The ‘Quasi-Permanent Crisis’: Understanding Collective Rebellion and Sectarian Violence in the CAR

ABSTRACT

This paper is a critical application of Ted Gurr’s theory of political rebellion to understanding the dynamics of the long history of socio-economic and political crises in the Central African Republic (CAR). Gurr locates his explanation for political rebellion in people’s ‘shared grievances’, ‘discontentment’, and ‘group mobilisation’ within the context of repressive state actions. Gurr, however, gives no real explanation as to what kind of people engage in collective rebellion, and whether or not popular grievances touch on all the people. In light of this, this paper explores what group identity issues, and what kinds of beliefs or appeals within CAR led to collective violence in the country, particularly the Séléka rebellion (2012–2013) and the anti-Balaka counter-response. The paper further discusses why and how groups like the Séléka remain a small but cohesive organisation, willing to kill and or die for their motives. Additionally, it engages with the ‘spill-over’ effects of CAR’s crises by discussing how the official borders in the Central African Region, as with the rest of Africa, remain insignificant in the everyday life of Central Africans.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Sean Byrne, Muhammad Dan Suleiman and the two anonymous reviewers for useful comments on early drafts of the paper. This study was made possible through a PhD fellowship by the Faculty of Graduate Studies, University of Manitoba.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 Patrick Chabal has argued that liberal democracy is ‘rooted in institutionalist notions of political change, which rests on the supposition that the practices of democratic elections will eventually result in the emergence of a democratic political culture’ (Chabal 2009, 6). This author does not subscribe to the view that transitioning to Western or liberal democracy will be the antidote to CAR’s political instability. We have argued elsewhere that the liberal democracy, as propagated by its agents in the CAR, derails prospects at cross-community peacebuilding projects that may address the root causes of CAR’s political instability (Maiangwa and Suleiman 2016).

2 It is alleged that Bokassa spent the equivalent of CAR’s annual budget to fund his coronation as emperor of the Central African Empire (ICG 2007, 6).

3 Akin to the domestic politics of CAR, Bayart (2000, 226) argues that genuine change of governments in the 1990s in Africa only saw the return of old demons in countries like Zambia, Madagascar, and Congo-Brazzaville.

4 It is said that many people resorted to informal economics of smuggling, poaching, and illegal accumulation due to the recession that hamstrung Patasse’s administration (Marchal 2015a, 179). These informal networks did not push for regime change in Bangui because they considered it to be too risky a move, given the calibre regional players that were grappling for dominance in CAR at the time (Marchal 2015a).

5 It is interesting that a Muslim Déby was willing to support a Christian Bozizé. This Déby/Bozizé connection questions the idea of regional identity politics in CAR’s crisis.

6 The fact that the anti-Balaka group members have different interests and objectives explain why CAR’s 2012–2013 crisis may not have been a textbook case of ‘genocide’ or ‘religious hate crime’ as some international actors and journalists would have us believe (Lombard and Carayannis 2015, 8). Most of the anti-Balaka members claim that they represent the true populations of CAR who have been raped, killed, deprived, and pillaged by ‘foreigners’ (Lombard and Carayannis 2015, 7–8).

7 Patassé is said to have capitalized on this ‘northern’ grievance to win the presidential elections in 1993 (Mehler 2011, 119).

8 Bozizé reportedly received logistical, financial, and moral support from the head of State of Congo, Joseph Kabila, the President of Congo-Brazzaville, Denis Sassou Nguesso, and President Omar Bongo of Gabon (ICG 2007, 16).