The politics of ‘lifelong learning’ in post‐1997 Hong Kong

Abstract

This article is concerned with the politics of lifelong learning policy in post‐1997 Hong Kong (HK). The paper is in four parts. Continuing Education, recast as ‘lifelong learning’, is to be the cornerstone of the post‐Handover education reform agenda. The lineaments of a familiar discourse are evident in the Education Commission policy documents. However, to view recent HK education policy just in terms of an apparent convergence with global trends would be to neglect the ways in which the discourse of lifelong learning has been tactically deployed to serve local political agendas. In the second part of this paper, I outline what Scott has called HK’s ‘disarticulated’ political system following its retrocession to China and attempts by an executive‐led administration to demonstrate ‘performance legitimacy’—through major policy reforms—in the absence of (democratic) political legitimacy. Beijing’s designation of HK as a (depoliticized) ‘economic’ city within greater China must also be taken into account. It is against this political background that the strategic deployment of a ‘lifelong learning’ discourse needs to be seen. In the third section of this paper, I examine three recent policy episodes to illustrate how lifelong learning discourse has been adopted and has evolved to meet changing circumstances in HK. Finally, I look at the issue of public consultation. The politics of education policy in HK may be seen to mirror at a micro‐level, the current macro‐level contested interpretations of HK’s future polity.

Notes

Peter Kennedy is Senior Programme Director with the School of Professional and Continuing Education, University of Hong Kong. He researches and publishes in the areas of education policy and adult learning (particularly second language learning). He is co‐editor of Lifelong Learning: Hong Kong Practitioners’ Perspectives (2002). This article represents the views of the author and not those of any specific organization.

NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), EU (European Union), APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Co‐operation) and the OECD (Organization of Economic Co‐operation and Development)

An education policy discourse is therefore a larger category than a policy text (though policy texts are, of course, part of policy discourse).

It was Tikly’s (2003) application of Foucault idea of ‘governmentality’ to education policy (in South Africa) that inspired the approach adopted here.

The Education Commission was established in 1984 ‘to define overall policy objectives, formulate education policy and recommend priorities for implementation having regard to resources available; to co‐ordinate and monitor the planning and development of education at all levels’ (EC3 1988: 9).

There is some conceptual confusion in these EC documents. At times ‘lifelong learning’ is used to refer to the entire (formal) education system from kindergartens to tertiary levels, sometimes to indicate a broader conception of formal and informal learning that occurs ‘from the cradle to the grave’. On other occasions, the term is used more narrowly, to refer only to the continuing education sector in HK. For a critical review of recent EC policy documents see Kennedy and Sweeting (2003).

A close reading of the EC (2000a, 2000b) documents reveals that most of these ‘new’ proposals—such as the accreditation of prior learning, the establishment of community colleges, a qualifications framework, work‐based learning, etc.—are all to be found in reports issued between 1982 and 1986; some proposals may even be traced back to suggestions put forward in the 1950s and 1960s (Kennedy 2002).

Recent education policies in the UK stress the need for ‘upskilling the nation, increasing the employability of individuals and securing the competitiveness of UK business … in a knowledge driven economy’ (DfEE 1999: 2, cited in Avis 2002: 76). This is an (overarching) discourse in OECD documents too: ‘In the long run, knowledge is the main source of economic growth’ (OECD 1996: 1.13). A similar thrust is to be found in recent education policy documents in Canada, Australia where the role of (continuing) education in the knowledge economy is a central tenet.

For instance, In October 1997, Mr Tung proposed the government would build 85 000 apartments annually. Many commentators attribute the subsequent slump in property prices—a 65% fall between 1997 and 2002—to government interference in the market. The policy was quietly abandoned.

The potential of the IT industry has been over‐stated elsewhere too. Only about 10% of jobs in OECD countries in 1995 were information‐related jobs (Poynter 2002). In the USA, IT had been deployed more to cut short‐term costs than to transform industrial practice. Poynter concludes that ‘the new knowledge economy is more potential than reality … changes occurring in the workplace are as likely to produce unskilled and routine forms of manual and white‐collar employment as they are opportunities for creative work and self‐expression’ (2002: 59, 62). For Collins (2000), the majority of those engaged in IT work are very far from being an empowered knowledge elite. Indian graduate night‐workers in US‐owned call‐centres, trained to fake an American accent and location, have been called ‘cyber‐coolies’ by Trivendi (2003: 31).

In the UK, a succession of reports from Dearing (1997) and Fryer (1998) to Blunkett (2000) stress the importance of lifelong learning. Similar trends in the USA and Australia are identified by Jarvis (2001), Ma (1999), West (1998) and Wagner (1999) inter alia, while Hatton (1997) provides numerous examples from countries on the Asia Pacific Rim.

C.H. Tung came to power as Chief Executive of HK after being ‘appointed’ by an 400‐person pro‐Beijing committee. He was ‘re‐elected’ five years later by a committee of 800. The population of HK was 6.8 million in 2002.

GDP was HK$201 billion in 1976, HK$450 billion in 1986 and HK$798 billion in 1996. In 1992, HK’s per capita GDP overtook that of Britain and was the third highest in Asia after Japan and Singapore (Starr 1998: 257). Foreign investment poured into HK. In 1994/95, the US invested $10 billion, Japan $13 billion and China $20 billion (Hook 1997: 98). In 1997, HK was the world’s ‘eighth largest trading economy, tenth largest exporter of services and fourth largest banking centre and foreign exchange market, with the busiest container port and the third busiest airport (Courtauld and Holdsworth 1997: 109).

A total of 24 of the 57 members were indirectly elected, 12 by functional constituencies (occupational groups) and 12 by an election committee whose members were drawn from the district boards and municipal councils. The remainder, civil servants and prominent public figures, were appointed.

By 1998, the electorate had expanded to 2.8 million.

The Chief Executive of HK can only nominate principal officials. The Chinese government has to approve them.

In 1998, the democrats received 61.58% of the votes but only 29.8% of the seats in Legco. In the 2000 elections, the pro‐China and pro‐business camp received little more than half of the votes cast for the democratic camp but still secured 60% of Legco seats.

In the insurance sector, for instance, the number of voters fell from 70 000 to 221 because of this change of practice. In the real estate and construction FC, 20 of the 206 votes for the representative were cast by the candidate himself in his capacity as director of 20 registered companies (Horlemann 2003: 159).

Sing (2004: 168) shows that of 53 private members bills put forward between 1995 and 1997, nearly half were passed. However, between 1998 and 2001, 22 bills were proposed and only four were even allowed to be tabled.

Government appointed district councillors—rather than elected ones—feature prominently. After 1997, 44 people had been appointed to advisory committees between five and nine times. It was also revealed that the Home Affairs Bureau keeps a database of current and potential appointees considered ‘trustworthy’ by the government (Lee 2004: 3).

For instance, in October 1997, the construction of 85,000 public housing units was announced. Property developers complained of the impact on the private property market and as prices tumbled, in July 2000, Tung casually announced that this policy had in fact been dropped in 1998. This came as news to the public at large as well as to some public officials in the housing department.

After Tung’s seventh policy speech, his popularity rating stood at 43.8% compared with a 79.1% rating for the Beijing‐appointed Chief Executive of nearby Macao, Edmund Ho Hau‐wah (Yeung 2004: 10). The Home Affairs Bureau’s own opinion poll in July 2000 had revealed that only 20% of respondents expressed satisfaction with the performance of the government, while 60% were dissatisfied (cited in Lo 2002: 106).

Amongst the many examples are: the Secretary for Justice’s decision not to prosecute a local member of the Chinese People’s Political Conference in connection with a fraud case concerning falsification of newspaper circulation figures; allegations that a senior advisor to Mr Tung had attempted to stop a researcher from conducting polls that revealed Tung’s unpopularity (an investigation into the incident resulted in the resignation of the Vice‐Chancellor of HK University); the resignation of the Secretary for Security and the Financial Secretary following public controversies.

A total of 95 of the Democratic Party’s 120 candidates won seats; 78 of the DAB’s 206 did. The Democrat’s victory at the ballot box was subsequently diluted by the government’s appointment of 102 unelected district councillors.

Commenting on the ‘election’ of Tung Chee‐hwa by a 400‐member Election committee in December 1996, Lo (2002: 100) quotes a senior mainland official in HK at that time who said that 150 of the 400 were Chinese Communist Party members, 50 were CCP ‘friends’ and the remainder could be persuaded or lobbied to offer their support.

EC (1986: 162), for instance, states that CE ‘programmes should be as far as possible self‐financing’. Chung et al.’s (1994) report on CE endorsed this view and UGC (1996) concurred there should be no public funding subvention for CE students. The post‐Handover, education review documents make it clear that this ‘principle’ would continue to apply since CE ‘helps to develop one’s potentials and raise one’s personal qualities’ (sic) (EC 2000a: 103).

Wong (2002) found that 1284 undergraduate and post‐graduate programmes were offered in HK in 2000–2001 (excluding sub‐degree programmes and research post‐graduate degrees). A total of 724 were local and 560 were overseas programmes.

A total of 14 500 first year degree places are available each year.

For instance, in autumn 2000, the HK City University introduced a two‐year associate degree to replace its three‐year higher diploma programme. The OU offered an Associate degree in October 2001 while the Baptist U., through its CE arm, offered a two‐year full‐time AD that articulated with the third‐year of degree courses offered by their collaborative partners in Australia and the USA. It also offered AD students one‐year, full‐time ‘top‐up’ degree courses in HK.

The average fees for a three‐year HK associate degree programme are HK100 000. This is in marked contrast to the US, where community college fees are largely funded by state governments.

In January 2001, EMB commissioned the Federation of Continuing Education in Tertiary Institutions to conduct a study of the AD. In June 2001, EMB announced that a common set of descriptors had been worked out for AD programmes.

The government introduced, at about the same time, an Employees’ Retraining Levy of HK$9600 on domestic helpers’ contracts. This levy must be paid by HK’s 130 000 domestic helpers—most of whom are from the Philippines—or by their employers. The levy is not earmarked for ‘retraining’ the helpers themselves.

Of course, HK is not alone in expanding post‐secondary educational provision by utilizing the CE sector. There are, for instance, parallel developments in the UK where an increase in part‐time foundation degrees is helping government meet its pledge to increase participation rates.

These de facto amendments to the Basic Law now require the Chief Executive to seek approval from the NPC before consultations on constitutional changes can begin. The HK government may then table a reform bill. A two‐thirds majority in Legco is required to pass it. Even then, the NPC reserves the right of final veto.

Confucius did not advocate blind obedience or compliance. He had much to say about moral conscience and the obligation of those in power to criticize or even oppose bad rulers so as to ensure the stability and prosperity of society at large.

Although there is now a proliferation of local pro‐democracy civic and political groups—the Frontier Party, the Democratic Party, the HK Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood, Civic Exchange, Synergynet, Civic Forum, HK Human Rights Monitor, the HK Democratic Development Network—they are weak, do not have a common platform and lack the huge financial backing that the pro‐China groups enjoy.

Morris (1996) and Goodwin (1999) have provided some fascinating insights into the real‐politik of education policy‐making in Hong Kong.

This 17‐member committee, chaired by the Secretary for Education and Manpower, ‘will provide advice to Government on the manpower needs of HK and the promotion and regulation of the vocational, post‐secondary and continuing education sectors … to support the development of a lifelong learning society’ (HK Government 2002a).

The Federation has described its members as being in ‘co‐opetition’—both partners and competitors in CE (FCETI 1999: 7).

However, it could be argued that a closer alignment of EMB and ED may strengthen coordination so that policies have a better chance of being implemented effectively. In his analysis of problems that arose with curriculum in HK schools, Lam (2003) identifies as an important factor differences in ‘personal beliefs and preferences of those involved in the curriculum reform and the consequent gaps that opened up at the different stages of policy formulation, development and implementation (2003:653).

In some quarters, the MDC is seen to be a part of the government’s cost‐cutting strategy. The Vocational Training Council has 4000 staff and provides pre‐employment training, the Employee Retraining Board retrains those over 30 who are unemployed. The former costs the taxpayer HK$2 billion a year while the latter costs $400 million. The President of the Institute of Vocational Education Teachers, Mr WK Chan, has said ‘the government has a hidden agenda to privatise courses and shift the financial burden onto students … restructuring was a government tool to boost the number of school‐leavers receiving higher education from 18 to 60 per cent within 10 years. Without additional resources, the government has to think about ways to provide cheaper services in the private sector’ (quoted in Lee 2002).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

PETER KENNEDY

Peter Kennedy is Senior Programme Director with the School of Professional and Continuing Education, University of Hong Kong. He researches and publishes in the areas of education policy and adult learning (particularly second language learning). He is co‐editor of Lifelong Learning: Hong Kong Practitioners’ Perspectives (2002). This article represents the views of the author and not those of any specific organization.