Authoritarian Personality vs Institutional Performance – Understanding Military Rule in Africa

ABSTRACT

Sub-Saharan Africa is the region where democracy has encountered the most difficulties in establishing itself, where the most military coups have occurred and, in addition, where public demonstrations of support on the streets are common after a coup d’état. In fact, the last 15 years has seen growing popular support for military rule. This study aims to analyse the underlying reasons for the public approval of military rule in Africa. Two main explanatory theories are contrasted: the institutional performance approach versus the cultural approach. The research takes the form of a quantitative analysis, making extensive use of survey data to analyse the factors that explain the support for military rule in eleven African countries. The results indicate that in Sub-Saharan Africa institutional performance and authoritarian personality and values, are the main factors driving societal support for military rule.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Some few countries gained independence in the region did it much earlier as Liberia in 1847; South Africa in 1910 or Ethiopia in 1941.

2 Although the two aforementioned approaches dominate the literature, there are some alternative ones that focus, for instance, on the origin of the regime and the state-building process (Clapham 2017); ideology, nationalism, religion and the like (Krastev 2011); personalism and charisma (Fagen 1965); procedures like elections or mechanisms of implementation of policies (Schedler 2015) and performance, such as management of the economy (Dimitrov 2009); legality and representation of ‘national interest’ (Turner 1990); or a combination of these factors (von Soest and Grauvogel 2015).

3 This line of research had already been developed by Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1947).

4 Algeria in 1991 was an exception (Brumberg 2004, 56–57).

5 This increasing support for military rule is not exclusive to Africa but part of a worldwide trend. As shown in Table A1 in the Appendix, support for military rule is becoming ‘normal’ all over the world. The main difference is that, in Africa, this support runs parallel to a much higher number of military interventions displacing democratically elected governments and to public demonstrations of support of these military coups in the streets.

6 Although welcoming a coup on the streets does not necessary mean ‘support for military rule’, generally, military rule starts with a military coup.

7 A two-term limit on the presidency was lifted in 2008 to allow Bouteflika to run for office again.

8 The many African presidents who outstayed their welcome include Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Nguema, president since 1979; Angola’s José Eduardo Do Santos, in power since 1979; Zimbabwe’s Mugabe, since 1980; Cameroon’s Biya, since 1982; or Uganda’s Museveni, since 1986. Algeria’s Boutlefika since 1999. Others remained in office until their death, like Conté, president of Guinea from 1984 until his death in 2008, Omar Bongo who ruled Gabon for 42 years or Idriss Deby president of Chad for three decades until his death in 2021.

9 Actually, presidencies become dynasties. In Zimbabwe Mugabe tried to make his wife president (sparking the 2017 military intervention against Mugabe). In Togo, the Eyadema family has ruled the country for over 50 years. In Gabon, after the death of Omar Bongo his son took over as president in 2009. In Equatorial Guinea, Theodoro Obiang, replaced his uncle in 1979. In Uganda, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, the eldest son of president Museveni, in power since 1986, has presidential ambitious but so has Museveni’s wife, at present Minister of Education and Sport. In DRC, Joseph Kabila became president after the praetorian coup that saw the assassination of his father and former president. General Mahamat Idriss Deby, became interim president of Chad after the assassination of his father in 2021.

10 Some researchers have found Islam and democracy incompatible whereas others have found no contradiction. See Garcia Rivero and Kotze (2007, 612–614) or El Hamalawy (2011, 11–12 for a detailed review).