The Necessity of Security Sector Reform in Zimbabwe

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the factors that demonstrate the necessity and significance of security sector reform in Zimbabwe. This is important given the security forces’ interference in elections and politics, the militarisation of civilian institutions and grave intra-party factional wars that emerged. It argues that the security sector was partisan, politicised, violent on civilians and divisive with the support of the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front amid the militarisation of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. Also, ahead of the 2002 Presidential elections, and the 2008 harmonised elections the securocrats vowed not to accept any presidential aspirant who won elections without liberation war credentials. It is fundamental for all stakeholders to the Zimbabwean conflict to encourage the security forces to uphold the constitution of Zimbabwe in particular the guidelines articulated in the Defence Act and Police Act in order to achieve sustainable peace and development in the country.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 The United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID n.d.) refers to SSR as a process of assisting ‘developing countries improve the accountability and transparency of their security sectors' (DFID Terms of Reference for the Provision of Consultancy Services on Conflict, Security and Development Issues, ref 01/2892 n.d., para 8). SSR is also referred to as ‘right-sizing, re-orientation, reform, and capacity-building of national defence forces' (Special Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe n.d., 25–26). On a different platform, SSR is planned ‘to create armed, uniformed forces which are functionally differentiated, professional forces under objective and subjective political control, at the lowest functional level of resource use’ (Brozka 2000, 9–11). More so, it is concerned with scaling down ‘the size, budget and scope of the security sector and reforming it to become more transparent and accountable to its citizens' (Naraghi and Conaway 2004).

2 He is alleged to have changed his name to Constantino from Constantine in 2016. It might be that there was no change of name it has always been Constantino but it slipped media houses and majority of his subordinates for some time.

3 Here he refers to MDC-T members, NGOs, activists and civil society groups.

4 The Mujuru faction is believed to have been initially led by Joice Mujuru's late husband, Solomon (died in 2011) and continued under the tutelage of his wife but others unconvincingly suggest that it rallied behind Sydney Sekeramayi. The term ‘Weevils' (anti-Mujuru ZANU-PF loyalists) was coined by the Mujuru faction denoting those individuals who were destroying ZANU-PF from within in a similar way weevils eat and destroy grains. The Gamatox group was the popular name for the Mujuru faction who due to their occupying dominant positions at both state and party levels likened themselves to the gamatox (a banned highly toxic pesticide). They included but were not limited to Didymus Mutasa, Nicholas Goche, Rugare Gumbo, Dzikamayi Mavhaire and Sylvester Nguni. This is because they perceived themselves as moderates who wanted reform in the party while the weevils consisted of hardliners such as Grace Mugabe, Oppah Muchinguri, Obert Mpofu, Ignatious Chombo, Saviour Kasukuwere, Patrick Chinamasa, Josiah Hungwe, Jonathan Moyo, Phillip Chiyangwa and Patrick Zhuwawo among others. See Matyszak (2015). Surely Emmerson Mnangagwa was at the time at the front of this group.

5 The G40 moniker denotes the group constituting of those young ZANU-PF cadres who did not fight in the liberation war and are in their forties. It is largely dominated by Mugabe's nephew, Patrick Zhuwao, Saviour Kasukuwere and the controversial Jonathan Moyo.

6 Mnangagwa's faction is also known as Team Lacoste in reference to his nickname Ngwena (Crocodile). See Tafirenyika and Kwaramba (2016).