Centre–periphery relations in Afghanistan: Badakhshan between patrimonialism and institution-building

Abstract

The article offers a review of centre–periphery relations and local politics in the Afghan province of Badakhshan from the 1980s to the post-2001 era. It maps the local powerbrokers and charts the transformations that occurred during this period, with particular reference to the impact of the central government's policies on local political alignments and relations of power. The key argument is that President Karzai's and the cabinet's behaviour towards Badakhshani politics was aimed at re-establishing a patrimonial system, rather than at institution-building as claimed. Unable or unwilling to successfully deal with established local players, Kabul resorted to sponsoring new players in local politics and facilitating their rise in order to weaken more independent powerbrokers. However, a local perception of weakness in Kabul, not least due to uncertainty over the durability of the Karzai administration, led local players, old and new, to behave with very short-term horizons, as ‘roving bandits’ rather than as ‘stationary’ ones.

Keywords:

• Afghanistan
• Badakhshan
• post-2001
• local politics
• centre–periphery relations
• sub-national administration

Notes

From UNAMA's mandate.

For the purposes of this article, Weber's classical definition (1922) will suffice.

For an interpretation of recent Afghan history as a dialectic of patrimonialism and institution-building, see Giustozzi (forthcoming b). See also on a similar topic Giustozzi and Ullah (2007).

Ismailis are a sect of Shia Islam; see Emadi (2005) for details.

The ethnic breakdown is based on estimates carried out while serving in UNAMA.

A.G.'s interviews with former commanders of Hizb-i Islami, Kabul, March 2007.

A.G.'s interview with Jami'at commander who was part of the expedition, Kabul, March 2007; see also Shahrani (1984).

Personal communication with former commanders of Hizb-i Islami and Jami'at, Kabul, March and October 2007.

Strategic Monitoring Unit (2001, pp. 4, 8); A.G.'s communication with UN official, Faizabad, April 2004; Giustozzi (forthcoming c); Emadi (2005, pp. 182–183); Gosztonyi and Fararoon (2004, p. 39).

Strategic Monitoring Unit (2001, pp. 6–8, 36ff); Emadi (2005, pp. 185–186); interviews with military leaders of Hizb-i Islami and Jami'at from Badakhshan, April and May 2007; Giustozzi (forthcoming c).

At this point Massoud was dead, but the structure he had laid helped his successors to fight on.

Strategic Monitoring Unit (2001, pp. 4, 11–12); Goodhand (2000, p. 275); Giustozzi (forthcoming c).

For a description of this process at the national level, see Giustozzi (2008).

A.G.'s observation as UNAMA official in northeastern Afghanistan, 2003–2004; A.G.'s interviews with Ministry of the Interior officials and UN, Kabul, October 2007 and April 2008.

Personal observation as UN officials in northeastern Afghanistan 2003–2004 (A.G.) and 2006–2007 (D.O.).

See note 13 above.

Personal observation as UN officials in northeastern Afghanistan 2003–2004 (A.G.) and 2006–2007 (D.O.). See also Gosztonyi and Fararoon (2004).

It is instructive in this regard to read Abdur Rahman's autobiography (Rahman 1900).

For Wolesi Jirga election results in Badakhshan, see http://www.results.jemb.org/assets/pdf/reports/certified_14_badakhshan_wj_vo_e.pdf [Accessed 31 October 2008].

Personal observation as UN official in northeastern Afghanistan 2006–2007 (D.O.); Emadi (2005, pp. 183–184); A.G.'s interview with MP from Badakhshan, Kabul, April 2008.

A.G.'s personal communication with UN officials, Ministry of the Interior officials and UN police advisors, Fayzabad, Kunduz and Kabul, 2003–2008.

Personal observation as UN official in northeastern Afghanistan 2006–2007 (D.O.).

Ibid.

Although neither was officially disqualified, they seem to have been unofficially discouraged from participating because of the allegation that they were linked to ‘illegal’ armed groups (UN sources, Kabul, May 2007). In public Sardar Khan would claim to have ‘retired’, but this could be an attempt to save his face (personal communication with D.O., 17 August 2006).

Personal observation as UN official in northeastern Afghanistan 2006–2007 (D.O.).

See note 24 above.

See note 25 above.

See note 25 above.

Personal observation as UN official in northeastern Afghanistan 2006–2007 (D.O.).

Contrary to many of his former affiliates, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar never renounced violent opposition to the government.

Personal observation as UN official in northeastern Afghanistan 2006–2007 (D.O.); A.G.'s personal communication with UN officials and diplomats, Kabul, October 2007 and April 2008.