The number of nuclear weapons in the world's arsenals has been reduced by around 80 per cent over the last two decades. Yet, as the US's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review made clear: ‘both [the US and Russia] still retain many more nuclear weapons than they need for deterrence.’Footnote1
The purpose of this paper is to examine how, and under what conditions, further cuts in these stockpiles could be made. It argues that steep reductions are possible if all seven established nuclear-armed states accept as an objective ‘nuclear restraint at low numbers’, defined as a situation in which each country feels comfortable with a stockpile numbering less than 500. If this objective were accepted, it would make possible a further 80 per cent reduction in the global military stockpile: from 11,500 warheads in 2012 to around 2,000 in the early 2020s. The main responsibility for achieving this objective would fall on Russia and the US, which still possess more than 90 per cent of the world's nuclear stockpile; but the five other states (China, France, the UK, India and Pakistan) would also have to take steps to restrain the size and capabilities of their own forces, and to show that they are doing so.
The Benefits of Restraint
Further restraint and reduction in the arsenals of the world's five recognised Nuclear-Weapon States would contribute to fulfilling their disarmament obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and strengthen their hand in arguing for continuing restraint from the treaty's Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. The NPT's ‘grand bargain’ between its nuclear and non-nuclear members may not be the main reason for the nuclear abstinence of the latter. If the Nuclear-Weapon States were now to argue that no further reductions were possible, however, it could do significant damage to the legitimacy of the treaty at a time when it is already under strain as a result of the nuclear programmes of North Korea and Iran.
Table 1 Estimated Military Stockpiles of Nuclear Warheads, 2012.
Yet even if the NPT did not exist, the major powers would need to take seriously, and consider what measures can be taken to reduce, the risks that existing nuclear arsenals pose to international security. Some nuclear weapons, during some time periods, are more dangerous than others. The risks that they pose, moreover, vary depending on the domestic and international political context in which they are held. However, in every country, risks could be reduced – or increased – by changes in nuclear doctrine (planning on how weapons might be used) and capabilities (what is available to be used).
The wider political benefits of nuclear restraint are also important. Nuclear weapons remain one of the most important indicators of whether, and how far, the major powers are able to manage their relationships in a co-operative manner. If states are vigorously building new, and more capable, strategic systems against each other, this can contribute to wider tension between them. Successful restraint amongst existing nuclear-armed states, on the other hand, can engender trust, as well as providing mechanisms for reducing the risks of rapid escalation in the event of limited conflict.
Some might criticise the scenario for nuclear restraint as overly ambitious. Others might feel that, by focusing on requirements for ‘minimum deterrence’ rather than on complete nuclear disarmament, it is not radical enough. At the very least, however, it is hoped that the reader will see it as providing some food for thought as to how the international community should respond to what remains a real, and potentially catastrophic, risk.
Outside the Tent
The main focus of the paper is on the seven states whose possession of nuclear weapons is, in practice, not under serious dispute, and which have openly declared that they possess these weapons. However, two further states possess nuclear weapons as of 2012, and more could follow over the next decade. Any discussion of how to move to nuclear restraint at low numbers has to take some account of these states.
Of the non-established nuclear-armed states, Israel is widely believed to have the greatest capability, both in terms of quality and quantity. It is believed to have an arsenal comparable in size to India's and Pakistan's (around 100 warheads), as well as a range of delivery systems. Yet it has never openly declared its capability, a policy of opacity which still contributes to regional stability. Israel's participation in multi-actor nuclear restraint could be of increasing importance, especially if others reduce their arsenals sharply. In the short term, prospects for such restraint depend more on relations with, and restraint by, potential nuclear-armed states in its neighbourhood, notably Iran and Saudi Arabia. If regional nuclearisation were to draw the established nuclear-armed states into more explicit nuclear alliances with states in the region, however, Israel's strategic relationships with extra-regional powers (such as Pakistan) would become more difficult to ignore.
Possible developments in the capabilities of other states, such as Iran and North Korea, also need to be considered. Even if the size and sophistication of their nuclear forces develop slowly at first, their nuclearisation is spurring further investment in missile defence (especially by the US), with all the difficulties this poses for relations between the larger nuclear powers. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by previously non-nuclear NPT states could also undermine the credibility of the treaty's ‘grand bargain’, weakening the case for deeper reductions by the recognised nuclear states.
The impact of Iranian and North Korean nuclearisation on prospects for nuclear restraint between the existing powers would depend on whether the two countries continued to be treated as nuclear ‘outlaws’, or whether (as in the case of India) a modus vivendi were reached in which their new status was reluctantly accepted. This latter scenario would become much more likely, in the case of Iran, were Saudi Arabia to acquire its own nuclear arsenal. Were this to ultimately lead to both countries being accepted as de facto nuclear-armed states, the risks of nuclear conflict could increase, and the negotiation of new confidence-building measures would become more relevant than ever. However, the content of such measures could be significantly different from those that are appropriate to a world with only seven acknowledged nuclear-armed states.
Although it already has a rudimentary nuclear-weapon capability, the prospects for eventual legitimisation of North Korea as a nuclear-armed state are even fewer than they are for Iran. Due to the close alliances that Japan and South Korea have with the US, and the domestic stability of their regimes, the risks of onward proliferation are not as strong as in the Middle East. There is also an expectation that regime change in Pyongyang could one day allow a reversal of its nuclear programme. Such a reversal would be in the common interest of the US and China – and indeed of Japan – and could serve as an incentive for co-operation in a future North Korean crisis.
Focused Restraint and Appropriate Transparency
Achieving an 80 per cent reduction in existing stockpiles over the next decade will require, most of all, steep cuts by Russia and the US. At this stage, however, the negotiation of a completely new US-Russia Treaty would distract from progress towards this objective. The existing New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) agreement already provides a good framework for counting and verifying their deployed strategic warheads and missiles, which continue to have the greatest destabilising potential. The possible use of such systems in a disarming first strike continues to be an important driver for the maintenance of large arsenals by both countries, and concerns over these capabilities could be a source of increased tension in times of intense international crisis. It makes sense, therefore, to focus the next steps in reduction and restraint efforts on these systems, including a mutual, incremental reduction in New START-counted deployed warheads from the current treaty's ceiling of 1,550 warheads each to around 700–800 by the end of the decade.
In parallel with this reduction in strategic systems, the US and Russia could aim for co-ordinated reductions in non-strategic nuclear systems, but focused – as in the case of New START itself – on operationally deployed weapons rather than on the warheads themselves. This could be attractive to both Russia and the US.
Russia is reluctant to reveal information about its non-strategic nuclear capabilities, seemingly content to create the impression of large numerical superiority in this field. Yet, because of its reliance on dual-capable delivery systems (aircraft, ships and defence missiles) for operational deployment of NSNW (non-strategic nuclear weapons), the size of its deployed non-strategic arsenal has probably fallen sharply in the last two decades, in line with the size of its conventional forces. One recent study suggests that it might have as few as 1,000 non-strategic weapons deployed with operational units.Footnote2 With further rationalisation of Russia's conventional force structure likely to take place, this number could fall further in coming years.
The US is also under political pressure to make further reductions of its own, with NATO's latest Deterrence and Defence Posture Review committing the Alliance to exploring ways of doing so as part of a reciprocal process with Russia. As a result, the US may be able to meet its requirement for NSNW in Europe with an arsenal that is significantly smaller than the 180 or so warheads currently deployed there. Therefore, provided that the prospect of a new, ‘all-encompassing’ arms-control treaty does not persuade the two sides to preserve current arsenals as ‘bargaining chips’, the next decade could see significant reductions in deployed NSNW arsenals on both sides.
The US remains far ahead of Russia in its plans for deployment of missile defence capabilities; and the possibility of a further step-change in the US's capabilities in this field is one of the central reasons which Russia has given for continuing high levels of investment in its own strategic nuclear missile forces. Yet current US ballistic missile defence (BMD) capabilities for use against Russian long-range missiles remain very limited, and planned NATO deployments will not change this materially. Russia could also hedge against the possibility of a US missile defence breakthrough by retaining the ability to rapidly rebuild its deployed offensive forces.
If the US and Russia do reduce their deployed strategic arsenals below 1,000 warheads each, there will be increasing pressure on the other nuclear-armed states to show that they are also restraining their arsenals. A possible early step could be for all seven states to join a New START-modelled information exchange process. In addition to the long-range missiles in their arsenals, the smaller nuclear-armed states could also be asked to declare, and verify, their deployments of medium-range, ground-based missiles (forbidden to the US and Russia under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty), as well as holdings of medium-range aircraft and sea-launched missiles.
If the process of mutual nuclear restraint is to evolve from a bilateral to a multiplayer exercise, it will probably have to rely more on mutual restraint and transparency, rather than the treaty-based numerical limitations that have been at the heart of US-Russian arms control since the 1970s. This would probably still involve most, if not all, of the five other nuclear-armed states maintaining arsenals lower than those of the US and Russia. The UK has already announced a reduction in its arsenal to fewer than 200, and India and Pakistan might not build up to the UK's level, on current trends, until around 2020. Provided that all seven states committed to the goal of restraint at low numbers, however, it would be unnecessary and indeed counterproductive to seek to enshrine this in a treaty-based formula. Nor would it be reasonable to expect the smaller nuclear-armed states to agree to permanent ‘no increase’ commitments, at least as long as the US and Russia still possessed much larger forces of their own, and their missile defence capabilities also remained unconstrained.
The focus of efforts to seek nuclear restraint at low numbers should be on encouraging restraint and transparency in relation to deployed warheads on long-range missiles. Further transparency in relation to other, second-echelon capabilities – such as warheads in storage and fissile material production capabilities – should be encouraged. However, restraint in relation to these capabilities could be less stringent, allowing states the option of maintaining a hedge against future developments that could threaten their minimum retaliatory capabilities. Allowing states to retain possibilities for future build-up could help to persuade states that it is safe to make deeper reductions in the forces that they need to deploy now.
The Risk of Losing Control
Chapter II explores the most important argument in favour of further nuclear restraint: the possibility that nuclear weapons could actually be used. Faced with an international crisis, and under levels of stress and uncertainty for which they may be poorly prepared, individuals and bureaucracies could take steps that lead to nuclear use becoming a real possibility. Indeed, this possibility is fundamental to the value of these weapons as a deterrent. For, in seeking to demonstrate the credibility of ‘deterrent’ threats in times of crisis, nuclear-armed states would be under considerable pressure to prove that they were as prepared as their opponent to carry them out if provoked.
Nuclear weapons have never been detonated, except in tests, since 1945. The average annual probability of their use remains relatively low; but a return to the levels of risk faced in the early 1960s – when President John F Kennedy estimated the risk of nuclear war as ‘somewhere between one in three and even’ – cannot be ruled out.Footnote3
It is not hard to imagine scenarios for a nuclear crisis during the next decade. Israel, the US and Saudi Arabia could find themselves in a confrontation with Iran as it crosses the nuclear threshold. India could mobilise its army in response to a Pakistan-originated terrorist attack, prompting Islamabad to disperse its nuclear weapons. The US could find itself in a deepening confrontation with China in the western Pacific, or with Russia in its near abroad.
Why Low Numbers Matter
The consequences of even a limited nuclear war would be many times greater than any natural disaster or accident of the post-1945 period. The risk of even a handful of weapons exploding should help to deter states from a serious conflict with nuclear-armed states whenever nuclear use is a possibility. Yet the additional deterrent value of more nuclear weapons declines thereafter: the possibility that fifty nuclear weapons could explode on UK cities is not ten times the deterrent of the possibility of five exploding. Both are to be avoided at (almost) any cost.
Yet, even if the deterrent value of nuclear threats is not proportionate to their destructive potential (beyond a certain threshold), the human consequences of nuclear war would be likely to increase proportionately until much larger numbers of nuclear weapons were involved. As the number of detonations rose, moreover, the risks of wider effects on the earth's climate, and on global food production, would also increase. Even a ‘limited’ India-Pakistan nuclear war, it has been estimated, could lead to a substantial reduction in global mean temperatures for several years.
Some might argue that seeking to reduce the damage that a nuclear war would cause could increase its probability. However, there is little evidence to support the proposition that, for example, Russia or India would be more willing to risk nuclear war if only 10 million of their population were at risk rather than 100 million.Footnote4 Above a certain level of assured destruction, therefore, the additional deterrent value of added destructive capability is probably negligible. A move to nuclear restraint at low numbers, therefore, could help to reduce the damage that would be likely to result from nuclear war, if it took place, without significantly increasing the danger that deterrence would be weakened.
Such considerations, nevertheless, do set lower limits on what ‘low numbers’ would mean. If a nuclear-armed state believed that its nuclear-armed opponent only had a fractional chance of getting one nuclear weapon onto its territory in a retaliatory strike, it might (in some circumstances) gamble that a surprise attack could limit the risk to its own society to acceptable (if still undesirable) levels. It is not easy to estimate the level of destructive capability that would be needed to avoid this risk, based as it would have to be on perceptions of the political calculus of leaders and regimes in situations of extreme stress. However, a capability to assure the destruction of ten to twenty separate targets with nuclear weapons is widely considered to be enough to provide a very considerable deterrent. Depending on the allowances that are made for missile and system failures, missile defence interception and other factors, maintaining an ability to destroy this many targets might require an arsenal of, perhaps, 100–200 deployed warheads.Footnote5
The Logic of Restraint
Another key element that supports the logic of restraint is the diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policy. Their non-use in military action since 1945 has made it easier to persuade Non-Nuclear-Weapon States to refrain from acquisition: the expense and trouble involved have simply not been worth the hypothetical gains. The existence of the NPT, together with US extended deterrence arrangements, have further added to the political costs that could result from attempts at acquisition. Non-use has also made it difficult for those states that do have nuclear weapons to define the circumstances in which they could proportionately, and thus credibly, threaten to use them. The use of nuclear weapons, in a pre-emptive strike, in order to deter their use by others remains the most credible deterrent threat. Threats to use nuclear weapons to respond to threats to the very survival of a state could also appear credible. Beyond these two basic scenarios, however, nuclear threats may seem so disproportionate as not, in practice, to be credible.
This does mean that there is a nuclear ‘taboo’: preparation for the use of nuclear weapons is still socially acceptable in all of the nuclear-armed states, and in the US's main European and Asian allies. Yet, as NATO's Strategic Concept recently reaffirmed, the circumstances in which the Alliance would have to contemplate the use of nuclear weapons are now ‘extremely remote’.
Other nuclear-armed states vary in the extent to which they rely on nuclear weapons. China and India have declared their commitment to use nuclear weapons only in retaliation to their use by others. Pakistan and Russia, by contrast, both maintain the option to use nuclear weapons first, primarily in response to invasion. Some of the most difficult challenges in seeking nuclear restraint at low numbers, as a result, relate to these two states.
National Cultures and Nuclear Restraint
Fear of a large-scale war between the major powers remains remote. Furthermore, the appetite for the use of nuclear weapons in more limited conflicts is now much less than some declaratory policies might still be taken to imply.
The more remote and less specific the threat of nuclear war becomes, however, the more states will tend to view nuclear policy through the lenses of domestic politics and national strategic culture. Debates on weapon systems and numbers take on a highly symbolic character, often out of all proportion to their operational or deterrent value. Debates on nuclear policy become more about political relationships within countries, rather than between them.
The shared Cold War experience of Russia and the US as superpowers make it difficult for them to move more quickly towards nuclear restraint at low numbers. The two countries, over many decades, invested a large proportion of their monetary and intellectual wealth in building the capabilities that they possess today. Leading national companies, and the hundreds of thousands of workers they support, continue to depend on the maintenance of large and sophisticated nuclear arsenals. These economic drivers, in turn, reinforce national conservatism in security policy, making it more difficult for political elites to divert resources from maintaining nuclear forces.
Yet support for further nuclear reductions in the US, in particular, continues to be strong. Almost every post-war US president has embraced the ultimate goal of nuclear abolition, while the large margin of conventional war-fighting superiority, developed since 1990, has deepened interest in making further reductions in the role that nuclear weapons play in national doctrines. There is still significant resistance to formal acceptance of mutual nuclear vulnerability with Russia and (even more so) China. Some analysts still argue that the risks of building first-strike capabilities as a means of enhancing deterrence are less than those of accepting vulnerability to nuclear attack in a possible future crisis. These concerns are reinforced by the difficulties that, these critics argue, would be involved in demonstrating the credibility of nuclear guarantees to Asian and European allies if, in doing so, the US itself could be put at risk. In practice, however, the US's key non-nuclear allies (Germany and Japan in particular) have been amongst the strongest supporters of further nuclear reductions.
Moving towards mutual nuclear restraint at low numbers could make US acceptance of its nuclear vulnerability more politically salient. Whether arsenals are small or large, however, it is hard to imagine that the US could ever build such strong disarming counterforce capabilities that it could guarantee its invulnerability against other major powers (such as Russia and China) that are determined to counter such efforts. The wide range of voices in the US nuclear debate make it difficult to predict what the next steps in its policy are likely to be. It would be surprising if the next decade does not see significant further reductions in the nuclear stockpile. The pace and shape of these reductions will depend, most of all, on the contingencies of national politics. While the numerical balance between the US and Russia may have little operational significance, at least at current numbers, it retains significant political importance in Washington. It is hard to imagine that the US would be prepared to cut the size of its deployed strategic arsenal significantly below that of Russia.
If operational necessity were the primary driver of its nuclear policy, Russia could be persuaded to make further mutual cuts. It already fields fewer strategic warheads than the US (1,492 compared with 1,737), and also has fewer nuclear-armed submarines, long-range missiles and heavy bombers. Whether or not the US follows suit, the footprint of Russia's deployed nuclear forces seems set to decline further over the next decade.
Russia's current leadership, however, may be reluctant to agree a new treaty without US concessions on its missile defence programmes, and it may prefer to proceed with a more informal process of mutual reductions that would allow it to retain more reconstitution options than a new treaty would probably allow. The US could provide useful political cover by making clear that it would match any Russian reductions in its deployed strategic forces with reductions of its own.
Such a process of mutual restraint may, however, be complicated by Russia's desire to maintain a clear margin of numerical superiority in relation to third powers. Its leaders still view its possession of one of the world's two large nuclear arsenals as one of the few remaining areas of national strength. Its sphere of influence has shrunk to a fraction of what it was in the 1980s. Widespread concern, dating back to the 1970s, that the US could use its technological edge in conventional military capabilities to threaten Russia's strategic forces – through BMD and conventional strike – further feeds the elite's sense of being encircled by a powerful and expansionist opponent.
The assertive declaratory policy of Russia's political and military leaders, in these circumstances, plays both a domestic and an international role. Russian leaders do not believe that nuclear weapons are a panacea for the multiplicity of security threats that they face, especially internally. However, they do fear that other major powers may seek to exploit its many weaknesses, either through sponsoring regime opponents or (in the case of China) attempting to gain political control of outlying territories. From this perspective, Russia's nuclear arsenal can still play an important role in deterring interference in its affairs by other major powers; and, in the longer term, can allow it to maintain a hedge against the possible re-emergence of more serious threats to its territorial integrity, either from NATO or China.
If the US and Russia were to contemplate the possibility of mutual reductions to below 1,000 deployed strategic warheads apiece, both would want reassurance that China continue to exercise restraint in its own nuclear force. Most independent estimates currently suggest that China possesses fewer than 300 warheads in its arsenal, of which perhaps only fifty would be defined as ‘deployed strategic warheads’. However, China has not confirmed these estimates, and a few experts have suggested that its total arsenal could be closer to 1,000.Footnote6
China has so far been able to use US-Russian numerical preponderance, together with the greater importance of opacity for a small nuclear force, as plausible rationales for remaining on the periphery of international discussions. If US and Russian reductions were to increase pressure on China to be more transparently restrained, however, it would be likely to trigger a vigorous internal debate. Joining the other nuclear-armed states in restraint could appeal to those who are genuinely committed to China's declaratory policies of No First Use and minimum deterrence. Some elements in China's security elite could argue that US and Russian reductions would present an opportunity to use its greater economic resources to build a more sophisticated nuclear capability, reinforcing efforts to build conventional military advantages over its neighbours. But others would argue that China's nuclear posture should continue to be based around a credible second-strike capability. This goal could require the deployment of larger and better protected forces, possibly alongside submarine-based and multiple-warhead missiles. It could also mean maintaining the ability to build larger forces in response to future developments in US capabilities. Given its wider economic and (increasingly) military strengths, however, China shares US interest in reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in international security. China's agreement to further transparency and restraint, even if Russia and the US were to undertake further reductions, could not be taken for granted. But it would be a necessary condition for moving towards a broader nuclear restraint at low numbers. And it would not be in China's interests to be seen as the main obstacle to such a process.
Further US and Russian reductions would also trigger debates in the two European Nuclear-Weapon States. The UK, with the smallest arsenal of these, would strongly welcome progress towards wider nuclear disarmament and, having announced a unilateral reduction in its total nuclear force to 180, of which only 120 will be deployed, might consider a reduction to an even lower level if the US and Russia were set on much steeper reductions. France continues to be NATO's leading disarmament sceptic, and its leaders would probably seek some reassurance that mutual nuclear restraint was not simply a way-station on the road to nuclear abolition. However, in the context of its own growing fiscal problems, France might also be prepared to make some contribution of its own, perhaps making further reductions in its warhead stockpile.
Most of India's leaders would also welcome further US and Russian reductions, which would be consistent with its longstanding commitments to nuclear abolition. It would be harder, however, to persuade it to accept restraint in relation to its own arsenal. Providing that China and Pakistan were also adopting a measure of restraint, however, India might not want to be the last obstacle to achieving mutual restraint in Asia. Much would depend on timing. As of 2012, India is still in the early stages of the development of a nuclear triad. Within a decade, India would be looking at whether it needed to go further in building up its force. Were it to do so, in the face of prospective reductions by other major powers, it would make it harder for the others – and China in particular – to continue to exercise unilateral restraint. A particularly important indicator of possible Indian overreach would be if it continued to develop, and then deployed, intercontinental missiles capable of reaching the US. An Indian decision to proceed with such a development, inconsistent with a declaratory policy focused on Pakistan and China, could significantly complicate efforts at wider mutual restraint.
Pakistan could be the hardest nut to crack for projects of nuclear restraint, given its geopolitical weakness and its consequent heavy reliance on nuclear deterrence. Yet these very factors may also make it more ready to agree to some restraint in return for greater recognition of its own concerns. Pakistan has, by a large margin, the smallest defence budget of all the nuclear-armed states, and one that is also heavily reliant on external financial support. High levels of investment in fissile material production over the next decade, moreover, mean that it should be able to build a nuclear arsenal of around 200 warheads by the early 2020s, comfortably in excess of the levels that some of its own experts have estimated are needed for ‘minimum deterrence’. Like other conventionally vulnerable states, it would want to preserve some hedge capability, for example against developments in Indian missile defences. It would also need to reassure the international community that it had given up any plans for possible transfers of nuclear technologies to other states (such as Saudi Arabia or North Korea). However, it could also benefit from the international acceptance of its nuclear weapons programme that would be a necessary trade-off in return for its commitment to transparency and restraint measures; and it could also legitimately request that it get Nuclear Supplier Group exemption status similar to that which India obtained in 2008. If Pakistan were to reject such a deal, it could risk drifting into an international nuclear ‘outlaw’ status similar to that now facing Iran, but without oil. Given such a choice, and with its position as a nuclear-armed state now acknowledged and accepted, Pakistan might also be willing to join a wider regime of nuclear restraint.
It is also possible, unfortunately, to imagine a scenario in which efforts to achieve mutual restraint fail, and in which the three Asian nuclear-armed states embark on a surge in their capabilities that would make global nuclear restraint at low numbers unachievable. If such a surge in capabilities were to occur, however, it would have symbolic and political consequences well beyond military-technical discussion of nuclear balances. It would symbolise a return to an age of great-power confrontation, and with it an increased risk of major war. Such an expectation, even if overly pessimistic, would in turn have considerable political and economic costs.
Given these wider consequences, it still seems more likely that the major powers, however hesitantly, will not want to give up on the possibility of further mutual nuclear restraint at low numbers.
Notes
1US Department of Defense, ‘Nuclear Posture Review Report 2010’, April 2010, p. ix.
2Igor Sutyagin, ‘Russian Non-Strategic Nuclear Potential: Developing a New Estimate’, RUSI Occasional Paper (forthcoming, 2012).
3Graham Allison, ‘At 50, the Cuban Missile Crisis as a Guide’, New York Times, 15 June 2012.
4James Acton makes a similar point in James M Acton, Deterrence During Disarmament: Deep Nuclear Reductions and International Security, Adelphi Paper 417 (Abingdon: Routledge for IISS, 2011), pp. 27–30.
5For a calculation along these lines by a former deputy director of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, see Naeem Salik, The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan's Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 304–06.
6Henry D Sokolski, ‘China's Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material Holdings: Uncertainties and Concerns’, testimony before the US Economic and Security Review Commission investigating ‘Developments in China's Cyber and Nuclear Capabilities’, 26 March 2012. For a detailed Russian analysis of China's posture, see Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin and Sergey Oznobishchev (eds.), ‘Russia and the Dilemmas of Nuclear Disarmament’, Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), 2012, especially pp. 31–35. Arbatov et al. argue that ‘Beijing's reluctance to engage in nuclear arms limitations may be … meant to obscure the huge surplus of China's nuclear capability rather than its “small size” and “weakness”’.