Situating the ‘Tulip Revolution’

Abstract

The authors assess various writings on the ‘coloured revolutions’ more generally and the ‘Tulip Revolution’ specifically. They place this scholarship into three broad categories: an assessment of the Akaev years from a democratization and state-building perspective; the nature of and relationship between formal and informal institutions prior to and after March 2005; and, finally, the domestic and international factors behind mobilization. These correspond broadly to the three areas of enquiry by the contributors to this collection.

Keywords:

• Kyrgyzstan
• ‘coloured revolution’
• democratization
• informal groups
• elites
• state building

Notes

‘Delegative democracies rest on the premise that whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited terms of office’ (O'Donnell 1994). See also Levitsky and Way (2002).

Others believe this increase in types of democracy is a nuisance rather than of help (Armony and Schamis 2005).

Berman argues against setting pre-conditions for democratization, known as ‘sequencing’, acknowledging the likelihood of a more turbulent and disorderly but eventually successful development.

The key works Katz associates with these theories are, respectively Gurr (1970), Skocpol (1979), Goldstone (1997), Goodwin (2001), and Kargalitsky (2005, p. 9).

For discussions of autonomous as opposed to factional or captured state, see Evans (1995).

In another paper, John Ishiyama and Ryan Kennedy (2001) relate presidentialism to the weakness of political parties.

Robert Elgie (2005) believes the rivalry between a strong Prime Minister and a strong President compromised democratic development in Ukraine before the Orange Revolution.

Importantly for the study here, informal rules may reinforce the presidentialism as in many Latin American and African countries, but sometimes, as in Chile, they restrict the authority of a formally very powerful president.

See M. McFaul (1999–2000, p. 66), where the author also suggests that state institutions require powerful societal groups to promote their reform.

On collective action problems, see Olson (1965). On relative deprivation, see Gurr (1970).

See Tarrow (1996, p. 394): ‘Electorates were deliberately mobilized on the basis of networks of mass organizations and political and recreational associations.’

Related to this issue is the long-standing discussion among historians and social scientists about the place of singular events in history. See, for example, Tarrow (1996).

On the role of tipping ‘thresholds’, see Schelling (1978).

For an interesting review of the conspiracy theories surrounding colour revolutions, see Shlapentokh (2007). Kyrgyzstan also did not benefit as Ukraine did from being in the vicinity of the European Union.