Drivers of the Foreign Policies of Southern African Small States

ABSTRACT

In international relations small states are either discarded as irrelevant, unimportant, or weak; held in high regard as potential movers and shakers in especially smart or niche diplomacy areas; powerful in blocs; or as a non-classification, that is undeserving of a unique type separate from the world body of states. Regardless of varying perceptions, small states exist and more so, they exist with foreign policies. This study examines what drives the foreign policies of the southern African small states of Botswana, the Comoros, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, the Seychelles and Swaziland. It finds that state size is important in shaping the foreign policies of these southern African small states, but that it is not mutually exclusive from other typical domestic and international determinants that play a role in conditioning most states’ foreign policies. Moreover, defence of national interest features as a common and undeniable primary foreign policy objective of these states.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 In terms of the global economy, Vickers (2011, 185) describes small states (or small vulnerable economies) as marginal players.

2 Crowards (2002) adds ‘trade openness … total exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP’ and ‘net foreign direct investment [FDI]’, as indirect variables, to his quantifiable definitions of the size of a state, arguing in the case of FDI that presumably small states would attract smaller FDI, compared to larger states, due to limited capacity. This indicator would be important then in terms of determining the influence a state might have in influencing decisions beyond its borders. According to the World Bank (2015), in 2014, the FDI of the five southern Africa states examined in this paper were as follows: Botswana (USD 393,180,125); Lesotho (USD 46,521,786); Mauritius (USD 418,430,128); Namibia (USD 493,302,263); Seychelles (USD 108,307,072) and Swaziland (USD 26,584,894).

3 Even within small state theory, you can refer to small developed states (mostly in Europe), or small developing states; or small island developing states (SIDS).

4 Geopolitics relates to how state location, natural resources and physical environment, including regional context, are important in helping to explain certain foreign policy choices (Breuning 2007, 47).

5 Although these characteristics are not exclusive to small states, for example, even large states may experience remoteness due to the widespread settlements of rural populations, they do, however, reveal as a collective the degree to which small states must face these challenges compared with larger states (The Commonwealth 1997, 12).

6 For discussion on small state use of balancing or bandwagoning in their international relations see Gunasekara (2015) and Gvalia et al. (2013).

7 Literature pertaining to African foreign policies and related processes reflects slightly more favourably in number, see more recent examples in: Akokpari (2001); Khadiagala and Lyons (2001); Adar and Ajulu (2002); Herbert (2011). For an economic emphasis on small states in SADC–European Union (EU) negotiations, see Vickers (2011).

8 Mayotte became an official overseas Department for France in 2011.

9 Blue economy refers to the sustainability of the world’s oceans by ‘ensuring that economic activity is in balance with the long-term capacity of ocean ecosystems to support this activity and remain resilient and healthy’ (Economist Intelligence Unit 2015, 7).

10 Although, according to the World Economic Forum (2016) more can yet be done to boost Mauritius’ technological readiness; which sits at a score of 4.1 (with 7 being the best possible score).

11 That is not to say that Namibia has enjoyed uninterrupted congenial relations with Botswana, for example. The two states were in dispute over the boundary of Kasikili/Sedudu Island, located on the northeastern international border between Botswana and Namibia, from 1992 to 1999, although a decision was finalized in 2003 (Du Pisani 2014, 375–377).

12 Mauritius served as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the first time in 1977 and 1978. In October 2000, Mauritius was elected for a two-year term (2001–2002) at the Security Council. Botswana and Namibia have also served on the Council in 1995–1996 and 1999–2000, respectively. Seychelles, in agreement with its east African neighbours, temporarily withdrew its bid to occupy a 2017–2018 non-permanent seat on the Council, but aspires to represent Africa in the 2021–2022 term.

13 See discussion on the Kasikili/Sedudu Island dispute in Du Pisani (2014, 375–377).

14 Swaziland’s King Mswati III had no qualms in 2006, attempting to enlarge his Kingdom’s territory, claiming parts of Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal from South Africa. Former South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkhosazana Dlamini Zuma quashed these claims in 2012 on the basis that AU protocol observes borders drawn up during colonial times (Simelane 2014).

15 See Taylor and Mokhawa’s (2003) review of Botswana’s diamond industry and related NGO, Survival International’s, allegations of the government’s ill treatment of the San people.