Elections in Africa During Covid-19: The Tenuous Balance Between Democracy and Human Security

ABSTRACT

Conventional wisdom conceives of COVID-19 narrowly as a global health crisis requiring a medical response with a view to ensure health security. A holistic approach characterises COVID-19 as a major crisis that require a response that safeguards democracy. With the onset of COVID-19, African countries have either proceeded with elections or postponed them. Each option has come with challenges for democratisation, peace and stability. Furthermore, African countries find themselves at the horns of dilemma between promoting the right to vote (democracy) on one hand and safeguarding the right to health for citizens (human security) on the other. The stark reality is that African states have to advance both democracy and human security in tandem. Depending on contexts, failure to maintain the democracy-human security balance may bolster autocratisation in Africa.

Introduction

The popular conventional wisdom conceives COVID-19 as a global health crisis requiring a medical response. While appealing, this perspective tends to be narrow in both form and substance. A more comprehensive perspective perceives COVID-19 broadly through a lens that transcends the health crisis. COVID-19 has the hallmarks of the larger crisis of development, democracy, governance, peace and human security (inclusive of health security). This article propounds this second school of thought by investigating the impact of the government responses to pandemic on elections in Africa. The article also delves into how responses to the pandemic manifest a tenuous balance between democracy and human security, particularly in the context of the pre-COVID-19 reversals of democratic gains and resurgence of autocracy on the continent.

The article has four sections. The second section below introduces the theory and practice of democracy within which the value of elections is to be understood. The third section focuses on elections under conditions of COVID-19 to show that African leaders face ‘a Cornelian dilemma: to organize elections and raise the risk of spreading the pandemic, or to postpone the election and face accusations of authoritarianism’ (Oulepo 2020, 2). The third unravels the tenuous balance between democracy and human security as African states respond to COVID-19. This uneasy balancing act may either bolster democratisation or incubate autocratisation depending on contexts. The conclusion restates the main arguments and observations and wraps up the discussion.

Democratic theory

The election story is best understood within the framework of democratic theory. Elections are part of the historical evolution of democracy globally. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Gerald Pomper proclaims that ‘popular elections are generally assumed to be the crucial element of democratic governments’ (Pomper 1967, 478).

Firstly, the genealogy of democracy is traceable to ancient Greek city–state of Athens between the fifth and fourth centuries B.C (Keane 2009). Three most important organs of the state were occupied by means of sortition (selection by lot) namely ‘the Council of 500 (Boule), the People’s Court (Heliaia) and practically all magistrates (arkhai) … . while the rest were elected’ (Van Reybrouck 2018, 63–64). The Greek direct/popular democracy was participatory and deliberative premised upon citizen power combining sortition and elections. Popularised by classical philosophers such as Rousseau, Locke and Aristotle, direct democracy allowed political equality, legitimate government, popular consent, public trust in governance institutions, popular participation and accountability (Pomper 1967, 478–479). Aristotle characterised ‘election by lot as the most democratic method’ (Pomper 1967, 480).

Secondly, the eighteenth Century bourgeois revolutions against feudalism in Europe and United States toppled direct/popular democracy and replaced it with the present-day liberal/representative democracy. The basic tenets of liberal/representative democracy are: (a) political competition through regular multi-party elections; (b) political rights and civil liberties; (c) free market and private property rights; (d) political participation; and (e) representative government. Popular power was replaced by elitism. Some of the foremost proponents of liberal/representative democracy included Plato, Mills and Madison (Pomper 1967).

This transformation had the net effect of aristocratisation and oligarchisation of democracy. For van Reybrook,

the representative system may have been democratic in that it gave people the vote, but it was aristocratic from the start in its form of recruitment. Anyone could vote, but a selection had already been made that favoured the elite … . This looks more like the start of a technocracy than a democracy. (Van Reybrouck 2018, 87)

Elections became the heart and soul of liberal democracy.

Thirdly, since the onset of the third wave of democratisation in the 1990s, a plethora of studies (see Zakaria 1997; Haynes 2001; Schedler 2002; Keane 2009; Gyimah-Boadi 2015; Van Reybrouck 2018; Matlosa 2017; Grayling 2018) have bemoaned democratic backsliding in many parts of the world including Africa. Hybrid systems or grey zone democracies are prevalent in the form of illiberal democracy or democratic illiberalism. Fareed Zakaria contends that ‘the greatest danger that illiberal democracy poses - other than its own people – is that it will discredit liberal democracy itself, casting a shadow on democratic governance’ (Zakaria 1997, 42).

Andreas Schedler has illustrated how elections under conditions of illiberalism have served to bolster electoral authoritarianism and not democracy (Schedler 2002; 2006). Borrowing from the opening lines of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in ‘The Communist Manifesto’, relating to the ‘specter of communism in Europe’, Schedler posits that ‘a specter is haunting the developing world – the specter of electoral authoritarianism … the institutional façade of democracy, including regular multiparty elections for the chief executive, in order to conceal (and reproduce) harsh realities of authoritarian governance’ (Schedler 2006, 1).

In illiberal democracies, elections amount to ‘a menu of manipulation’ devoid of democracy (Schedler 2002, 36). This has, in part, compelled Gyimah-Boadi to proclaim that ‘the march to democratic progress in Africa that received such fanfare seems to have been succeeded by a long phase of stagnation’ (Gyimah-Boadi 2015, 103). Elections are routinely manipulated and rigged by elites for self-serving partisan political ends. Cheeseman and Klaas bemoan the contradiction of the flourishing, globally, of elections on the one hand and the erosion of democracy on the other. Graphically, they detail ‘the sumptuous’ six-course ‘menu of manipulation’ of elections in Africa including (a) gerrymandering, (b) vote-buying, (c) repression, (d) electronic hacking, (e) ballot box stuffing and (f) playing the international community (Cheeseman and Klaas 2018).

COVID-19 has, therefore, come at a perilous moment for democracy. Trends show that the world today is under torrential waves of autocratisation. Using data from the Varieties of Democracy’s (V-Dem) Liberal Democracy Index, Maerz et al, show that today almost 35% of the world’s population, 2.6 billion people, live in nations undergoing autocratisation, while fewer than 8% of people currently live in increasingly democratic regimes (Maerz et al. 2020, 2). As COVID-19 spreads across the world and states increasingly respond to the pandemic with emergency measures, the incentive for autocratisation is greater, more so under conditions where pro-democracy protests are suspended under the pretext of containing the spread of COVID-19 as happened in Uganda in November 2020 resulting in severe police brutality leading to the killing and injury of several protestors following the arrest of an opposition presidential candidate, Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, popularly known as Bobi Wine. These authors conclude that

the early months of 2020 have given additional reason for pessimism: the corona pandemic. While many social restrictions may be justifiable in the face of the pandemic, there is a risk that governments will abuse the crisis to enact measures that are disproportionate to the task at hand and to extend their powers and limit freedoms permanently … . In summary, the third wave of autocratisation … risks gaining unprecedented momentum. (Maerz, et al., 5–6)

Katherine Ellena agrees that the pandemic has arrived at ‘a time when the rule of law and fundamental rights are already under attack’ (Ellena 2020, 1). She concludes that

without a strong foundation for democratic resilience, a global health crisis can shock democratic institutions and offer an alluring blank check to governments to use emergency powers to curtail individual and collective political rights in the short and long term (Ellena 2020, 1)

The rise of illiberalism today progressively leads to dwindling public trust in governance institutions, as Table 1 below illustrates.

Table 1. Public Trust in Governance Institutions in Africa.

	President (%)	Parliament (%)	National Election Commission (%)	Local Council (%)	Ruling Party (%)	Opposition Party (%)	Police (%)	Army (%)	Traditional leaders (%)	Religious Leaders (%)
Not at All/Just a Little	43	51	49	50	49	59	47	32	30	47
Somewhat/A Lot	53	44	44	43	44	33	51	65	48	51
Refused	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Do not Know/Haven’t Heard Enough	3	1	7	7	4	5	2	8	8	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Afrobarometer Round 7 (2016-2018).

From Table 1 above, it is clear that less than 50% of the respondents to the Afrobarometer survey trust parliament (44%), national election commission (44%), local council (43%), ruling party (44%), opposition party (33%) and traditional leaders (48%). Interestingly, more than 50% of respondents trust the army (65%), president (53%), police (51%) and religious leaders (51). The next section discusses elections during COVID-19.

Elections in 2020

More than 20 African countries had scheduled elections (presidential, parliamentary and local) and referenda for 2020. Much as the COVID-19 poses an immense risk to the health of African citizens, government responses to the pandemic presented a major hazard to the health of democracy and integrity of elections. During the first half of the year, 8 Member States of the African Union conducted their elections and one referendum as Table 2 below shows.

Table 2. Elections, January-June 2020.

Country	Type of Elections	Date of Elections	Voter Turnout	COVID-19 Impact
Comoros	National Assembly	19 January (runoff on 23 February)	62.42	Not Applicable
Cameroon	National Assembly, Senate and Local	9 February	43.79	Not Applicable
Togo	Presidential	22 February	76.63	Not Applicable
Guinea	National Assembly and Referendum	22 March	58.04 & 61.18	Absence of international EOMs
Mali	National Assembly	29 March & Run-off on 19 April	35.58 & 35.25	Absence of international EOMs Low Voter Turnout
Benin	Local	17 May	49.14	Low Voter Turnout
Burundi	Presidential National Assembly and Local	20 May 7 June	87.71	Absence of international EOMs
Malawi	Presidential	23 June	64.81	Absence of international EOMs

Source: Electoral Institute for the Sustainable Democracy in Africa website (http://www.eisa.org). Accessed on Tuesday 4 August 2020.

Only three countries (Comoros, Cameroon and Togo) conducted their elections prior to the onset of COVID-19 in these countries. Five countries (Guinea, Mali, Benin, Burundi and Malawi) held their elections and referendum (in Guinea) under harsh conditions of COVID-19.

It is clear from Table 2 that the trend of voter turn-out in the five countries that held elections during COVID-19 was a mixed bag. While voter turnout was low in Mali (35.58% on 29 March and 35.25% on 19 April) and Benin (49.14%), it was high in Burundi (87.71%) and Malawi (64.81%), but moderate in Guinea (58.04% for the legislative elections and 61.18% for the referendum). Low voter turnout is inimical to democratisation as it illustrates poor citizen participation and reinforces elitism. It denudes the credibility of election outcomes and the legitimacy of resulting governments. It may also be a harbinger for post-election political violence and instability as illustrated by the post-election conflicts in Mali, culminating in a military coup. While COVID-19 may have contributed to low voter turnout in Mali, terrorism and violent extremism in the north and central parts of the country have contributed to the disincentive for Malians to throng the polling stations. According to the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) and Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) the low voter turnout in Mali was ‘due to the escalating insurgency across the country and the public safety threat posed by the COVID-19 pandemic’ (CDD 2020, 10).

Of the countries that held elections in 2020, two stand out namely Malawi and Seychelles. Malawi had held its general elections earlier in May 2019. The outcome of the election was contested by opposition parties and overturned by the courts. Attempts by former President Peter Mutharika to postpone the polls due to COVID-19 did not bear fruit. Consequently, a fresh election was conducted on 23 June 2020 under conditions of COVID-19, with no international observers, but monitored by domestic observers only. The election went well overall and was won by the opposition coalition led by Lazarus Chakwera, leader of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), the current president.

Seychelles held its election on 24–25 October 2020. As in Malawi, the opposition party won the polls. The Linyon Demokratik Seselwa (LDS) led by Wavel Ramkalawan dislodged Danny Faure’s United Seychelles party which had been in power for about 43 years under various political labels in what had become an enduring dominant party system. Ramkalawan won 54.9% of the votes to claim the presidency and his LDS grabbed 20 of the 26 elected parliamentary seats (Today in Seychelles, 2020).

The lesson from Malawi is that of protection of democracy from autocratic tendencies which are currently bolstered by dictatorial responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. The lesson from Seychelles is that with or without COVID-19, dominant party systems are not necessarily a permanent feature of the political landscape in Africa. The next sub-section focuses on Mali’s election which, in part, led to a military coup.

Mali: controversial election propels a military coup

Mali experienced a major post-election violent conflict triggering a military coup. The Mali legislative elections started off on a wrong footing and ended badly too. The polls had been planned to hold on four previous dates (25 November 2018; 16 December 2018, April 2019 and June 2019) but postponed as many times. The main factor behind these numerous postponements was terrorism in various parts of the country especially north and central. But when the poll was agreed for 2020, two additional factors added to the toxicity of the political environment: (a) public protests and (b) COVID-19. At the start of the electoral process, the opposition leader, Soumaila Cisse was abducted, an act that polluted an already poisoned electoral environment. Following the election, the opposition, through its organised formation known as June 5th Movement-Group of Patriotic Forces (M5-RFP), led by the popular imam, Mahmoud Dicko, mounted protests against the government of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. Dicko subsequently announced his withdrawal from politics following a military coup that toppled the Keita government.

The protests by the M5-RFP revolved around three main issues: (a) rejection of the parliamentary election results; (b) dissatisfaction with the government response to terrorist insurgency and (c) corruption in the public sector. The hidden factor was, of course, COVID-19. The escalation of the protests prompted the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to intervene by appointing Goodluck Jonathan, former President of Nigeria, as its Special Envoy and Mediator. Jonathan undertook a field mission to Bamako on 15–19 July 2020 which stalled as M5-RFP maintained its four demands: (a) the resignation of the President; (b) the establishment of a transitional regime; (c) the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the killing of more than 20 protestors during the demonstrations of 10–12 July 20; and (d) the release of Soumaila Cisse, opposition leader, abducted during the parliamentary elections (ECOWAS 2020a, 3).

Due to the stalemated mediation, ECOWAS dispatched a High-Level Fact-Finding Mission of five Heads of State from Niger, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria and Senegal to Mali on 23 July. On 27 July ECOWAS held an Extra-Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government which adopted a five-point declaration calling for (a) the resignation of all 31 Members of Parliament whose elections were contested, including the president of the National Assembly, Moussa Timbine, and the holding of partial elections in the affected constituencies; (b) the facilitation of the re-composition of the Constitutional Court and the immediate appointment of judges; (c) the formation of a government of national unity (GNU) led by Prime Minister Boubou Cisse 50% of whose members should come from the ruling coalition, 30% from the opposition and 20% from civil society; (d) establishment of a Commission of Inquiry to determine the causes and identify those responsible for the violence that led to the death and casualties and destruction of property during the demonstrations of 10–12 July; and (e) Malian authorities to accelerate their efforts towards the release of Soumaila Cisse (ECOWAS 2020a, 6).

The Malian stakeholders were given ten (10) days to implement these ECOWAS recommendations. The Heads of State requested the ECOWAS Commission to consider imposing sanctions against all those who would act contrary to the normalisation of the political situation in Mali. Despite the threat of sanctions, M5-RFP rejected ECOWAS proposals and stuck steadfastly to its four demands outlined earlier. Following a visit to Bamako on 10–12 August by the ECOWAS mediator, developments took a more dangerous turn on 18 August when the military intervened through what started as a mutiny (Paquette 2020) but quickly mutated into a full-fledged coup de tat that toppled the government with the president, the prime minister and scores of ministers arrested.

Keita later announced, from his detention at Kati military base, his resignation dissolving his government and parliament. The military junta, dubbed the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP), declared that it had taken charge in order to stabilise the country. Making this announcement, the junta’s spokesperson, Col. Ismael Wague, proclaimed

we are not holding on to power, but we are holding on to the stability of the country … . This will allow us to organise within an agreed reasonable timeframe, general elections to equip Mali with strong institutions, which are able to better manage our everyday lives and restore confidence between the government and the governed. (Aljazeera 2020a)

At the heart of the CNSP were five soldiers in the driving seat of the junta. The 37-year old Col. Assimi Goita, head of Mali’s Special Forces, was the president of the CNSP. The first vice-president was Col. Malick Diaw, Deputy Chief of the Kati Camp. Col. Sadio Camara and Col. Modibo Kone were the second and third presidents respectively, while Col-Major Ismael Wague, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, was the spokesperson of the junta (Diallo 2020).

ECOWAS denounced the military coup as an affront to constitutionalism, rule of law and democracy contrary to the noble principles of its 2001 Additional Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. Besides denouncing the military coup, ECOWAS called on the military to release Keita and all other arrested officials; suspended Mali from all decision-making bodies of ECOWAS; imposed economic embargo on Mali through closure all land and air borders and putting a halt to all economic, commercial and financial transactions; activated the ECOWAS Stand-by Force in readiness for possible military intervention; imposed sanctions against all putschists, their partners and collaborators and decided to dispatch a high-level delegation to Bamako to ensure immediate return to constitutional order (ECOWAS 2020b). The Peace and Security Council of the African Union met on 19 August and condemned the coup as a blatant violation of the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Consequently, the PSC resolved to immediately suspend Mali from all AU activities until constitutional order is restore in the country; called for the release of the president, prime minister and other officials from detention; encouraged an all-inclusive dialogue for the speedy resolution of the crisis; implored the military to return the barracks (AU 2020).

On 23–25 August 2020, the ECOWAS envoy and mediator, Jonathan, was back in Bamako. While ECOWAS had resolved that the military junta must reinstate Keita as the president, the CNSP only agreed to release the former president from detention in Kati army base. The major bone of contention during the negotiations related to the structure and duration of the transitional authority. The CNSP junta proposed a transitional authority led by the military and including a technocratic civilian component for three years. In contrast, during its extra-ordinary summit held on 28 August 2020, ECOWAS decided that Mali should establish a transitional authority with a civilian President and civilian Prime Minister and with no military body above the transitional President by no later than 15 September 2020 for a period of twelve months (ECOWAS 2020d). Both the transitional President and Prime Minister are barred from contesting next elections which should combined presidential and parliamentary polls (ECOWAS 2020c). Following national consultations involving CNSP, political parties and civil society organisations in Bamako held on 10–12 September 2020, a political charter on the transitional was adopted with M5-RFP expressing its reservations. The charter proposes a transitional authority for 18 months. The authority will have (a) a president (civilian or military) and a vice president, (b) prime minister to head a 25-member government and (c) a 121 strong transitional council. The transitional president is Col. (retired) Bah N’Daou, a former minister of defence and the interim prime minister is Amb. Moctar Ouane, former minister of foreign affairs; both will not contest the 2022 elections.

Few countries shown in Table 3 above postponed elections due to COVID-19. Postponement of elections due to COVID-19 has not been a smooth sailing. The risks around postponement of elections have been marked by a plethora of political dynamics worth highlighting here, with special focus on Ethiopia.

Table 3. Postponed elections in 2020 due to COVID-19.

Country	Type of Election	Date	Remarks
Ethiopia	National Assembly and Local	29 August	Postponed due to COVID-19
Liberia	Senate & Referendum	13 October	Postponed to 13 December due to COVID-19
Chad	National Assembly and Local	13 October	Postponed due to COVID-19
Somalia	National Assembly	November 2020	Postponed to August 2021 due to COVID-19
Somaliland	National Assembly and Senate	Late 2020	Postponed due to COVID-19

Source: Electoral Institute for the Sustainable Democracy in Africa website (http://www.eisa.org). Accessed on Tuesday 4 August 2020.

Ethiopia: postponed elections trigger an armed conflict

Ethiopia has experienced feudal rule until 1974, military rule (1974–1991) and dominant party system (1991–2018) under the hegemony of the ruling coalition known as the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The country began a delicate governance reform agenda under Abiy Ahmed as the Prime Minister from April 2018 (Gebissa 2018; Temin and Badwaza 2019).

Abiy’s ascent to power was preceded by popular protests across Ethiopia predominantly in the Oromia and Ahmara regions between 2015 and 2018. He succeeded Hailemariam Dessalegn who resigned. Dessalegn had taken over the reign of power from Meles Zenawi, who passed away in 2012 after being in office since 1991. Abiy, an Oromo, himself, appealed to the popular aspirations of the protesters. Upon assuming office, as Prime Minister, he embarked on wide-ranging reforms including the normalisation of relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea which earned him the Nobel Peace Prize.

Governance reforms have included the release of political prisoners, commitment to political and economic liberalisation. In his own words when addressing political parties, Abiy proclaimed the

given our current politics, there is no option except pursuing a multiparty democracy supported by strong institutions that respect human rights and rule of law. This will allow us to mediate our differences peacefully and to ensure lasting progress. (Temin and Badwaza 2019, 145)

Beyond the noble commitment above, Abiy’s popularity has not yet been tested through a democratic election.

Elections for members of the House of Representatives, Regional State and Local Councils in Ethiopia were originally planned for May 2020, but subsequently postponed to 29 August 2020. On 14 March 2020, the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) proposed suspension of the electoral calendar due to the COVID-19 pandemic. NEBE announced that ‘we have decided to hold back the timetable issued for the parliamentary election due to the coronavirus phenomena that made it impossible to carry on with electoral preparations’ (Getachew 2020, 1).

On 8 April 2020, using Article 93 of the Constitution, the Ethiopian government declared a five-month state of emergency in order to fight the COVID-19 pandemic making clear that violators of the state of emergency would face up to three years behind bars. Opposition parties criticised the declaration of the state of emergency as a ploy by the ruling coalition to centralise power and entrench repression. It should be noted that in November 2019, Abiy Ahmed dissolved the then ruling EPRDF which was led by TPLF between 1991 and 2018 when he introduced the new ruling coalition, the PP to the chagrin of TPLF. TPLF subsequently pulled out from the PP and effectively repositioning itself within the opposition ranks. Since then, relations between TPLF and PP have remained sour.

On 10 June 2020, the House of Federations (HoF) agreed to extend the tenure of office for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, his federal government and regional governments by a period of nine (9) months after which, depending on the risk associated with COVID-19, elections would be considered. Ironically, this decision was taken two days after the Speaker of the HoF, Ms. Keria Ibrahim, and one of the top officials of the TPLF, resigned in protest at what she dubbed an attempt at the unconstitutional usurpation of power by the new ruling coalition styled the Prosperity Party (PP). In her own words, ‘I can’t be an accomplice when the constitution is being violated and a dictatorial government is being forme … I have resigned not to be collaborator with such a historical mistake’ (Endeshaw 2020).

The Tigray Regional State, in the northern part of the country, the stronghold of the TPLF, vowed that it would proceed with the regional elections despite the postponement of the national poll. When the NEBE rejected the request by the Tigray Regional State Council for logistical support, the Council established its own regional structure to administer the polls, a move the federal government dubbed unconstitutional. In like manner, the TPLF also argued that the postponement of elections by the HoF was unconstitutional, proclaiming that ‘we will not forsake the people’s right to vote just to please a dictatorial clique in Addis Ababa’ (Zelalem 2020, 5). Obviously, this development had the net effect of pitting the Tigray regional state council and the federal government in a tug-of-war.

On 6 August 2020, the Council of the Tigray Regional State amended its regional constitution reforming the electoral system and increasing the size of the council from 152 to 190 seats. The sitting of the council also re-affirmed the establishment of the new five-person regional electoral commission (Kiruga 2020) headed by Muluwork Gebrekidan to manage the polls. The PP was one of the political parties that boycotted the Tigray regional election. The election took place on 9 September and as the date drew near political temperature kept rising. The newly elected speaker of the HoF, Farah Adem warned the Tigray Regional State Council to refrain from conducting the election. Consequently, the HoF called for an emergency meeting on Saturday, 5 September. Ahead of the meeting, the Tigray Regional State Council issued a statement warning the HoF that

if it passes a decision to suspend or put any other obstacle to the Tigray election, it is a declaration of war … and that the Prime Minister will be held accountable for the reaction and damage that follows with the decision of the House of Federation. (Ekubemichael 2020a)

When the HoF held its emergency meeting, it did conclude that the Tigray regional state election scheduled for 9 September is unconstitutional and contravenes article 9 sub-section 1 of the constitution and that its outcome would be ‘void, non-binding and non-applicable’ (Ekubemichael 2020b). The ruling TPLF won 98.2% of the regional poll and grabbed 152 seats of the regional state council leaving 38 seats as a political hand-out to be shared by the remaining four parties (Ekubemichael 2020b). The controversy around the postponement of elections and the declaration of the state of emergency intensified following 10 October when the tenure of the current government expired.

In all fairness, to reduce the current COVID-19 related political challenges in Ethiopia to the tug-of-war between the Tigray Regional State and the Federal Government may be myopic at worst and simplistic at best. The problem is more complex and much broader as it manifests in almost all the regional states: Oromiya, Ahmara and the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples included. Thus, Berhe is spot-on by observing that ‘on-going riots in Oromia and Wolayta; state fragmentation in the Ahmara region, and the standoff between the federal government and the Tigray region have put the survival of government in question’ (Berhe 2020, 1). In December 2018, Sidame people were given a regional state status through a referendum thereby breaking away from the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State. This development has enthused the Wolayta people to agitate for regional statehood as well taking advantage of Abiy’s political liberalisation (Berhe 2020, 3).

The postponement of elections has polarised Ethiopia’s already toxic ethnic-based polity triggering sporadic protests and political violence. On 29 June 2020, the popular Oromo pop star and activist, Hanchalu Hundessa, aligned to Abiy’s ruling PP, was killed. This incident led to violent protests in Addis Ababa and several towns in the Oromo Regional State on 30 June–2 July 2020. Business came to a standstill. Public transport was halted. Looting of businesses became rampant. Private and public property was destroyed. Broadband, Wi-Fi and internet were shut down until 15 July. A total of 166 people were killed (Aljazeera 2020b), although non-official sources put the figure at 239 (Meseret 2020) and 167 people sustained serious injuries. According to Aljazeera, the high death toll was attributable to ‘a combination of lethal force by security officers and inter-ethnic violence’ (Aljazeera 2020b). A total of 1084 people were arrested (Aljazeera 2020b). Unofficial sources put the figure at 3500 (Meseret 2020). Three high-profile Oromo opposition leaders were arrested in connection with this unrest, including the media mogul and Oromo nationalist, Jawar Mohammend. About 10, 000 people were forcibly displaced by the violent protests and security forces’ response (Zelalem 2020). The Ethiopian Prime Minister blamed the killing of Hundessa and the ensuing protests and violence on coordinated attempts to destabilise the country (Aljezeera 2020b). These protests highlighted not only the ethnically polarised Ethiopian polity, but also the depth of the controversy around postponement of elections due to COVID-19 and the prolongation of the tenure of the current administration by the House of Federations. This polarisation may torpedo the reform agenda of the current administration.

On 4 November 20, the Prime Minister announced a military operation by the Ethiopian National Defence Force against the TPLF in the Tigray Regional State. The Prime Minister justified this operation as a response to the attempt by the TPLF to rob the Northern Command of artillery and military equipment, arguing that ‘the government tried to avoid war, but war cannot be avoided by one side’ (Addis Ababa Standard 2020). At the time of writing this article the armed conflict between the federal government and the TPLF was continuing. Up-to-date and accurate information was difficult to come by due to the six-month state of emergency in Tigray declared by the federal government and news blackout. This armed conflict poses a serious threat to the stability of Ethiopia and the entire Horn of Africa region.

Besides compromising electoral integrity, responses to COVID-19 have laid bare the frailties of democracy and human security in Africa, subject of the next section.

The tenuous balance between democracy and human security

In promoting democracy, citizen’s fundamental rights are key. In advancing human security, peoples’ basic livelihoods are paramount. But responses by governments to COVID-19 have constrained rights of citizens and threatened their livelihoods. The promotion of human rights lags behind in Africa, hence the existential crisis posed by COVID-19 for vulnerable communities that eke a precarious living from the informal sector, informal settlements and slums.

As part of containing the spread of COVID-19, people are encouraged to use clean water and soap to regularly wash their hands. But informal settlements dwellers do not even have clean water to drink let alone the means to buy soap or alcohol-based sanitisers. The limited water they have would be used largely for drinking. Afrobarometer Round 7 survey (2016/2018) covering 34 countries, outlines various vulnerabilities faced by ordinary Africans in the context of COVID-19 and notes that

at the most basic level, hundreds of millions lack access to clean water for frequent handwashing and cleaning, a critical tool to limit the spread of the virus. Nearly four of every 10 Africans (38%) went without clean water multiple times in the past year, and more than one in five (22%) lack clean water frequently. Just as troubling, the same number (38%) say they or someone in their family went without needed medical care in the past year, and nearly one in five (18%) did so frequently. (Gyimah-Boadi and Logan 2020)

The human security deficit in Africa in the face of CIVID-19 is epitomised by this melodramatic story. On 6 April 2020, during delivery of water by the Deputy Minister of Water and sanitation, David Mahlobo and the Premier, Refilwe Mtshweni-Tsipane, communities of Jerusalem and Mshandza in White River, Mpumalanga Province of South Africa were elated. Speaking on behalf of the communities, Smith Malumane, said ‘we thank the virus for this … though the [government] had promised us water long time ago, but now that we have this virus we see fast delivery’ (Khoza 2020). The irony here is instructive: government provides water to communities in order to prevent the virus. Instead of thanking government, communities thank the virus for prompting government into action on a long-standing demand for social services.

In the face of COVID-19, African countries should pursue democracy simultaneously with human security. Failure to do so may accelerate democratic backsliding and the upsurge of autocratisation, a phenomenon that is dubbed ‘koronadiktatura’ (corona dictatorship) in Eastern Europe following the push by the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, for the promulgation of an act of parliament ‘that gives him power to govern by executive decree for an indefinite period’ (Petrov 2020, 2). Some of the emergency powers exercised by governments in the face of COVID-19 were unfathomable in democracies less than 12 months ago. But now they are acceptable by all. According to Zizek

many liberal and leftist commentators have noted how the coronavirus epidemic serves to justify and legitimize measures of control and regulation of the people, measures that were unthinkable in a Western democratic society. The lockdown of Italy is surely a totalitarian’s wildest aspiration come true (my emphasis). (Zizek 2020, 73)

Due to draconian lockdown measures, ‘some weak democracies and autocracies have suffered a particularly serious lurch towards more centralised power and repression … [restricting] … democractic activities and … [silencing] … critical voices … with probable long-term ramifications’ (Youngs and Panchulidze 2020, 4). The emergency powers exercised by the executive should not be used (or abused) to reverse Africa’s democratic gains. Temptation towards authoritarian governance should be resisted. Gyimah-Boadi and Logan observe that

of perhaps even greater concern are clear signs that some countries already edging toward more authoritarian governance may take advantage of the moment to impose greater restrictions intended to become permanent. Newly granted presidential powers, and new limits on public freedoms, may not be so easily reversed. (Gyimah-Boadi and Logan 2020, 3)

Petrov has called for more assertive roles of the legislature and the judiciary to counter-balance possible excesses of power by the executive during COVID-19 related emergency measures. According to him,

the deliberative function of the legislature and the dispute-resolution function of the courts is crucial not only for preventing the abuse of the emergency measures, but also for improving the effectiveness of the emergency policies by supporting their legitimacy and feasibility. (Petrov 2020, 3)

IFES has proposed four indicators for assessing if emergency measures during public health emergencies are within the limits of democratic norm or have crossed boundaries into autocracy: (a) they must be proportional to the problem at hand; (b) they must be non-discriminatory; (c) they must be temporary; and (d) they must be limited in geographic and material scope (Ellena 2020, 2).

Conclusion

When COVID-19 started spreading across the globe in early 2020, the democratisation wave was at its lowest ebb. Therefore, the pandemic is threatening the health of African citizens and government responses pose a health to democracy. During COVID-19, some countries have proceeded with elections, while others postponed their elections. Some elections have been marked by low voter turnout. International observers have been conspicuous by their absence in some elections. Whereas in Malawi and Seychelles, the elections held under COVID-19 facilitated a peaceful alternance of power, Mali experienced a post-election violent conflict and a military coup prompting regional mediation by ECOWAS.

Postponement of elections due to COVID-19 in Ethiopia and the declaration of a state of emergency triggered political tension, resulting in the upward spiral of ethno-regional conflicts affecting almost all regional states. At the apex of these conflicts is the current armed conflict between the federal government and the TPLF.

Besides compromising electoral integrity, COVID-19 has placed African countries in an awkward predicament wherein their focus on providing health security for citizens could risk the health of democracy. In the face of COVID-19, Africa does not have the luxury of choosing between democracy and human security. African states have to provide both the right to vote with a view to advance democracy and the right to health in order to advance human security. Depending on how this tenuous balancing act is maintained, policy responses may either bolster democratisation or incubate autocratisation (koronadiktatura, to borrow Petrov’s concept).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).