Quantifying the effects of teacher movements between schools in New Zealand: to schools that hath, shall be given

Abstract

This paper examines the flow of teachers between schools of different socio‐economic statuses. New Zealand Ministry of Education data is examined with regard to teacher age and salary structures in schools from high and low socio‐economic intakes. Teacher mobility data is examined and a model of the mobility life cycle of a ‘typical’ teacher reveals causes of the staffing discrepancies between schools with differing socio‐economic intakes. The model accounts for the tendency for low socio‐economic intake schools to have staff who are older and at lower salary levels than those from high socio‐economic intake schools A theoretical interpretation of the situation in New Zealand is provided. It is argued that there is competition between schools for teachers’ labour, and this has had the effect of exacerbating the social stratification flowing from market oriented reforms promoting consumer choice in New Zealand education.

Notes

* Department of Human Development & Counselling, Nga Pumanawa, School of Education, The University of Waikato, Private Bag 3105, Hamilton, New Zealand. Email: [email protected]

The cultural capital referred to here includes cultural capital embodied in the individual (habitus), objectified in symbolic form (cultural goods) or institutionalized as academic credentials or diplomas. Thus, the cultural goods of the middle and upper classes which are what are valued and strived for in schools.

Useem and Neild (2001) and Hanushek et al. (1998) provide strong empirical data for this proposition for the US contexts of Philadelphia schools and Texas schools, respectively.

Maguire (2001) provides qualitative findings that link teachers classed identities to their commitment to teaching at inner city schools..

This is the percentage of households with equivalent income (i.e. adjusted for the number of adults and children in the household and the age of the children) in the lowest 20% nationally

The actual number of students in each decile are only approximately equal since deciles are populated by schools (with varying roll numbers). Table 7 indicates the number of returning teachers for the schools of each decile.

Note that Ministry of Education published loss rates do not include teachers moving to limited term positions, but intake rates include teachers moving from limited term positions.

The term ‘returning teacher’ is used in this paper to refer to teachers who have remained in the teaching workforce in successive years and who have occupied regular positions in both of these years.

Analyses for both data‐sets reported here are restricted to the categories of state primary and secondary categories. The principal analysis is without funding category considered, but there is one analysis which includes funding category.

For primary teachers, the salary scale steps in use in this report ranged from 1 to 10, with the top of automatic advancement in the primary scale being at step 9. (Primary teachers with degree and teacher qualifications entered the salary scale at step 4. Primary teachers without university education could only rise to step 7 on the scale.) For secondary teachers, the salary scale steps in use in this report ranged from 1 to 11, with the top of automatic advancement in the scale being at step 11. Teachers with a bachelors degree and teacher qualifications enter the salary scale at step 5. Secondary teachers without degrees enter the salary scales at lower rungs and can only rise to step 9 or 10 on the scale.

Because age cohort data is for 5 year periods, the current analysis moved one fifth of an age cohort to the next cohort’s transition rates every year. It can be shown that the effect of this is equivalent to introducing a linear annual change of transition rate between the transition rates of the two cohorts.

The projections do not constitute predictions and are hypothetical, because they are based upon zero loss in the population model underlying the projections. Nevertheless, it is likely that these projections do not over‐estimate the impact of teacher movement, as it is likely that leaving teachers are older (low transition probabilities) and are replaced by younger teachers (high transition probabilities).

Note that Ministry of Education published loss rates do not include teachers moving to limited term positions, but intake rates include teachers moving from limited term positions.

Deciles are obtained utilising the Targeted Funding for Educational Attainment classification of schools based upon New Zealand census data on the socio‐economic status and ethnic compositions of the populations in school catchments. Lower deciles indicate an economically poorer catchment.

There is no necessary contradiction in low schools having older staff and yet more staff low on the pay scale. This is because the pay scale has progressively higher maxima for staff with degree level or higher degree level qualifications. Thus, this data indicates that low decile New Zealand schools rely more on older teachers with fewer years of tertiary education.

The relative tendency of teachers from schools of each decile towards upward or downward mobility cannot be easily compared from the graphs. A teacher at a decile 1 school can only move upwards (leading to a positive average move). A teacher at a decile 10 school can only move downward (leading to a negative average move). Because age and decile of school can be correlated, this makes interpretations of the graphs of movements plotted against age cohort tentative.

Appendix B has detailed results of the projections of total primary teacher movement patterns for each age cohort.

This pattern in the projections of a loss of teachers from low decile schools and a gain of students in high decile schools occurs in spite of roll growth in schools of all deciles over the period that the model transition rate estimates are based upon (Harker, 2000).

Maguire (2001) provides qualitative examples of how teachers from working class backgrounds have knowledge of the class experiences of working class children attending inner city schools.

The negative impact of this scenario could also happen in times of teacher over‐supply. However, at times of over‐supply schools are more able to avoid the negative effect by judicious selection of the most appropriate appointee from a long list of candidates.

It should be noted though, that there is a new trend towards primary teacher over‐supply and secondary teacher under‐supply from 2001 onwards. Under such conditions, the flow of teachers between secondary schools of different SES deciles could begin to disadvantage low decile schools and their students.

New Zealand school certificate scores.

The progress at school analysis of Harker and Nash not withstanding. It is the author’s position that the HLM analysis that arrives at the conclusion that minimal explanation of the variation of student outcomes is due to schools is flawed both conceptually and analytically. A paper on this point is in preparation.

Thrupp’s documentation of school mix effects is not concerned with school outcome measures, but with the processes occurring on the ground. In contrast, the school mix effects searched for by Harker and Nash are those concerned with school outcome measures.

Thrupp’s position is not incompatible with the concept of social class related dispositions. However, it is incompatible with the suggestion that it is disposition, not at all access to social capital, that is fundamental in understanding differences in educational outcomes between pupils and between schools.

One fundamental problem is that their HLM analysis utilises school entry achievement tests as proxies for ‘ability’. Such a proxy incorporates a direct estimate of relative school outcomes and as such will be predictive of future school outcomes. Further, the predictive power of the proxy is because it is both proxy for any genetic ability component and also for also a school disadvantage component (initial school disadvantage is likely to be repeated with students of low SES primary schools going on to low SES secondary schools). Thus, in the Harker and Nash studies, removing ‘ability’ prior to investigating differences between schools, actually may be removing school effects as well.

The facilitation of social mobility stated explicitly in fundamental mission of the Ministry of Education as ‘Raise achievement and reduce disparity’ (New Zealand Ministry of Education, 2000b).

One of the limitations of the current study is that the data purchased from the Ministry of Education for the current study was supplied in aggregated form because of concerns about school confidentiality.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Garth Ritchie *

* Department of Human Development & Counselling, Nga Pumanawa, School of Education, The University of Waikato, Private Bag 3105, Hamilton, New Zealand. Email: [email protected]