Palestine refugees and support for the UN relief and works agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, whereas SA and India abstained. In the third committee, as regards the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, South Africa and India voted no in the 62nd and 63rd sessions and Brazil abstained. Brazil had previously voted in favour of this resolution at the 58th and 60th sessions. In the second Committee Brazil and India voted in favour of a resolution at the 62nd session on agricultural technology and development, whereas South Africa abstained.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Suzanne Graham

Department of Politics, University of Johannesburg, South Africa.