Brazil's Human Rights Foreign Policy: Domestic Politics and International Implications

Abstract

This paper analyses the approach to human rights in Brazilian foreign policy agendas since President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's first mandate. It discusses institutional arrangements arising from domestic processes of democratisation, as well as from human rights regime changes that have occurred regionally and globally. The paper's key contention is that the foreign policy changes—both in emphasis and positioning—which took place after 2003 were due to three variables: (i) the securitisation of the global order after 9/11 and the resumption of the double standards policy; (ii) the transnationalisation of human rights movements and the emerging judicialisation of foreign policy; and (iii) at the domestic level, non-governmental actors' and social movements' emerging demands for participation in the field of foreign policy. The paper aims to contribute to the theoretical debate on foreign policy as public policy, and to offer some new frames of reference regarding Brazil's official motivations in the field of human rights.

Notes

1 The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, named after the palace that houses it.

2 For example, the recognition by Brazil, in 1998, of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights' competence and jurisdiction, followed by the establishment in 2006 of the United Nations Human Rights Council.

3 That is, democratisation, transition Cardoso-Lula/Dilma Rousseff, and improvement in the organisational standards of human rights NGOs.

4 It should be mentioned that South Africa, China, Germany, USA, France, India, and Japan, among others, have not signed this Convention either. The USA has signed but not ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989).

5 The Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food conducted an official mission to Brazil between 12 and 18 October 2009. Olivier de Schutter affirmed in his report that the degree of commitment and the range of efforts deployed by the Government of Brazil had improved the situation of food security in the country, particularly child malnutrition, since 2002. He also identified a number of challenges lying ahead and included recommendations on how to meet those challenges. For a detailed report on this mission, see: http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/officialreports/20100305_a-hrc-13–33-add6_country-mission-brazil_en.pdf

6 Statements collected from the Human Rights Council extranet, which makes several official documents available for the purpose of academic research. See also Conectas (2010, p. 111–121).

7 See, for instance, Pereira's editorial (2010, p. 4) and the article signed by Fernanda Godoy, in O Globo (20 November 2010, p. 41), on the Brazilian abstention from voting on a resolution to censure Iran at the UN-GA. Chade (2010), Geneva correspondent of O Estado de S. Paulo, also published an article entitled ‘Brazil wants UN to avoid censure of countries that violate human rights'.

8 It was in favour of the no-action motion in 2004, whereas previously it had always abstained, except in 1996 when it voted favourably.

9 The Brazilian diplomacy has affirmed the non-indifference of the country with respect to situations that pose a threat to global peace and international security. As Almeida (2013, 7) recalls, ‘although almost a decade after its adoption by the African Union the principle of non-indifference as it applies to Brazil came out of Lula's foreign policy’. It was a clear strategy to reconcile Brazil's constitutional principle of non-intervention and the priorities of Lula's foreign policy, as far as engagement with peacekeeping, international development cooperation, and human rights were concerned. See interview given by Chancellor Celso Amorim to Foreign Policy journalist Susan Glasser in December 2010, available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/29/the_soft_power_power

10 Asano, Nader, and Vieira (2009) provide a clear and detailed discussion of some activist networks' criticism of Brazilian foreign policy limitations in the field of human rights, particularly in regard to resolutions on some specific countries' violations.

11 For example, regime change, government policy, and critical events that acted as catalysts of public opinion.

12 For example, the fight against communism, military coups in South America, and transnational exchanges between civil society organisations and human rights activists.

13 It is interesting to note that Brazil has always kept a low profile throughout its history of participation in the UN's Human Rights Commission: it has proceeded with caution when voting on resolutions about other countries and it has even made the ‘preferential option for abstention’ in these cases. In the early 1990s, the Brazilian delegation began to vote favourably on some countries' resolutions, such as East Timor (1993, 1997), Sudan (1994, 1995, 1998, 2001–2003), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1994), Iraq (1994–1998, 2000–2002), Iran (1994–1998, 2000), Nigeria (1997), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1998), among others (Belli 2010, 164–165).

14 These documents are available in the Human Rights Council's extranet.

15 In November 1999, Mr Damiao Ximenes, a 30-year-old man who suffered from schizophrenia, was admitted to receive psychiatric treatment in a private psychiatric health centre operating within Brazil's governmental Single Health System (known as SUS), situated in Sobral in the North-western federate-state of Ceará. Just a few days after his admission, Mr Ximenes was found dead with obvious signs of torture. Since then, in view of many difficulties of access to justice domestically, his relatives sought to obtain judicial protection externally, with the support of civil society organisations. The process in question led to Brazil's first formal condemnation of Brazil by the Inter-American Court, in July 2006. For more information: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_149_ing.pdf

16 Cf. http://dhpoliticaexterna.org.br/

17 It is common among foreign policy analysts from the media and some Brazilian former ambassadors to ascribe the sources of Brazilian Foreign Policy (BFP) mainly to either an individual (generally the President or the Foreign Minister) or an institution (the Foreign Ministry). This is due not only to the concentration of power in the president's hands, but also to the long-standing professionalism of Brazilian diplomats and the process of institutionalisation of Brazilian diplomacy. These two factors have contributed to the acceptance of the idea that BFP is a state policy, and not a public policy whose decision-making arena reveals a plurality of actors, preferences, and interests. Amazingly, the majority of media analysts in Brazil tend to adopt a more conservative position in this regard, and defend the idea that foreign policy should be protected from the interests of political parties, NGOs, social movements, and ‘domestic' ministries.

18 In the wake of demands for social participation in the debates on foreign policy, Itamaraty organised between February and April 2014 a series of dialogues with other ministries, public agencies, civil society organisations, business, and union representatives, with a view to develop and publish the first foreign policy White Paper. Currently, Itamaraty also considers the possibility of establishing a permanent forum on foreign policy.