ABSTRACT
In a recent article in Politikon, Colin Chasi outlined and analysed Desmond Tutu’s ethics, teasing out the implications of these to just war theory. Chasi, who follows a Metzian interpretation of Tutu’s ethics, concluded that Tutuism offers little guidance for war ethics. In this article, I wish to respond to Chasi and argue that his interpretation of Tutuist ethics is not charitable enough. I present two sets of arguments to support this view. Firstly, Tutuist Ubuntu can morally justify violence when this promotes social harmony. Secondly, Tutu’s moral reformation theory can be used as guidance for an ethics of war, to the extent that a principle derived from it is that morally acceptable acts of war are those acts that can restore peace following conflict.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 John Allen’s study is particularly relevant to understanding Tutu’s own position as it is an authorised biography.
2 It is important to emphasise here that later versions of Metz’s theory are deontological rather than consequentialist.
3 I do not wish to give a full account of the elements of reconciliation here; rather I wish to list the ones relevant for the present discussion.