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Abstract
This article examines the history of Russian conquest of Bukhara, with special reference to military and diplomatic aspects. From the beginning of the Russian advance into the region, relations between Russia and Bukhara had several peculiarities, but were characterized above all by mutual incomprehension. In my view, the main obstacle to the development of relations lay in the different understandings the two sides had of the nature of a peace agreement or treaty. In this paper I try to shed light on some questions arising from the military conflict between the Emirate of Bukhara and Russia in the interpretations of Russian military historians and Bukharan chronicles of the period. The focus is on a comparative analysis of the military capabilities of the Bukharan Emirate and Russia, the differences in weapons technology between these two powers, the links between the Russian advance in the region and the domestic and foreign policy of the Bukharan emir, Muzaffar, the situation in the emirate, and the use of Islamic ideology as a mobilizing force for the population in opposition to Russian expansion.
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Alexander Morrison, Sergey Abashin and Wolfgang Holzwarth for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
Notes
1. M.S. Yusupov, ‘Armiia Bukharskogo Emirata v kontse XIX i nachala XX veka’ NAGMIKUz D.814 ll.1–3, 13.
2. Shahrukh was a relative of the Persian Qajar Shah Nasruddin, and after the latter attained the throne in 1848 he fled to Amir Nasrullah in Bukhara and was appointed commander-in-chief of the army, because he had considerable experience of war.
3. Najmaddin Khwaja was a sayyid by descent, and occupied the position of ra'is (leader) of the sayyids of Bukhara. This was not his first or his last embassy: he had been to Saint Petersburg in 1859, and more recently to Orenburg and Kazalinsk. He would be given the thankless task of negotiating with the Russians before Samarkand in May 1868 (see below).
4. Amir Muzaffar had continued the policy of his ancestor Muhammad Rahim Khan (1756–1758), who had shown distinct preference for exiles and former slaves from Iran when it came to distributing civil and military posts (Abduraimov Citation1966, 182). This policy was intended to reduce the dependence of the amir on the Uzbek tribal nobility and strengthen central power (Holzwarth Citation2006, 100).
5. ‘Ali Muhammad Qarataev had arrived in Bukhara in 1854, where he worked for a Bukharan merchant, Rahim Bai. After the latter's death he wished to return to his homeland, but Amir Nasrullah forbade his departure. In the 1870s he worked as an interpreter for the Russians and was much respected (Stremoukhov Citation1875).
6. In justifying his actions to Saint Petersburg, Romanovskii invoked the possibility of a military union between the Bukharan Emirate and the Khoqand Khanate against Russia.
7. Called Istaravshan since 2000.
8. ‘Nagradnye spiski ofitserov i soldat, otlichivshikhsia pri zashchite tsitadeli goroda Samarkanda’ 08/06/1868 RGVIA F.1392 Op.1 D.13 l.28.
9. ‘Chastnye svedeniia iz Bukhari, 1867’ RGVIA F.483 Op.1 D.103 ll.1ob, 2ob.
10. ‘Materialy dlia istorii zavoevaniia Turkestanskogo kraia’ TsGARUz F.I-715 Op.1 D.36 l.266.
11. Ibid., l.239.
12. A rivayat is a document, drawn up in accordance with the shari'a, explaining the proper course of action in a given situation. A rivayat bearing the seals of the ‘ulama had the force of law.
13. ‘Materialy dlia istorii zavoevaniia Turkestanskogo kraia’ TsGARUz F.I-715 Op.1 D.36 l.239.
14. ‘Perepiska s komanduyushim voiskami Sir-Dariinskoy oblasti o vziatii russkimi voiskami Bukhari i Samarkanda’ RGVIA F.1392 Op.1 D.2 l.4.
15. ‘Materialy dlia istorii zavoevaniia Turkestanskogo kraia’ TsGARUz F.I-715 Op.1 D.36 l.239.
16. ‘Sem'desiat let moei zhizni’ Memoirs of A.N. Kuropatkin, Vol. I, Part 2. RGVIA F.165 Op.1 D.1742 l.23.
17. Ibid., ll.21–22.
18. Hajji Rumi may have been an Ottoman military specialist (Mirza Salimbek Citation2009, 38).
19. ‘Raport o Chupanatinskom srazhenii’ RGVIA F.1393 Op.1 D.2 l.7a.
20. ‘Sem'desiat let moei zhizni’ Memoirs of A.N. Kuropatkin, Vol. I, Part 2. RGVIA F.165 Op.1 D.1742 l.50.
21. The conflict between Amir Muzaffar and his son may have arisen when Amir Nasrullah was making his choice of heir, and hesitated between his son and his grandson (Donish Citation1960, 33–34).
22. ‘Abd al-Malik continued to fight against the Russians, and against his father, but suffered defeat and fled to Peshawar in British India, where he was awarded a pension. He died in 1908.
23. ‘Sem'desiat let moei zhizni’ Memoirs of A.N. Kuropatkin, Vol. I, Part 2. RGVIA F.165 Op.1 D.1742 l.54.
24. There is a suggestive passage in Ahmad-i Donish's Risala to this effect, stating that Amir Muzaffar decided to open hostilities in 1866 ‘because he was convinced that the Russian government – was like the rulers of Mawara’ al-nahr, and as he had enjoyed victory over them, so he reasoned that he would have victory over the Russians as well. … As for the amir, being by nature stupid and narrow-minded, he was unable to comprehend the difference between governments’ (Donish Citation1960, 40–41). Allowances must be made for Donish's strong anti-Manghit agenda.