The Democracy Deficit of Africa’s Liberation Movements Turned Governments

ABSTRACT

This article will argue that at the heart of the governance failures of many African independence and liberation movements turned governments was, and still is, their inability to effectively transform from resistance movements into effective democratic governing parties. Many African independence and liberation movements often have inherent organisational, ideological and historical inefficiencies – which in the context of an independence and liberation struggle were often strengths, but once in government reinforce anti-democratic practices. This essay reflects on the ‘culture’ of African independence and liberation movements, which it argues is replicated within the state. It further argues that this ‘culture’ undermines these movements’ ability to build viable, quality and lasting democracies in the countries they govern and should therefore be transformed for improved governance.

Introduction

At the end of colonialism and white-minority regimes, African independence and liberation movements promised so much in the name of freedom, democracy and economic development. Yet, over the past 50 years, most of the African governments that sprang from these movements, which were expressly committed to transforming their societies for the better during the liberation and independence struggles have failed to establish quality democracies, build inclusive societies and bring economic prosperity to their countries. Why have most African independence and liberation movements when in government so spectacularly betrayed the ideals of the liberation struggle like democracy, social and economic equity for which they fought for and hundreds of thousands of their people lost their lives? The political culture of African liberation and independence movements made it difficult for them to pursue democratic governance – quality democracies, ethnically inclusive societies and equitable economic development. Both the first generation African liberation and independence movements that came to power immediately after the Second World War, in the 1950s and 1960s, and the subsequent generation of movements that came to power in the 1980s and 1990s, in spite of the different contexts and dynamics, have in many cases exhibited broadly the same failures in government.

This article reflects on the ‘culture’ of African independence and liberation movements that is at the heart of the spectacular failure of many independence and liberation movements turned governments. It argues that this culture undermines their ability to build viable, quality and lasting democracies in the countries they govern and should therefore be transformed for governance to be improved. The article analyses the discourses of African liberation and independence movements both in the battle for liberation and independence and when they are themselves in government through a systematic review of their policy documents, reports, resolutions, public statements, communiqués and through an extensive literature review. It uses the discursive argumentative approach articulated by scholars such as Fischer (2003) and John Forester (1993), who emphasised the importance of looking at ‘claims actually made, spoken or written’ (Fischer and Forester 1993, 5) to analyse a particular policy action or non-action. It revisits the contentious concept of political culture prior to outlining the key elements of the political culture of African independence and liberation movements that served them in their opposition to the colonial rule and was later transferred into their governments, but proved inappropriate for creating viable African democratic states and requires radical change or transformation.

Revisiting the notion of ‘political culture’

Lucian Pye describes a ‘political culture’ as a ‘set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in a political system’ (1968, 218). According to Sidney Verba, it is a ‘system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the situation in which political action takes place’ (Pye and Verba 1965, 513). Political culture governs the formal and informal ‘processes of interaction among political actors’ (White 1979, 16), structures and institutions. It is also about the way the state is organised – ‘ideological, policy and institutional’ (Jowitt 1974, 1171) in a given society. Stephen White defines political culture as both expressing and influencing ‘the patterns of political belief and behaviour within a given political system’ (1979, 16). He holds that ‘it informs the actions of political actors; comprehends political symbols, foci of identification and fundamental beliefs and values; and generally both reflects and influences popular orientations towards the institutions and practices of government’ (16).

Political culture is not solely applicable to the whole political system of a country. It could also be determined for the ‘masses’, referring to the political culture of the general population; the ‘elite’, referring to the political culture of those of the policy-makers; regime or movement political culture, referring to those of the ruling regime in power; the political culture of opposition movements; independence and liberation movements’ political culture and perhaps in the African context, particularly salient, the political culture of African leaders (White 1979, 16).

Peter Dahlgren, in his exposition of ‘democratic political culture’, argues that the values of democracy must underpin behaviour in everyday life and democracy must be ‘enacted in concrete, recurring practices – individual, group, and collective – relevant for diverse situations’ (2005, 148). Over time, democratic practices can become ‘traditions and experience become collective memory’ (148). At country and continental levels, African political leaders, movements, elites and citizens themselves – although many professed support for democracy, have largely been unable to internalise a set of values, norms, beliefs, attitudes, patterns of behaviour and way of doing things, which are democratic.

The values of democracy have not underpinned behaviour in everyday life (Dahlgren 2005, 148) or what de Tocqueville referred to as the ‘habits of the (democratic) heart’ (De Tocqueville 1981, 352). Whether a country’s leaders and citizens develop democratic habits will determine whether democracy will not only thrive, but also endure.

The elements of political culture of African independence and liberation movements¹

Because independence and liberation movements have such hegemony in power, the political culture that manifests within these movements also become replicated within the new state. What are some of the core elements of the political culture of African independence and liberation movements that undermines their ability to pursue democratic governance when they eventually gain power?

One-partyism

Many African post-independence leaders argued that only one united party where all different groups are represented could drive the development and nation-building effort. In 1964, Jomo Kenyatta, persuaded the Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU) to join KANU using the spoils of government as reward, rendering the country became essentially a one-party state (Odhiambo-Mbai 2003, 61). Kenyatta argued that given Kenya’s mountain of challenges, the country needed to speak with one united voice, and that multiparty politics would only increase ethnic tensions, create instability and undermine the infant government’s efforts to bring about positive change (Odhiambo-Mbai 2003, 61).

In 1962, Ghana’s independence leader Kwame Nkrumah called for a one-party state arguing that most of the opposition parties were organised along regional, ethnic and sectarian lines and were undermining national unity, leading to ethnic polarisation and encourages regional succession (Biney 2008, 129). In 1965, Julius Nyerere, the independence leader of Tanzania, introduced a single-party state (Luckham 1998; Legum & Mmari 1995) for similar reasons put forward by Nkrumah. After independence in Algeria, the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) outlawed all opposition and established the country as a one-party state with the FLN as the only legal party (Esposito and Voll 1996). Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda banned all opposition parties following violence during the 1968 national elections, creating a one-party state in 1972 (Phiri 2001). Soon after independence in 1975 Mozambique’s main liberation movement, Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), established a one-party state in 1977 (Egero 1990). The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) dominated Guinea-Bissau from independence in 1973, through a revolutionary council until 1984, when no other political parties were allowed (Rudebeck 1974). In Senegal, the Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS), with Léopold Sédar Senghor, as the country’s first president following it becoming an independent republic in 1960, became the only legal party from 1966 until December 1976, when it was reconstituted as the Senegalese Socialist Party (PS) (Alalade 1981)). The Angolan Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) declared a one-party state almost immediately after taking power at independence in 1975 (Malaquias 2007). In 1987, Mugabe’s Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) merged with ZAPU-PF (Zimbabwe African People’s Union-Patriotic Front) to form the ZANU-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) (Bond and Manyanya 2003; Ranger 2004; Gumede 2005).

The decision to form a one-party state has in many African countries often been the cause of further, rather than the end of ethnic or regional conflict (Thompson and Adloff 1960; Ballard 1966; Rudebeck 1974; Alalade 1981; Charrad 2001; Phiri 2001).

Centralisation of decision- and policy-making

Many African independence and liberation movements were structured along variations of Soviet Marxist-Leninist or Chinese Communist Party lines, with a powerful leader at the head (Mohan 1966; Chuanzhi 2013). To more effectively fight colonial or white-minority governments, anti-colonial and anti-apartheid movements were organised in a top-down, secretive and military-like fashion, with power in the hands of either the leader or a small leadership group, centred on the leader. When the leadership decides, the members were expected to obey, according to the principle of ‘democratic centralism’ (Mohan 1966, 227). Once in government, however, the small leadership core of many independence and liberation movements remained the repository of decisions, policy-making and appointments. In government, many liberation and independence movements have invariably restricted ordinary members and citizens’ participating in decision-making beyond voting every five years (Gumede 2010, 14).

Since policies and decisions are usually made by a small group, without much broader input by members, supporters or voters, and without the benefit of critical scrutiny that wider debate brings, governments often come up with poor, inappropriate policies, which are costly – in the end the poor suffer, when these policies have to be reversed or abandoned. Furthermore, when only a few decide on policy, rather than in a participatory, public and broadly consultative way, corrupt, partisan and clientistic groups can also easily capture it.

Discouraging competitive leadership elections

Democratic leadership elections within African independence and liberation movements during the independence and liberation struggles were often discouraged, because leaders feared that it would promote political, ethnic and factional divisions (Gumede 2010, 14). The party leadership of these movements was often elected, or rather appointed, by a small clique, often in secrecy. Or, if there is an election for leader within the party, the party barons decide whom to back and their choice is presented to the membership as the best option. This often leads to the phenomenon of uncontested elections.

In 1963, Ben Bella, with the support of the FLN leadership, was presented in an uncontested election as president of Algeria (Evans and Phillips 2007). Following the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane in 1969 by Portuguese agents (Egero 1990), Mozambican independence leader of Mozambique, Samora Machel, became the new leader of FRELIMO with the support of leadership and in what was essentially an uncontested election. Following the assassination of Machel in 1986, Joaquim Chissano was also presented as leader of FRELIMO in an uncontested election (Egero 1990).

Following the assassination of his brother, Amilcar Cabral, the leader of the PAIGC, Luís Cabral was appointed by the party barons as the first President of independence Guinea-Bissau in 1974 (Chabal 1983; Sousa 2011). When Thabo Mbeki was elected as leader of South Africa’s governing African National Congress (ANC) in 1997, he was presented to party rank and file by the ANC leadership as the ‘only’ candidate (Gumede 2005, 123). In other instances, the outgoing leader handpicks the person to succeed him. Eduardo dos Santos was elected unopposed as leader of the MPLA after Agostinho Neto, the first president of Angola following independence in 1975, died in 1979. Before his death, Neto chose Dos Santos, the then planning minister, as his successor, over other contenders such as the then defence Minister Iko Carreira, Lopo do Nascimento, the former Prime Minister, and Lucio Lara, the former provisional president of the MPLA (Chabal & Vidal 2007). Sam Nujoma, the leader of South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), handpicked Hifikepunye Pohamba, as successor in 2004 (Melber 2003; The Economist 2004). In Senegal, Leopald Senghor in 1981, handed the baton over to a handpicked successor, Abdou Diouf. Senghor even handpicked Abdoulaye Wade (leader of Senegal since 2000) to be the leader of the opposition (Ottaway 2002). In Kenya, Kenyatta, the independence leader handpicked a weak deputy, Daniel Arap Moi, who eventually became his successor when the former died of ill-ness (Gumede 2005).

Appointing leaders, rather than electing them because of their ideas, undermines democracy and prevents renewal, fresh ideas and innovation. It also means that such leaders are likely to be more accountable to the party barons or factions than to party members, voters or citizens.

The cult of the leader

Post-independence and liberation leaders were often put on a pedestal, and that was the basis of the ‘strongman’ syndrome which fostered a personality cult around the leader (Gumede 2010, 16). Leaders were rarely publicly criticised, and were deferred to on almost all matters, whether they had the necessary expertise or not. Leaders were also given extraordinary leeway to make policies, decisions, without having to consult ordinary members. Furthermore, there were often two set of laws: one for ordinary people, and one for the leader and his allies.

This culture of deference to the leader meant that leaders often thought of themselves as ‘God’ and indispensable – their minions often reinforced this view. Very few leaders voluntary stepped down from political office – God does not retire. Tunisia’s independence leader, Habib Bourguiba was often called the ‘Supreme Combatant’ (Salem 1984; Charrad 2001; Cavatorta 2012). Kenyatta called himself the ‘Flaming Spear of Kenya’ (Karimi and Ochieng 1980; Malhotra 1990; Oyugi, Wanyande, and Odhiambo-Mbai 2003). Nyerere was Mwalimu, the teacher (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Leophold Senghor of Senegal and other independence leaders referred to themselves as ‘Father of the Nation’ (Lamb 1984; Phiri 2001, 225; Schatzberg 2001, 149). Many of these leaders saw themselves as the ‘father’ and ‘head’ of families, where the nation is the ‘family’ (Schatzberg 2001, 149). Opposing or criticising the father of the family is simply not palatable.

In some cases, the leader actually started the party, or at least were part of the initial group of people who did. Luís Cabral, the first president of independent Guinea-Bissau, with his brother, Amílcar Cabral, also started the ruling PAIGC (Chabal 1983; Sousa 2011). Aristides Pereira was also one of the founders of the PAIGC, and became the Cape Verde president at the independence in 1975. Sam Nujoma led SWAPO since its formation in 1960, was elected president of Namibia in 1990 and left reluctantly as leader of the party in 2007, and the country in 2004 (Melber 2003, 2013). Nkrumah launched the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) on 12 June 1949 in Accra. Julius Nyerere founded the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in 1954. In 1977, Nyerere merged TANU with the Zanzibari party to form Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM – Party of the Revolution). Senegal’s independence leader Leophold Senghor founded his own party, the Bloc démocratique sénégalais in 1948. Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia formed the Neo Destour Party (forerunner of the Socialist Destourian Party (PSD) – 1964, and the Constitutional Democratic Rally – 1988) in 1934, with himself as leader.

The domination of independence and liberation movements by a small clique

A small clique, often a group from the same ethnic group, the same generation, military commanders or the same class, dominated many liberation movements or who attended the same school. At independence, the political elite of African independence and liberation movements became the new governing elite (Ayittey 1994; Mohan 1996). The educated elite and traditional leaders who were the power brokers under the colonial system started many of the first African independence and liberation movements. They became independence or liberation aristocracy, who would get most of the party and government jobs after independence or liberation. These movements could be so imprisoned and dominated by entrenched leadership factions and their networks, either along regional, ethnic, generational or class lines. The phenomenon has been referred to as ‘partyarchy’ (Coppedge 1994, 41).

Nkrumah and the original group of youth and socialists that broke away from the United Gold Coast Convention in 1949 dominated Ghana Convention People’s Party. The ‘Zairians’ controlled the MPLA’s, dos Santos (Pomonti 1982, 3). In Kenya, the independence leader, Kenyatta, ruled through a close-knit group consisting of mostly his relatives, from his native Kiambu district, and those from the Kikuyu ethnic group, many of them who had worked in the colonial administration. An informal hierarchy known as the ‘Zezuru’ and allied to Mugabe, dominates Zimbabwe’s Zanu-PF (Chikuhwa 2004, 141). The Zezuru is one of the two largest clans of the wider Shona ethnic group in Zimbabwe. The Zezuru in Zimbabwe occupies almost all the leading positions in the party, government and business (Chikuhwa 2004, 142). In Mozambique the southerners dominated FRELIMO. Since the formation of FRELIMO, those from the centre and north have regularly complained of being sidelined in the leadership structures (Hume 1994), with those from the south of the country being favoured (Weinstein 2007).

African liberation and independence movements are essentially parties led by the elite – with poor, working class and peasant supporters. Over time, African independence and liberation movements in power often act in the interests of a small elite, whether ethic, political or regional, rather than act in the broadest public interest.

Playing ethnic politics

Colonial powers drew up most African country borders arbitrarily, across language and ethnic groups. In spite of their lofty rhetoric of pan-Africanism and attacking colonial powers for deliberately dividing African countries along tribal lines, many African leaders when in government often opted for playing the same tribal card – especially when in political trouble (van de Walle 2003, 313). Many African liberation and independence movements started as ethnically based civil groups, whether as trade, regional or community organisations lobbying for the interests of specific ethnic groups. A typical example is in Nigeria, where the Action Group started as a Yoruba group, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) as Hausa-Fulani cultural organisations and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), although initially started as a national organisation, became over time supported by the Igbo in the East (Okafor 2013, 19).

Often African independence or liberation leaders movements tried to change their movements into more ethnically inclusive organisations after they were initially started and dominated by members of one ethnic group. After securing power, many African independence and liberation movements’ leaders called for one-party states, ostensibly to prevent politics being organised along ethnic lines. Yet, many of these movements were still dominated by one ethnic group, when in power. Many opposition parties in Africa are often also frequently based on narrow ethnic, tribal and regional lines (Cheeseman and Ford 2007) – often in response to the perceived ethnic favouritism of the governing parties. Leaders such as Nkrumah, Nyerere, Senghor and Sekou Toure argued that the one-party state would forge national unity and a new identity for the new nation. However, the one-party states actually increased ethnic divisions. Opposition parties who were forced to merge with the dominant liberation movement often found themselves marginal in the enlarged party, expect for a few token appointments. The sad fact is that many liberation and independence movements in most African countries actually reinforced the ethnic census so successfully introduced by colonial and white-minority governments.

Fusion of party and state

In their attempts to transform their societies, leaders of most independent and liberation movements fused their parties with the new state, to form a kind of ‘party-state’, where the movement and the party became one and the same. Indeed, in many cases, it has been a familiar pattern, the ‘party merged with the apparatus of the state’ (Leslie 1960, 16). There is no firewall between the party itself, and the executive, legislatures and public institutions. In power, the party and the state merge as a party state with no place for the separation of powers, an independent judiciary, checks and balances between branches of government or limits on power. Independent democratic institutions are seen as an extension of the party, and not only are the heads of such institutions ‘deployed’ there by the party leadership, they are expected to defer to the party leadership (Gumede 2010; De Jager and Steenekamp 2016).

In this system, democratic institutions must be bent to the party and to the leadership’s will. Sékou Touré argued: ‘The Party is the brain of our state, while the state is the executive part of the Party which works according to the spirit and intentions of the Party’ (Touré 1959, 45). This means that liberation movements-turned-governments have few qualms about changing laws and constitutions to fit their short-term party interests. Turning into party states is one of the reasons why many African countries run by former independence or liberation movements failed to institute broad-based democracy when they came to power. When the ruling independence or liberation movements became corrupt, undemocratic or divided into factions, or the leadership become personalised, their governments became so also, stunting democratic development and service delivery efforts.

The idea of opposition never properly took root within or outside liberation movements

In some African traditional societies, consensus seeking was often the norm and open opposition to ‘authority’ was often not encouraged (Osabu-Kle 2000, 19; Schatzberg 2001, 216). According to Osabu-Kle (2001, 19): ‘the only known opposing force was … the enemy from outside. In African political culture and vocabulary, therefore, the concepts of opposition and enemy came to mean the same thing’. Some African independence and liberation movements have exploited such consensus-seeking cultures to discourage legitimate opposition against them. Most traditional African societies, however, even if they may be overall consensus-seeking, do not tolerate unaccountable, autocratic and self-interested leadership.

Some African leaders portrayed themselves as the ‘father-chief’ who should not to be opposed (Schatzberg 2001, 216). Many African independence and liberation movements saw their movements itself as the embodiment of the nation or the ‘people’, which speaks for everybody, with the leader or founding founder the tribune of the ‘people’ (Logan 2008, 11; Gumede 2010, 30).

Internal and outside opposition was not tolerated: it was seen as going against the ‘voice’ of the ‘people’ itself. Opposition or criticism, whether from within or outside the independence or liberation movement is often wrongly seen as ‘opposing’ the ‘people’ (Gumede 2010, 30; Osabu-Kle 2001, 19). During the anti-colonial struggle, some indigenous movements allied with the colonial governments. The forces in the liberation and independence struggle were divided as those on the side of the liberation movement, and those aligned with the colonial or minority government or their allies. Furthermore, colonial governments often handed over power in a compromise settlement, with some power still in the hands of groups associated with the colonial government.

In power, many independence and liberation movements still divide the world between those on their side, and those belonging to the old order. Legitimate opposition to the sitting liberation or independence movement government is often portrayed as in league with the former colonial power, foreign ‘enemy’ governments or in defending white minority or ‘settler’ interests (Gumede 2010, 31).

Fractured and irrelevant opposition parties

In some African countries, the main opposition parties were either associated with the colonial or the minority governments, or had opposed independence or liberation. The opposition in most African countries at independence therefore started off with a credibility problem. Independence and liberation movements attempted either by force or negotiation to swallow opposition parties into one large united party. In countries where opposition parties remained separate entities, they became bogeymen for ruling parties to blame for delivery failures in government of the independence or liberation movement. These opposition parties did not have the same liberation ‘legitimacy’ that independence or liberation movements had and found it hard to expand their reach. It was easy for independence and liberation movements to blame such groups and the former colonial power for when things went wrong. African ruling parties, however, made (and continue to make) it difficult for opposition parties to operate, throwing their leaders in jail, depriving them of funds and continually attacking them.

Yet, most African opposition parties still organise themselves solely on the basis of opposing the sitting president or government, rather than providing an alternative vision of government with clear policies to match. Moreover, opposition parties, from Angola, to Botswana, Namibia, to the DRC are often fractious, uninspiring, with no clear or credible alternative policies. In fact, there is often nothing to differentiate opposition parties from the ruling party, except personalities (Gumede 2008). Since parties do not have distinctive policy programmes, African politics is often the victim of both leadership cult and tribal politics. Opposition parties are often dormant between elections, coming to life only during elections and winding down again thereafter. Even the few opposition parties with liberation struggle ‘credentials’, which survived the independence period of enforced unity, often offer little relevant policies, and remain stuck in the past, offering little in substance in terms of alternatives for voters (Kimenyi and Moyo 2011).

Opposition parties that eventually come to power have offered little alternatives to the independence or liberation movements (Logan 2008, 4). Often, opposition parties that come to power are also extreme ideologically, veering towards the most extreme forms of free market capitalism, almost as if to compensate for the independence or liberation movements dogmatic African socialism. In other cases, new opposition parties are out rightly populist, rather than presenting clear-headed pragmatic policy proposals. This was the case of Zambia’s Frederick Chiluba, who came to power, promising change, fought an election campaign on populism, but in power hardly differed in its failure, from the regime of Kenneth Kaunda, the independence leader (IRIN 2006; Kimenyi and Moyo 2011).

Morgan Tsvangirai, the leader of Zimbabwe’s opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) overruled the democratic vote of his own party in 2005, after the majority of his party voted to participate in senatorial elections in 2005. Following this undemocratic action, prominent members broke away to form a new party, under the leadership of MDC general secretary Welshman Ncube. In 2013, Tsvangirai lost the elections for a third time against ZANU-PF’s Robert Mugabe. Tsvangirai refused to stand down as leader of the MDC he led since its foundation in 1999 after members and supporters questioned his leadership capability.

The bridling of civil society

Many African liberation and independence movements emerged from civil society groups; professional associations, cultural and religious groups or trade unions. In fact, many leading African independence and liberation leaders cut their political teeth in civil society. During the African liberation and independence struggle, many civil society groups were also aligned to these movements as part of broad anti-colonial and anti-apartheid fronts. But many independence and liberation movements also sprung from civil society groups. Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the independence leader of Ivory Coast was the president of the African Agricultural Union, which was later transformed into the Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast. Nigerian independence leader Nnamdi Azikiwe was the leader of the Ibo State Union, a lobby group for the interests of Ibos (Sklar 1963, 71). Julius Nyerere in Tanzania was president of the Tanganyika African Association, a civic organisation of civil servants, which was later turned into the Tanganyika African National Union, the independence party.

In government, many liberation and independence movements, in power, based on the ‘party-state’ conception, also saw civil society as appendages of the party. After they took power, almost all of the liberation movements immediately demanded uncritical loyalty from civil groups, trade unions and the press that were loyal to it. This is in done supposedly to form a ‘united’ front against enemies of the new state, whether within or outside the country (Gumede 2010, 31).

In 1977, the MPLA incorporated and co-opted the main Angolan workers union, the União Nacional dos Trabalhadores Angolanos. The independence regimes in Namibia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique kept the trade unions on a tight leash. FRELIMO subsumed local ‘civic’, cultural and voluntary organisations into the party. The Tanzanian trade unions actively campaigned against colonialism. During the 1964 military mutiny, Julius Nyerere and the governing independence movement alleged involvement of senior trade unionists, and banned the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL). It substituted it with a more pliant new union, called the National Union of Tanganyika Employees (NUTA), which was supposed to be an ‘economic development orientated/state institution’ (Kamoche 2004, 81).

Intellectuals associated with the liberation and independence movements were also expected to be uncritical. If not, they were often also silenced, or they censored themselves, not to fall foul of the party and leadership. Many intellectuals failed to ‘draw the line between principled support of the (liberation and independence) movements and uncritical apologia’ (Leslie 1960, 17) for the misdeeds of the movements and their leaders.

The abuses of liberation and independence rhetoric

Many liberation and independence movements turned governments often used independence and liberation struggle rhetoric, discourse and imagery – which were crucial during the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle to unite the populace against the common colonial enemy and to exert their hegemony over post-colonial society. They often divided the world into two camps: those in the camp of the liberation/independence movements and the opposite, ‘enemies’, which can include former colonial powers, remnants of formerly white-minority ancient regimes, foreign and local white-owned businesses, donors and ‘settlers’. Failures in governments – even if self-inflicted – are often blamed on these ‘enemies’. Leaders frequently attack legitimate critics and opposition, often labelling them as traitors, unpatriotic or stooges of former colonial powers. Leaders and movements demand uncritical support from their camp – even if they do wrong, are corrupt and autocratic. Anyone who points out such rank hypocrisy is terrorised; their commitment to the national interests questioned and they are excluded from government jobs and contracts.

While brazenly autocratic, corrupt and uncaring, most of African independence and liberation movements and their leaders cynically use the rhetoric of the liberation struggle, communal ‘solidarity’, black ‘unity’ for their own enrichment (Gumede 2010, 28). In government, most independence and liberation leaders use progressive discourse on gender equality, democracy, anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism; but do the opposite in practice (Melber 2009, 21). Many liberation and independence movements in government also reduce development solutions to complex problems into simple answers, such as nationalisation, indigenisation and land expropriation of assets from ‘settlers’ (Gumede 2010, 29). Given the fact that a core demand of African independence and liberation struggles is for the return, from colonial governments and ‘settlers’, of the land, minerals and public resources to indigenous people, such as ‘solutions’ have very deep emotional appeal.

The irony is that leaders and party elites – not the broader populace, are often the beneficiaries of nationalisation, indigenisation and land expropriation (Ayittey 1994, 4; van de Walle 2003, 232; Vidal 2007, 130; Gumede 2008, 30). For another, such development solutions also means that African governments neglect the more arduous, complex and demanding, but necessary, focus on industrialisation reforms. Anyone questioning such rank hypocrisy is lumped with the ‘enemy’ camp (Gumede 2015, 105). Given the fact that secrecy prevails in these movements, and the leaders selectively make available information, ordinary members and supporters cannot really tell the difference between reality and façade. This, especially if leaders blame ‘imperialists’, machinations by former colonial powers, beneficiaries of the colonial regime, which, of course, may have a hand in wanting to undermine any African ruling regime, but the full truth is that mostly ruling liberation and independence movements and leaders are equally responsible for government failures. Since most of the media in post-independence states are often in state-hands, or the media is generally restricted from reporting negatively on the government, leaders can keep on the charade.

The abuse of liberation rhetoric, together with the restriction of critical information, help extend the reigns of many African independence and liberation movements, even if their records in power is poor.

Ambivalence to democracy

Independent and liberation movements often had a limited view of democracy, or rejected democracy as supposedly ‘unAfrican’, ‘Western’ (Nkrumah 1967; Nyerere 1968; Alalade 1981). Key Western powers, international organisations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund have wrongly pushed for a particular brand of democracy in Africa: liberal democracy which is combined with neo-liberal economics of unfettered free markets, limited employee rights and limited state involvement. Some African independence and liberation movements, still in power, introduced limited internal democratic measures, under pressure from foreign donors. Yet, most such democratisation was half-hearted. Or alternatively, democracy applied often only to a limited elite, connected to the leadership of the party.

At FRELIMO’s Mocuba party conference in 1975, Joachim Chissano said: ‘Democracy for us is the discipline of the party’ (Chissano 1975, 4). Alternatively, the leaders of independence and liberation movements equate democracy to ‘representation’ only (Machel & Munslow 1985, 17). Many African leaders viewed democracy in its narrowest sense, wrongly insisting that if only elections had taken place, their countries are democratic.

Some African leaders insisted that economic development must be pursued first, before attention could be given to democracy building. Tanzania’s post-independence leader Julius Nyerere summed it up: ‘Until our war against poverty, ignorance and disease has been won, we should not let our unity be destroyed by a desire to follow somebody else’s book of rules’ (Nyerere 1967, 4). Damningly, the record speaks for itself: the very African leaders who have advocated this approach have achieved neither development nor democracy. The Turkish political economist, Dani Rodrik, in his ground-breaking research across developing countries, shows to the contrary, democracy is not only compatible with growth and poverty reduction, but may be crucial to both (Rodrik 1998). The great Indian economist Amartya Sen has conclusively argued that certain values are universal, democracy is one of them: the case for liberty and political rights is not exclusively Western, it is as strong in Africa or Asia as it is elsewhere (Sen 1999).

Intolerance of dissent

During the independence and liberation struggle, many African independence and liberation movements discouraged dissent and criticisms of these movements themselves, unless in highly circumscribed ways, lest they expose divisions within the movements of the oppressed, which could be exploited to brutal effect by the colonial army. If non-criticism continues – which was the case in most post-independence and liberation movement governments – during the first crucial years of power, it becomes entrenched, part of the new political culture.

Opposition or criticism, whether from within or outside the independence or liberation movement was often wrongly seen as ‘opposing’ the ‘people’. Sékou Touré argued that in a ‘democratic nation’, everyone is expected to ‘unanimously … approve (the party line) enthusiastically: functionaries, employees, merchants, peasants, youth and workers’ (Touré 1959, 104). Critics of the government are frequently labelled as agents of the former colonial power, or white settlers, as the case of the ANC or ZANU-PF.

Often African independence and liberation movement governments criminalise dissent, criticisms and opposition. Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, routinely detained critics using the Prevention of Detention Act (Huq 1989). Independence or liberation movements turned government either use some of the same colonial era laws to crush dissent, or imitate the ways the colonial and apartheid governments crushed dissent. These governments often use the same colonial era laws or state agencies to crush dissent, or imitate the ways the colonial and apartheid government’s crushed dissent. The intolerance of dissent and criticisms means that independence and liberation movements never have to own to failures or examine themselves.

The culture of secrecy

During the struggle for liberation African independence and liberation movements were by their nature secretive. They were confronted by brutal regimes who tried to infiltrate them. So they had to treat internal information by a need to know basis. But, they and their cadres generally had to act in secrecy and subterfuge to foil the secret or security police of the colonial or white-minority government. However, if this culture continues after they come to power, it undermines democratic governance. Most post-independence and liberation movements turned governments continue to govern with obsessive secrecy: lack of openness, transparency and limitations on access to even basic information.

Gwen Lyster, the veteran Namibian journalist and democracy activist, warned about the SWAPO government continuing the culture of secrecy of Namibia under apartheid when ‘clandestine, often dark things, plots and plans, happened behind closed doors’ (Lyster 2008, 9). Lyster wrote there is a ‘tendency (in Namibia) to keep under wraps information which is in the public interest’ (p. 9). The irony, observed Lyster, is if there

was less secrecy, there’d also be less likelihood of ‘leaked’ information; and again, because of secrecy, matters which should be easily explained by the media, among others, to the public, are often misrepresented because government officials are not themselves open and transparent. (9)

In Mozambique, even after FRELIMO came to power, the party still launched a programme to fish out alleged ‘reactionary’ enemy ‘agents’, which ‘infiltrated the movement, and leaked information to help ‘imperialism to sabotage the revolution’ (Chissano 1975, 12). State secrecy laws from the colonial or white-minority era are rarely scrapped from the statutes when African independence and liberation movements come to power. For example, Angola still has a Law on State Secrecy, which permits the government to classify information, even the most basic sort. Contravening the law is a criminal offence. The MPLA government regularly drags critics off to prison for contravening ‘state secrecy’ (Pomonti 1982).

Government secrecy impoverishes public discussion of policy alternatives, which is crucial to separate the poor policies from the better ones (Stiglitz 1999). In the end poor policies that result in delivery failure becomes the norm. In the absence of information from government, public debates are likely to focus on personalities and side issues. Without real information of what government is really up to, ordinary people cannot effectively participate in democracy, and cannot hold their local representatives accountable (Stiglitz 1999).

When ordinary people do not have information, they cannot make a proper judgement call on the record of government. Secrecy also means that a small clique of leaders, with access to information, can manipulate the information in such a way that it appears that only they are capable of leading, even if they are incompetent. Potential capable competitors for leadership positions are sidelined by those in control withholding or manipulating information. It is when government is shrouded in secrecy that corruption thrives (Stiglitz 1999).

The cult of violence

Colonial, white-minority and apartheid rule were violent. To effectively tackle colonial, white-minority and apartheid rule, anti-colonial and liberation movements often had to respond with violence to counter the violence of colonialism, white minority-rule and apartheid. Because the colonial, white-minority and apartheid regimes used violence against internal opposition, some independence and liberation movements also adopted violence to fight the colonial power. This created a culture of violence, which once in power, many African political movements almost never rid themselves of. Indeed, ‘the very process of struggling for liberation, especially by resort to force of arms, may generate political processes that prefigure undemocratic outcomes in the wake of revolutionary success’ (Saul and Leys 1994, 146). The great Tunisian, anti-colonial thinker Memmi (2003) warned against the colonised internalising the violence of the coloniser. Often liberation movements turn the violence inward against suspected ‘infiltrators’, ‘spies’ or ‘traitors’. The ANC had notorious camps, including its Quatro camp in Angola, where leaders tortured, jailed and executed members accused of being informers for the apartheid regime (Gumede 2005, 15). Former ANC President Nelson Mandela immediately after being released from jail apologised to ANC members who suffered there (Gumede 2005, 24). If violence was used, once in government, it is often used again, and again.

Internalising the (political and social) culture of undemocratic colonial governments

Departing colonial powers left states with little democratic traditions, institutions and resources that could underpin the building of strong democracies. Most of the colonial institutions were attuned to oppress rather than promote democracy (Gumede 2010). Many post-liberation governments often did not try to go beyond the abysmal institutions inherited, either by adapting it or creating new sustainable ones. A case in point is that many African leaders’ kept colonial era insult laws, making criticism of the president a criminal offence. African governments have often inculcated the bad habits of their former colonial and apartheid administration adversaries. For example, because the colonial government or apartheid government leaders lived lavishly and consumed conspicuously, the new liberation and independence leaders do the same. They use the habits of the colonial and apartheid elite as the standards of behaviour and consumption of the new government. If the colonial or apartheid leaders drove with huge cavalcades, VIP entourages and hangers-on, the new ruling elite does the same. They send their children to the same schools where the colonial elite send their children, send their money to colonial countries, shop in Paris, London or Rome, as Grace Mugabe does, even if they in the same breath attack the ‘imperialists’. Frantz Fanon was the first to point out the psychological impact of colonialism and apartheid, in that it induced the colonised adapts the habits of the colonised, which he or she so rejects (Fanon 1967; Zahar 1974; Jahoda 1961). Ashis Nandy, the Indian psychologist of the colonial condition, talks about the ‘codes’ that the colonial power introduces into colonial society, which may not ‘end with the departure of the alien rulers from the colony’ (Nandy 1988, 2).

Newly liberated African countries often adopted the inherited institutions of colonialism, as is. Many newly liberated African countries, for example, Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda and Kenya, adopted winner-takes-all electoral systems, ill suited for ethnically diverse societies. Importantly, very few liberation movements put much effort into building relevant democratic institutions. In contrast, Mauritius, which cobbled together an electoral system that gives losing parties stakes in the system, has been a relatively successful story. Botswana successfully blended indigenous local forms of democracy into its political system.

Often, once in power, the leaders also mimic the power trappings of the colonial governors or the executive presidents of the white-minority governments. The office of the state presidency or prime minister in former white minority or apartheid and that of the colonial governor or head of the colonial administration are often very powerful. Incoming presidents or prime ministers coming from liberation and independence movements rarely reduce the power of the position. Since, the colonial state was vested with such consuming power, and democracy was not on top of their agenda, many post-liberation governments were not keen to have limits or checks on their powers. Independence and liberation movements, who did cobble together new constitutions and democratic institutions in practice, in reality rarely honoured the separation of powers, independent judiciary and a system of checks and balances between branches of government.

Members, supporters and citizens allow leaders to act as vanguard

Since African independence, members, supporters and voters have been extraordinarily lenient to the movements when they are in government. More often than not, citizens go to the elections in their droves, vote and then sit back, and wait on their leaders, governments and representatives to ‘deliver’ on the promises made. If they do not, which has been predominantly the norm, voters, citizens and supporters, take at face value African leaders’ blaming of anybody but themselves, for their failures. In the view of many African independence and liberation movements, citizens, supporters, ordinary members and voters have no role to play in governing: the leaders, act as vanguard, on behalf of them (Saul 2002). This notion of the vanguard role of the leadership and movement, and the view that members, voters and citizens, should do nothing but wait on the leadership to deliver, is at the heart of many of the failures of independence and liberation movement governments.

The leadership of independence and liberation movements often frames the priorities, values and agenda of their countries: there is no place for the input from ordinary members, citizens or civil society. They do so, while invoking the independence or liberation struggle, even if what they do is far removed from the ethos, values or priorities of the liberation and independence struggle. Unless those who go out to vote stay active in politics by at the most minimum holding the government they elected accountable on a daily basis, it will turn into a wasted vote. Democracy is a two-way process: it is a contract between the government and the citizens, where both have to deliver on their bargain. The responsibility of citizens is not only to monitor whether service delivery has improved, but also to actively hold government to account, when it slows. Unless, citizens get involved, marching, striking and protesting to express their unhappiness, government complacency will set in, and service delivery will slow down. Most independence and liberation movements and their leaders argue, well, you cannot protest, strike or criticise a government which you elected, let alone if you are a member of the ruling party in control of the government.

The reason for the drift in governments after independence and liberation is because many citizens active in the struggle were demobilised en masse: many expected that electing an independence government alone is enough guarantee for it to deliver. In many cases when independence and liberation movements fail in government, citizens, supporters and voters turn to the ways they have survived under colonial and white-minority government tyranny, by using coping mechanism such as withdrawing from politics, focusing on family, clan or informal survivalist strategies.

Entitlement to rule forever

Some African leaders’ think they and their movements have the divine right to rule forever, because they have ‘delivered’ liberation, notwithstanding their poor records in power, or for another, it is the people who have brought them to power. South African President Jacob Zuma said that the ANC will ‘rule until Kingdom come’ (Sapa 2004). ‘We fought for this country and a lot of blood was shed,’ Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe told a rally in Silobela, a village in the country’s Central Midlands province, ahead of the questionable June 2008 presidential election re-runs. ‘We are not going to give up our country because of a mere X. How can a ballpoint pen fight with a gun?’ he asked (Sapa-DPA 2008).

This is also why leaders and parties refuse to leave office, even if they lose elections, or organise fake elections, to put a veneer on democracy to please international donors, to stay in power. This is also the reason why they cannot tolerate opposition outside government. But the culture of entitlement also means that leaders and movements feel no obligation to deliver in power, because they already ‘delivered’ liberation or independence. It also means that there is no sense of accountability within the leadership of the movements for their records in government. This entitlement culture, also means that they can justify looting their countries, because they ‘sacrificed’ during the anti-colonial and liberation struggle, and are therefore entitled to live in luxury now, ditto, the ordinary citizens who invariably often as individuals suffered more from the oppressive colonial and apartheid regimes.

Moral bankruptcy of African liberation and independence movements and their leaders

One of the reasons why most African liberation movements have failed in government is because they claim justification for governing solely on the basis of their liberation legacy, rather than on the basis of accountable, moral and decent behaviour while in power. The failure of many African liberation movements turned governments, even if they have a just cause, impeccable past ‘struggle’ credentials that gives them the moral high ground, and the right policies in government, is linked to the moral corruption of the leaders and parties in power. Suddenly finding themselves with state power, with it all its trappings – from extreme poverty, powerlessness and marginalisation to access to fabulous wealth, unlimited power and domination, has corrupted many liberation and independence movements turned governments. Amilcar Cabral, one of the great thinkers of African liberation ideology, said the success of liberation-movements-turned-governments will depend on the personal moral behaviour, decency and honesty of their leading leaders and members (Cabral 1980). Cabral argued that the decency, honesty and moral behaviour of the party elite were more important in government than adherence to ideology and mechanical dedication to the rules and policies of the party (Cabral 1980).

In the context of political parties, governments and leaders, we are talking about democratic morality, which transcends narrow religious, cultural traditions and ethnicities. At the heart of democratic morality is personal behaviour, to act ethically and honestly, to have sense of duty and to govern according to democratic principles, and in the interest of the widest number of people, rather than for personal self-enrichment or in the interest of a small elite. In practice, democratic morality means where traditional practices undermine democratic values, individual dignity and rights, these traditional practices should be set aside. Very few African liberation movements and their leaders have governed ethically. A real problem has been that those in positions of authority do not appear to exercise such authority responsibly, namely ‘ethically and conscientiously to effect the best possible outcomes’ (Khoza 2011, 74)

It appears that many African leaders have ‘de-linked’ their actual day-to-day behaviour from their rhetoric and promises, yet ethical leadership demands the two to be in concert. If one listens to public statements from many leaders, double-speak has often become the norm. Those in position of authority would say one thing, but act the opposite. Some leaders say they are pro-poor, but they drive live ‘bling’ lifestyles paid by scarce public money, in the midst of seas of poverty of their supporters. Others again call for strong measures against corruption, but behave dodgy themselves. Others defend democratic institutions, but in their actions undermine it. They defend the rule of law, for those who transgressed to be harshly punished. Yet, they themselves appear to be untouchable.

Three central tenets are often missing in African independence and liberation movement leadership: morals, values and ethics. Because of this leaders view supporters and followers often merely as faceless numbers, euphemistically the ‘masses’, or ‘our people’, to be used to secure power. That is why so-called leaders could play ethnic groups against each other, or make promises to whatever faction, even if contradictory (and even if they know in their hearts of hearts these promises can never be fulfilled), to secure power; opportunistically exploit the legitimate grievances of voters to secure personal power; or dishonestly use the rhetoric of the liberation struggle, and use sophistry, blaming legacies of colonialism or apartheid, for very often their own failures in government.

Internal operations of many African liberation and independence movements are undemocratic

Many African independence and liberation movements often have inherent organisational, ideological and historical inefficiencies – which in the context of an independence and liberation struggle were often strengths, but once in government reinforce anti-democratic practices. African liberation movements developed organisational practices, traditions, obsessive secrecy and an unabashedly hierarchical command structure that proved effective in the struggle against colonial forces. But once these movements won power, that political culture worked against building durable democracies.

Unless African liberation and independence movements internalise the values of democracy in the way they run and organise their parties and governments and in their everyday behaviour, quality democracies will remain a distant dream for their citizens. African societies must be less tolerant of non-delivery, mismanagement and autocratic behaviour by independence and liberation movements and their leaders. Institutional checks-and-balances, whether through democratic watchdogs, civil society or the media, together with active followership are crucial to hold African liberation and independence movements and their leaders accountable.

To create more effective political parties, African nations will have to start with setting clear democratic rules, in their national constitutions, for how political parties should be organised. A start must to be to make minimum internal democracy a requirement for the registration of political parties across the continent. Parties must regularly prove that they have had transparent internal democratic elections – especially for the top leadership, have regular conferences and show evidence that members participated in policy formulation and adoption.

Country constitutions must make it a requirement for political parties not to discriminate on ethnic, religious or gender basis. It will even be a good idea to compel parties to show membership lists that are inclusive. Parties must set minimum gender, youth, minorities and rural communities’ representative levels in leadership positions. Party funding must be made transparent. Funding to parties must be allocated on the basis of a formula that obviously take into account their performance in the last elections, but also how internally democratic they are, and how inclusive they are in terms of ethnicity, gender, youth and regional make-up.

Merit must be introduced to the internal leadership elections. There is a higher premium on quality leaders in developing countries, where democratic institutions, political cultures and nation-building efforts are still nascent and where undemocratic leaders can damage the system.

Conclusion

Many African countries have formal democratic constitutions, laws and institutions. However, although these constitutions, laws and democratic institutions are often impressive on paper, they are often not respected or genuinely implemented. African citizens will have to hold their political parties and leaders accountable to respect democratic constitutions, laws and institutions.

African independence and liberation movements turned governments have often become obstacles to building lasting democracies. Their internal organisational cultures, leaders and the way they exercise power have more often than undermined democracy.

The only way to prevent further moral decay of African independence or liberation movements is for members to transform these movements into wholly internally democratic organisations. Members, supporters and activists must play more active roles in keeping these movements democratic and holding their leadership accountable.

Pro-democracy activists could, for example, form pro-democracy lobbies within these movements and push for the total internal democratisation of the party at all levels, whether in participation in decision- and policy-making or leadership election, especially the election of the president.

Members, supporters and activists who support these movements will have to decide whether to club together as genuine democrats to fully take-over these movements and transform them. By taking over African liberation movements over ‘lock-stock-and barrel’, they could clean them up from within, make them more accountable, bring better leaders with integrity and honesty and introduce better policies.

The quality of political leadership of Africa’s independence and liberation movements Africa has been stunningly inadequate. Clearly, for democracy to flourish the continent desperately needs a new generation of visionary, caring and capable leaders that are committed to inclusive democracy.

Old-style leaders, who are only in power because of their struggle credentials, rather than because of their leadership record, must be jettisoned. If these movements and their leaders are too rotten, African civil society and its trade unions, civil movements and churches must form new parties out of the ashes of independence and liberation movements, as happened in Cape Verde and Mauritius. African citizens, members and supporters of liberation movements turn government governments will have to reinvent the current mostly undemocratic political culture of these movements, towards democratic cultures (Goldfarb 2012). Unless they do so, these movements, in government, will not become effective democratic governance parties.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 The core indicators of political culture of African liberation movements of the centre-left tradition, for the purpose of this article are culled from the works of Pye and Verba (1965), Pye (1968), Jowitt (1974), White (1979), De Tocqueville (1981), Dahlgren (2005), Gumede (2010) and Goldfarb (2012). The core indicators include: one-partyism, centralization of decision-making and policy-making, discouraging of competitive elections, leadership cults, ambivalence to democracy, intolerance to dissent, culture of secrecy and cult of violence.