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ABSTRACT
There are competing interpretations of ubuntu as a moral theory, and these various understandings of it entail diverging moral-political responses to real problems in the world. The Marikana massacre is one such moral-political problem, and the various interpretations of ubuntu might recommend various responses to it. This article, in some sense, critiques, and, simultaneously, supplements Thad Metz's relational interpretation of ubuntu that recommends reconciliation as the best response the government could offer to the Marikana massacre. Unlike Metz, I adopt a self-realisation approach to ubuntu, and argue that Marikana must be understood within the broad narrative of historical injustices with cheap black labour as the core of the issues. I proceed to argue that the government needs to address some of the vestiges of cheap labour that is part of the core causes of protests before we can talk meaningfully about reconciliation. Ubuntu should demand, in part, that inter alia economic historical injustices be addressed for the sake of making humanity possible for all, particularly victims of oppression.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1 In no particular order, we distinguish four salient interpretations of Ubuntu. (1) Ubuntu construed in terms of critical humanism (Praeg Citation2014); (2) Ubuntu construed in terms of strict cosmopolitanism (Etieyibo Citation2017); Ubuntu construed in terms of harmonious relationships; and (4), Ubuntu construed in terms of self-realisation (Ramose Citation1999; Shutte Citation2001, Van Niekerk Citation2007).
2 For example, Augustine Shutte (Citation2001) in his analysis of Ubuntu totally ignores historical injustices. He simply elucidates on what Ubuntu can contribute to the new South Africa. I am aware that in another place, Metz (Citation2011) does touch on historical injustices in relation to ubuntu. It is important to note, however, the aim of the essay is not dedicated to this theme, but he does so to indicate that his theory is robust enough to accommodate these considerations. We hold the view that Metz’s theory of Ubuntu is implausible (Molefe Citation2017; Metz Citation2011).
3 Here, we advocate the self-realisation approach. We do not have space to consider all four salient approaches to Ubuntu, and their nuances. It suffices that we inform the reader that we consider the views of Ubuntu defended under the rubric of critical humanism and strict cosmopolitanism to be implausible.
4 For defense of the self-realisation approach to ubuntu ethics, see the following articles and book by one of us where the self-realisation interpretation of ubuntu (Molefe Citation2018a, Citation2018b, Citation2019b).
5 We advise the reader to note that there are scholars of African ethics, like Menkiti, Wiredu and Gyekye, that invoke the idea of personhood, but never use the term Ubuntu. We assume that the idea of Ubuntu and personhood have the same moral content at least as used by African scholars. We say so precisely because at the heart of the idea of Ubuntu is the idea of personhood (Molefe Citation2019b).
6 This point corroborates footnote 4.
7 This way of understanding ubuntu suggests an egoistic reading, whereby the duty for personal perfection is entirely left in the hands of the agent.
8 I am here (content) merely to sign the blank cheque that there must a set of social and political conditions in place that are necessary for a possibility for a human (moral) life i.e., certain basic conditions and goods are necessary for a human life. It is not necessary that to specify them to make an argument here. The point however here is to point out that colonisation and apartheid did not provide such basic conditions.