The assumptions of cognitive neuropsychology: Reflections on Caramazza (1984, 1986)

ABSTRACT

Approximately 30 years ago, Caramazza (1984. The logic of neuropsychological research and the problem of patient classification in aphasia. Brain and Language, 21, 9–20; 1986. On drawing inferences about the structure of normal cognitive systems from the analysis of patterns of impaired performance. Brain and Language, 5, 41–66) proposed that cognitive neuropsychology needs to make four assumptions in order for its inferences from pathological performance to the structure of intact cognitive systems to be justifiable. These assumptions were: fractionation, modularity, transparency and universality. Analysis of the current status of these assumptions leads me to conclude that all four remain defensible today.

KEYWORDS:

• Modularity
• fractionation
• cognitive universality
• transparency
• subtractivity

Acknowledgements

I thank Colin Klein, Robyn Langdon, Mike McCloskey, Vince Polito, Teresa Schubert, Kevin Shapiro and Andy Young for valuable discussions of issues with which this paper is concerned.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 I.e., the assumptions.

2 I thank Colin Klein for initially raising this point with me.

3 Which does not of course preclude any scientist from pursuing both of these distinct goals.