Ethno-religious dynamics and the emergence of the Hezbe Seri Itehad (Secret Unity Party) in Afghanistan in the late 1940s

Abstract

The Afghanistani government's discriminatory policies against its ethno-religious minorities from the late nineteenth century to the end of World War II brought widespread resentment, which resulted in many local revolts. After the war, these took on a different dimension and led to the founding of an underground political party, Seri Itehad (Secret Unity). The party was different from the other political parties of the time because its goal was to foment an uprising to overthrow the monarchy and so establish a republic. This paper explores why and how the party emerged, and how the unique characteristics of the party's two co-founders, who had little in common in terms of socio-political and cultural backgrounds, shaped the aims, approach, organization, membership and operation of the party. It also examines the consequences of the uprising.

Keywords:

• Afghanistan
• ethno-religious politics
• minorities and state discrimination
• political parties

Notes

According to Farhang, when the Afghanistan government submitted its application to join the United Nations, it learned from its ambassador in Washington that acceptance into the organization was contingent on the implementation of its charter and observation of human rights (1992, p. 660).

For Afghanistan's foreign relations from the late nineteenth century to the end of World War II, see Adamec 1967, 1974.

Like Ghubar and Mahmudi, who founded Watan (Homeland) and Khalq (the Masses), respectively.

Like the Weesh Zalmayan (Awaken Youth) party.

Balkhi studied in Iran between 1925 and 1935. Most Shiite ulama had received their religious education in Iraq and Iran since the early nineteenth century.

Individual religious leaders had sometimes played an important role in the modernization process and the establishment of political parties, as was the case with Mawlawi Muhammad Sarwar Wasef (executed in 1909), who was the founder of the Constitutional Movement in the early 1900s (see Habibi 1984, pp. 35–36). However, these individuals did not use religious symbols as political tools.

The most influential cleric in the country, Fazel Omar Mujadidi, alias Sher Agha, was appointed minister of justice, and Muhammad Sadiq Mujadidi, alias Gul Agha, was appointed ambassador to Egypt (Fletcher 1965, p. 227, Farhang 1992, p. 604, Olesen 1995, p. 185).

This policy to weaken the influence of the clergy through their incorporation into the state bureaucracy was continued by successive regimes in Afghanistan during the twentieth century (Roy 1986). The first attempt to bring the ulama under state control was begun by Abdul Rahman in the 1890s through the nationalization of waqf, which undercut the autonomy of the clergy and allowed the government to decide who would get financial support. Thus in order to control qazis and their decisions, Abdul Rahman put them on the state payroll (Barfield 2005, p. 217).

The real purpose of establishing Jamiat-ul Ulama, according to Bo Utas, was ‘controlling the ulama and integrating them in the centralised state’ (1988, p. 85).

The bulk of Balkhi's contribution was oral. He hardly published anything during his lifetime. It is claimed that on his return from Iran to Herat, Balkhi wrote two books: Teb az Negah-i Quran [Medicine According to the Koran] and Falsafat-ul Ahkam [Philosophy Precepts] (Shujaie 2004a, p. 26). At the time of writing the books he was only 16. However, some of his sermons were recorded and were available until the early 1970s.

Reportedly, Balkhi participated in many political activities in Iran, including uprisings against the ruler organized by Iranian clergy (see for example Hashimi Balkhi 2004, pp. 189–201).

According to M.K. Kazemi, the difference between Balkhi's critical poetry and that of other poets of the time was that while he directly targeted the ruling class and invited people to rise up, the others' criticisms were general (2004, p. 341).

The rituals associated with Ashura, according to David Pinault, ‘commemorate both a battle of righteousness against corruption and a key moment … so powerful that subsequent moments were characterized by an “overriding paradigm of persecution, exclusion, and suffering”’ (cited in Deeb 2005, p. 122).

Balkhi was the first Afghanistani cleric to deal with the so-called Karbala Paradigm (to use Michael Fischer's usage, 1980) through an unorthodox and revolutionary interpretation of Shiism in his sermons. However, this part of his contribution has been largely ignored.

For Balkhi's Ashura group poetry, see Muzafari 1997, pp. 8–15.

For a fine study of Balkhi's poetry and politics, see M.K. Kazemi 2004, pp. 332–356. See also Balkhi's Divan (complete works of poetry), published in Iran in 1989.

I am grateful to Barin Zuri for giving me his manuscript. Barin, the son of Khwaja Naim, was a former lecturer at Kabul and Bochum universities. In response to my request, he wrote an account of the 1950 uprising based on his own memories.

The British minister in Kabul noted that big decisions were made in the inner Royal Family circle. He gave a list of the people who participated in the meetings of the ‘inner circle’ (see Burdett 2002a, vol. 4, p. 1013).

Under Musahiban rule, the police commissioner controlled all the security forces of the country and was directly in touch with the monarch or the most powerful person in the royal family on security issues. The commissioner usually came from the army rather than the police force (Azhar 2012).

Pohanyar (2000, p. 186) and Zalmai (2003, pp. 255–256) note that in 1949 Naim refused to serve as the head of Afghanistan's spy agency (Zabt Ahwalat).

In 1935, Riza Shah announced a westernized dress code, including hats instead of turbans for men, and lifting veiling for women. The reform sparked outrage among the ulama, of which the most significant was in Goharshad mosque in Mashhad, where thousands of people gathered. However, it was harshly crushed by the security forces; dozens of people were killed and hundreds were arrested (Chehabi 2003, p. 199). The Goharshad incident is one of the most profound events inspiring Muslim activists.

Zamani (2000, p. 23) and Seddiq (2007, pp. 145–151), who studied under Bahlol in prison, acknowledge that he was a wise, well-informed and humble man with a very good memory.

Shahrestani notes that after the 1950 failed coup, Bahlol was exiled to Laghman, a province in the east (2000, p. 123). With the help of Balkhi, Bahlol left for Egypt in the mid-1960s (Masror Najimi 2006). In his memoir, Bahlol asserts that the Afghanistani government gave him three options: to stay in Afghanistan and teach in the theology school; to return to Iran; or to leave for a country of his own choice. He preferred the last and chose Egypt (Bahlol 2009, p. 265).

The reason for the move was his close association with the ex–prime minister Muhammad Hashim. The new prime minister moved him to Mazar-i Sharif.

According to Bahlol, the first day the two men met in Mazar-i Sharif, Naim told him:

‘You are my mentor [ustad] and I owe you a great deal. I was unable to do much for you in Kabul and had to keep you in prison because of the order of the king and the prime minister. I did not have as much power as I do now. You are free here and are staying with me.’ (Bahlol 2009, pp. 167–168)

Naim admitted that when he and other members of Seri Itehad were arrested due to revolutionary association with them, Bahlol was sent back to prison. ‘Fifteen years of his miserable life was connected with the attempted coup organized by the party’ (1982, p. 29).

Some scholars claim that Balkhi had worked with Bahlol while he was living in Iran. For example, Shujaie asserts that Balkhi was a collaborator with Bahlol in the Mashhad uprising (2004a, p. 26). However, in his memoir Bahlol makes no reference to such collaboration.

For the list of the central committee and prominent members of the party, see Farhang 1992, Hashimi 2009, Barin Zuri 2011.

While Balkhi and Gawsawar were known for their anti-government activities and were jailed on different occasions, Naim remained a trusted government security official. It is claimed that before settling in Kabul in the late 1940s, Balkhi was imprisoned a few times in Herat and Mazar-i Sharif (see for example Shujaie 2004e, p. 505).

The informant's assumption that it was published by Ghubar and Mahmudi seems incorrect. Both of these men were members of the national assembly and had established their own party and newspapers. They advocated a constitutional monarchy.

The king was in Europe at the time. Majid Zabuli, the minister of national economy, told the US ambassador in Kabul that the plotters aimed at assassinating the prime minister, Muhammad Daud, minister of defence, and Zabuli (US State Department 1950).

Yunas's claim that the revolt actually took place and an ‘attempt on the life of the Regent [and Prime Minister] (Sardar Shah Mahmud) was made by shooting but he escaped unharmed’ (1997, p. 26) seems incorrect.

For the list of those arrested, see Farhang 1992, p. 673, Mawlaie 2002, pp. 618–622. Yunas gives a list of 20 ‘prominent personalities arrested in the plot’ (1997, p. 27) that is wrong. Olesen's assertion that ‘the six leading persons (all Shias) were arrested’ (1995, p. 230) seems to be incorrect.

Citing a Pakistani document, Marwat claims that 2000 people were arrested (1995, p. 61). This is exaggeration. Apart from members of the party's central committee, there were other people with links to the party who were also arrested in Kabul and other provinces; after a relatively short period of imprisonment they were released (Pohanyar 2000, p. 192).

For a study of discrimination since the late nineteenth century, see Mousavi 1997 and Shahrestani 2000, especially pp. 80–91, 104. Shahrestani experienced this discrimination.

One of the government's discriminatory policies was the settlement of Pashtuns in the northern and western parts of the country and giving them farmlands using the excuse of the emigration of Muslims from Central Asia to Afghanistan after the Russian revolution in 1917. In a conversation with the American ambassador in Kabul in 1948, Abdul Majid Zabuli, minister of national economy, revealed the policy:

As a means of integrating and nationalizing these groups in northern Afghanistan, the Afghan government had pursued a deliberate policy of colonizing those areas with groups of true Afghans [read Pashtuns]. Abdul Majid stated that in the Herat area, as high as 50% of the population was now Afghan, growing somewhat less than that in the direction of Mazar-i Sharif. In that locality there are only about 15% to 20% Afghans and they are concentrated in their own villages. (US State Department 1948).

According to Cullather, the credit for providing Pashtuns with their exclusive identity belongs to British colonial officers:

Cultivating a Pathan identity as a unitary ‘pure’ race in contrast to the ‘mixed’ Tajiks, Baluchis, Hazaras, and others with whom they were mingled, colonial officials invented the reputation of the Pathans as a warrior caste. They were ‘our chaps’, natural rulers, the equals of British. ‘You're white people, sons of Alexander, and not like common, black Mohammedans’, the title character of Rudyard Kipling's The Man Who Would be King told the Afghans. (Cullather 2002, p. 8)

An example of the discrimination against the Hazaras can be drawn from the following contemporary incident.

During a confrontation between Hazaras and Pashtun nomads (kochis), a Hazara man was killed and the foot of a camel belonging to a kochi man sustained minor bruises. When the case was referred to a court in Kabul, the justice official gave a verdict that awarded 600 Afghani in compensation to a surviving relative of the Hazara who was killed, while the kochi was given 3,700 Afghani in compensation for the injuries sustained by his camel. (Talib Qandahri 1983, pp. 28–29).

For the list of his publications, see Benawa 1967, pp. 1256–1276.

The British military attaché, who visited northern Afghanistan in the early 1940s, noted that ‘the Pashtu speaking official appears to control the people of Turkestan very firmly’. He further noted that in ‘northern Afghanistan … all important appointments are held by Pashtu speaking Afghans drawn from Kabul, Eastern and Kandahar provinces’ (Burdett 2002b, p. 851).

In a royal decree in December 1933 regarding the expulsion of Jews and refugees from the Soviet Union, the Afghanistan government stated: ‘Russia's Jews are not to be permitted to take refuge in Afghanistan. They are to be sent back across the frontier.… Afghan Jews who have moved from Afghan Turkestan are not to be allowed to reside within 30 miles of the frontier’ (L/P&S/12/1653, part 52, p. 27).

It was in Mazar-i Sharif in 1998 that the Taliban massacred thousands of civilians, mainly Shiites, to establish their political domination in the area.

For these policies, see Saikal 2004, pp. 111–115.

In a report in October 1952, the American embassy in Kabul noted: ‘There is general dissatisfaction with the Government throughout the country, extending not only to minority racial groups, but to the small but influential intelligentsia and business interests’ (US State Department 1952).

Akbar (2003, p. 116) and Ruttig (2006, p. 5) call it Itehad wa Taraqi (Unity and Progress).

Panjsheri provides the names of those who participated in the founding the party and the behind-the-scenes supporters. On 1 January 1964, during the founding congress of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the complete documents of Jamiyat Khorasan were given to Noor Muhammad Taraki by Tahir Badakhshi, one of its leaders. However, the documents eventually disappeared (Panjsheri 1999, p. 132).

Even the name of the party was copied from a Pan-Turkish political party in Ottoman Turkey (1908–1918) (see Ahmad 1993).

Among the political parties, Watan had a significant number of Shiites in its leadership and rank.

For the geography of Hazarajat, see Thesiger 1956, pp. 87–95, Nayel 1985, pp. 25–52, Poladi 1989, Mousavi 1998, especially pp. 65–72.

Although distinct from the Sunni population, the Qizilbash did not suffer from the severe discrimination inflicted on the Hazaras. For the Qizilbash and their role in the government and community, see Dorronsoro 2005, p. 32.

Yousof Beg rebelled against the government and reputedly eluded the authorities for 19 years in Shahrestan, but was eventually surrounded and executed in 1945 (see Poladi 1989, pp. 384–385, 396–397, Dorronsoro 2005, p. 47). These landowners themselves were a source of people's misery.

As an army officer, Naim had spent all his adult life in the military and had little experience of political activity. Until the 1978 coup, military personal were forbidden from taking part in politics or becoming a member of any party.

According to Hashimi Balkhi, when Balkhi was studying in Mashhad in Iran, he took part in political activities alongside Shaykh Bahlol. He was one of the organizers of the Goharshad Mosque uprising of 1935 (2004, p. 189; see also Khesrawshahi 1991a, p. 125). Although it is an exaggeration to say Balkhi was one of the organizers of the uprising (because he was only 15 years old then), it shows his involvement or at least his familiarity with violent political acts.

The rebellion, which was against a tax on clarified butter that Hazaras had to pay on every animal they owned, lasted for many years. For a detailed discussion about Gawsawar's rebellion, see Edwards 1986, pp. 209–212, Daulatabadi 1995, pp. 24–30, Najafi 1998, Shahrestani 2000, pp. 124–129. Of these sources, Shahrestani's account is more reliable, because he was an eyewitness to the incident and knew Gawsawar in person. On Hazara uprisings, see Edwards 1986, Mousavi 1998.

Emadi claims that Gawsawar and his family were exiled to Pol-e Khumri in 1947 and a few years later were allowed to return Kabul (2010, p. 55). This seems incorrect. In fact, after being released from prison in 1964, Gawsawar and his family were exiled to Pol-e Khumri (see for example Najafi 1998, p. 176). This point is important because firstly, he was the only one of the group who was exiled, and secondly, it happened at the time of the ratification of a new constitution and the beginning of a new era known as the Constitutional Decade, 1964–1973.

Najafi (1998, p. 170) and Mubarez (1996, p. 166) claim that Gawsawar was responsible for the assassination of the prime minister and that Balkhi provided him with a pistol on the morning of the day. But Barin Zuri's and Pohanyar's assertion that Akramoddin was the supposed assassin seems more credible because their accounts are based on information provided by those directly involved in the incident.

According to Barin Zuri (2011, p. 14) and Pohanyar (2000, pp. 194–195), Akramoddin managed to escape arrest but surrendered to the government after the prime minister personally swore an oath on the Koran to pardon him. He was exiled to Mazar-i Sharif, where a few years later he was killed in a personal feud.

During this period (until his death in 1969), Balkhi travelled extensively inside and outside Afghanistan to explain his cause and deliver heated speeches. However, there are no documents from the time regarding his role in the foundation of the party and his political activities prior to his release.

For example, David Edwards's chapter, ‘The Evolution of Shi'i Political Dissent in Afghanistan’ (1986a), is heavily based on the account of Shiite and Hazara informants living in Peshawar in the 1980s.

For attribution of these to Balkhi, see the collection of articles written by Shiites, dedicated to his life, works and political struggle, and collected by Shujaie (2004). Interestingly, most of the articles in the collection contradict each other in relation to the date, place and name of the formation of the party (see for example Shujaie 2004a, pp. 28–27, 504, M.A. Kazemi 2004, pp. 200–204). The only contrasting published account is Nuhzat-i Khwaja Muhammad Naim Khan (Khwaja Naim's Political Movement), written by one of Naim's family members, Nisar Ahamd Zuri. It appeared in serial in the weekly Omid, published in the US in 1997. The author attempts, as the title suggests, to prove that Naim was the central figure around whom the party evolved. According to this account, Balkhi was only a member of its central committee. Zuri tries to give the party an Islamic orientation, and asserts that it was formed to counter Russian influence. He even denies any attempt by the party to stage a coup.

It is not only the political life of Balkhi which is surrounded by myth, but also his death. Most accounts say that he was killed by the government while hospitalized (see for example Shujaie 2004b, especially pp. 42–48). However, there is no evidence or even a reason to believe that Balkhi was killed by the government. In fact, after being released from prison he had a good relationship with the government and the monarch, and met him often (see for example Shahrestani 2000, p. 130, Shujaie 2004d, p. 259). According to Balkhi's daughter, when Balkhi fell sick the king sent Ali Muhammad, minister of the court, to visit Balkhi and deliver his offer that the ‘government wants to send him overseas in a charter airplane for urgent medical treatment’ (Shujaie 2004b, pp. 45–46). In addition, in the mid-1960s new political activists and political parties emerged which created more urgent concerns for the government than Balkhi.

Barin Zuri (the son of Khwaja Naim) gives four reasons why Balkhi's death was natural. ‘Firstly, he was told so by Balkhi's family at the time of his death. Secondly, if the government wanted to kill him it could have done so easily while he was in prison. Thirdly, after being discharged from prison, Balkhi became very close to Zahir Shah and served as his informal advisor in connection to the Hazara community. And fourthly, if he was killed, his only son Ali Aqa, who was my playmate since childhood and studied in the same university both in Afghanistan and Germany, would have told me at least in private’ (2011, pp. 8–9).

One of these commentators goes further and claims that Balkhi was the first person in Afghanistan to propose and outline the concepts of republicanism and democracy (tez jamhoryat wa mardomsalari) (Mohed Balkhi 2003, p. 248).

Khesrawshahi claims that Balkhi founded a party in Herat in 1943 with the name of Mujtamae Islami (Islamic Gathering), and later in 1955 or 1956 at a secret meeting the central committee of the party changed its name to Hezbe Irshad (1991b, p. 637). Boyko (2010, p. 370) and Yunas (1997, p. 23), while generally agreeing with Khesrawshahi, add that it was established in the Shiite headquarters in Kabul in 1932–1933. Amazingly, these scholars make obvious mistakes with the dates. Edwards states that Balkhi established the party covertly whilst in prison (1986a, p. 215), but in fact the party was established some time before March 1950, prior to his imprisonment. Under the severe conditions in prison, including being held in solitary for seven years (Pohanyar 2000, pp. 193–194), Balkhi hardly had the means to found a political party.

Apparently he knew he would be arrested but did not hide. The question is, why was he not arrested with the other leaders on the same day? Akram (2001, p. 69) is the only scholar who provides a reason, suggesting it was because the government had no proof of his involvement in the coup other than Guljan Wardak's report. He was arrested after making a fiery anti-government speech at the funeral of a prominent Shiite.

According to this account, the government, fearing unrest, did not arrest Balkhi immediately but closely watched his movements for some time and then detained him (Shujaie 2004a, p. 30).

The government only issued the statement 10 days after the failed coup because the king was overseas and it had to wait until his return.

Khalili, the secretary of the cabinet, notes that Naim was sentenced to death, which was discussed and endorsed in a cabinet meeting. However, Muhammad Daud, minister of defence, did not agree. King Zahir Shah also did not approve the sentence (Khalili 2010, p. 356).

The author is grateful to Professor Shahaliakbar Shahrestani for providing access to the handwritten manuscript.

These are not the only errors about Irshad Islami in Khesrawshahi's book. In fact, it is full of mistakes about Shiite political organizations prior to 1978 (see for example in the case of Watan Party, pp. 87–89). The information is based on a single informant, Muhammad Hossain Riyazi (Khesrawshahi 1991a, p. 89).

One of the common versions is that Balkhi founded Hezbe Irshad in 1943 in Herat and when he moved to Kabul in 1947 he set up the party there with new recruits, including new leadership and new goals (see for example M.A. Kazemi 2004, pp. 200–205). The aim of this is to suggest that while in Herat the party's aim had been to promote the rights of Shiites, whereas in Kabul it transformed into ending the political system and the rule of Musahiban family. However, as Panjsheri (1999, p. 130) suggests, there is little evidence for this, because due to political suffocation there was no opportunity for the foundation of the party in Herat at that particular time. Moreover, if such an organization had been set up, at least a few of the known intellectuals of Herat would have joined it.

Naim notes that in the mid-1970s he and some other members of the party had a few meetings with Ghubar about the different aspects of the party. Ghubar made notes and was supposed to include the information in the section dedicated to Seri Itehad in the second volume of his Afghanistan in the Path of History. However, he died before the publication of the book (Naim 1982, p. 1).

Edwards's claim that ‘Gawsawar capitulated to the government after his arrest and this was why he was released sooner than Balkhi who remained in prison until 1964’ (1986, p. 215), and therefore a rift emerged between them which resulted in the formation of separate political parties (p. 215) is incorrect. Both of them were freed at the same time (see also Najafi 1998, p. 175, Shahrestani 2000, p. 129).

Marwat calls the party radical, and adds that ‘the radical Muslims wanted to replace the Zahir government with an Islamic government’ (1997, p. 246). Korgun goes even further and claims that the party ‘included officers and minor officials, members of national [read ethnic] and religious minorities, and religious fanatics. Their aim was to smash the outdated absolute monarchy and establish a caliphate’ (1985, p. 247).

Contrary to Yunas, who claims that the government ‘arrested about 600/700 Hazaras and Qizilbash’ (1997, p. 26), it only arrested the leaders of the party and a few others. While the leaders remained in prison for a long time, ordinary members were soon released.

A report from the American Embassy in Kabul on 20 November 1952 described a plot by five men aimed at assassinating Zahir Shah during a hunting trip outside Kabul. Three attackers were killed and two escaped. The plot was not made public. The report stated that for ‘some unknown reasons the plotters would never be recognized’ (cited in Akram 2001, p. 73).

Shah Mahmud saw Daud's hand behind the coup. In fact, it was a widespread rumour in Kabul that Daud was behind it (Akram 2001, p. 68, Barin Zuri 2011, p. 17). Daud had just left his post as Afghanistan's ambassador to France and joined the cabinet as minister of war, despite the displeasure of the prime minister. From the outset, he began to openly challenge Shah Mahmud. As a rival, Daud had been working hard to replace him. Therefore, Shah Mahmud believed the coup to be one of his undertakings. As well, there was a close relationship between Naim and the former prime minister Muhammad Hashim, who supported Daud. Hashim had never married, and after his brother Abdul Aziz was murdered in 1932, he adopted his two sons, one of whom was Daud. Hashim was Daud's mentor.

The arrest of the leaders of the party, especially Balkhi, provoked a public demonstration, mainly from the inhabitants of the Shiite area in Kabul, Chendawal. They demanded the release of the prisoners (Khesrawshahi 1991a, p. 124, Akram 2001, p. 69). It was the first public protest against the government's action, but was soon subdued.

The number given by Balkhi is obviously exaggerated. Shiites compromise only 10–20% of the total population of Afghanistan. Drawing on government sources, Dupree gives the total number of Shiites in the mid-1960s at around one and half million (1973, pp. 59–61).