Localism, Devolution and Housing Policies

Abstract

In this study, we examine the idea of localism in the context of housing policy and as mediated by the experience of devolution in England and Scotland. After considering arguments for adopting localism in principle, we examine the meaning and limitations of the concept when account is taken of the real nature of housing systems. This forms the basis for a consideration of the experience of localism in the context of social housing provision. We conclude that the implementation of localism by UK policy-makers has exhibited shortcomings and the emerging interpretation of localism may lead to policy dumping rather than enhanced real local autonomy.

Keywords:

• Localism
• governance
• social housing

Notes

¹ At the level of nation states the term sovereignty connotes the formal autonomy or policy-making powers that the state holds. Devolution is the transfer of formal autonomy for decision-making to some more local level or order of government. The EU has espoused the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ that argues that policy autonomy should always be devolved to the most effective level. Devolution needs to be distinguished from administrative decentralisation, which occurs when a wider order of government moves advisory, delivery or consultative capacities to more local settings but retains unchanged political control over what they do.

² Although we could also explicitly add fairness to this list of criteria against which to judge housing policy—and fairness has figured large in the concerns raised by the localism agenda in England, in particular with respect to protection of the interests of vulnerable and minority groups (House of Commons Communities & Local Government Committee, 2011, p. 34) and the avoidance of postcode lottery type outcomes (ibid, pp. 45–47)—we have refrained from doing so for reasons of space.

³ An important exception to this generalisation was the study of the development of public housing in the UK to 1975 conducted by Dunleavy (1981).

⁴ In a social housing context, there is a remarkable paucity of hard numbers on the effectiveness of different systems and scales of service provision despite high annual expenditures on social housing management in the UK (Hills, 2007; Maclennan et al., 1989; Pawson & Mullins, 2010). However, while frontline housing and neighbourhood management may require decentralised area offices even within quite small municipalities, this is unlikely to be the case for higher order functions such as strategic management. Mirroring the growth of regional non-profit social housing organisations, interest in the possibility of merging housing service provision across groups of councils is increasing and it is not inconceivable that metropolitan wide social housing systems, serving the interests of multiple municipalities could eventually emerge.

⁵ These are now more commonly referred to as Registered Social Landlords (RSLs).

⁶ Source: Wilcox & Pawson (2010): Table 17d.

⁷ Initially, the vehicle used in mainland Britain for this purpose was the Housing Corporation. Because there was much concern that local neighbourhood housing efforts would be captured by sectarian influences, there was never a clear role for the Housing Corporation in Northern Ireland however, and the funding and regulation of housing associations in this instance was undertaken directly by government. The Northern Ireland Housing Executive replaced all council housing provision after the early 1970s, while in Scotland and Wales the roles of the Housing Corporation were transferred to new central government agencies (Scottish Homes and Tai Cymru, respectively) after 1989.

⁸ For a detailed analysis of the differences between the Glasgow and Birmingham stock transfer processes, see Daly et al., (2005).

⁹ Amongst other things, this is evident in the extremely acrimonious exchange between government and the RSL movement occasioned by the publication of findings from commissioned research into the relative capacities of RSLs and local authorities to build new social housing (Bramley et al., 2010).

¹⁰ Housing associations have a policy advantage in that only the grant component of their expenditures is classed as public spending. As council investment is backed by taxpayers, it is generally viewed in the UK as entirely public spending.

¹¹ Review work for the Chartered Institute of Housing in Scotland indicates more fully the detailed diversity of the approaches to housing policy that has now emerged across the devolved governments of the UK (Newhaven Research, 2011).