IV. THE JIGSAW OF RESTRAINT

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Notes

¹For a thoughtful account of what an agreement on nuclear disarmament might contain, together with the associated information exchange and verification requirements, see George Perkovich and James M Acton, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, Adelphi Paper 396 (Abingdon: Routledge for IISS, August 2008).

²For an early discussion, see Jonathan Schell, The Abolition (New York: Knopf, 1984). For a recent analysis, see Christopher Ford, ‘Nuclear Weapons Reconstitution and its Discontents: Challenges of “Weaponless Deterrence”’, Hudson Institute, November 2010.

³For an example of such an approach, see Richard Burt and Jan Lodal, ‘The Next Step for Arms Control: A Nuclear Control Regime’, Survival (Vol. 53, No. 6, December 2011), pp. 51–72.

⁴Hans M Kristensen, ‘New START Treaty Has New Counting’, fas.org, 29 March 2010.

⁵US Department of Defense, ‘Nuclear Posture Review Report 2010’, April 2010, p. 21.

⁶US Department of State, ‘New START Treaty: Resolution of Advice and Instrument of Ratification’, 22 December 2010, <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/153910.htm>, accessed 13 August 2012.

⁷Robert Joseph, ‘Nuclear Weapons and Regional Deterrence’, in Jeffrey A Larson and Kurt J Klingenberger (eds.), Controlling Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities (United States Air Force, Institute for National Security Studies, July 2001), p. 90, cited in Amy F Woolf, ‘Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons’, Congressional Research Service, 12 February 2012, p. 28.

⁸Some experts have argued that, if New START definitions are used, China currently has no ‘deployed’ strategic missiles. For the purposes of the comparison made here, however, Russia would be interested in the number that China could deploy at short notice.

⁹The report of the Global Zero US Nuclear Policy Commission, which was chaired by former Vice-Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff James Cartwright, proposes a total force of 450 deployed warheads, including ten missile submarines with 360 deployed warheads, together with eighteen B-2 bombers with ninety deployed warheads. A further 450 warheads would be held in reserve. Global Zero US Nuclear Policy Commission, ‘Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and Posture’, May 2012, p. 7.

¹⁰For further technical discussion, see Dean A Wilkening, ‘Does Missile Defence in Europe Threaten Russia?’, Survival (Vol. 54, No. 1, February–March 2012), pp. 31–52.

¹¹See Malcolm Chalmers, ‘The United Kingdom: A Status Quo Nuclear Power?’ and Camille Grand, ‘France and Nuclear Stability at Low Numbers’, in Malcolm Chalmers, Andrew Somerville and Andrea Berger (eds.), ‘Small Nuclear Forces: Five Perspectives’, RUSI Whitehall Report, 3–11, December 2011.

¹²See discussion above on p. 20.

¹³For further discussion of such ‘splendid first-strike’ scenarios, see David S McDonough, Nuclear Superiority: The New ‘Triad’ and the Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Adelphi Paper 383 (Routledge for IISS, 2006). Also see Keir A Lieber and Daryl G Press, ‘The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy’, Foreign Affairs (March/April 2006); Keir A Lieber and Daryl G Press, ‘The Nukes We Need’, Foreign Affairs (November/December 2009); Keir A Lieber and Daryl G Press, ‘Obama's Nuclear Upgrade: The Case for Modernizing America's Nukes’, Foreign Affairs (July/August, 2011).

¹⁴Wilkening, ‘Does Missile Defence in Europe Threaten Russia?’, p. 49.

¹⁵Greg Jaffe, ‘U.S. Model for a Future War Fans Tension with China and Inside Pentagon’, Washington Post, 1 August 2012.

¹⁶Hans M Kristensen and Robert S Norris, ‘US Nuclear Forces, 2011’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Vol. 67, No. 2, 2011), p. 66.

¹⁷Hans M Kristensen and Robert S Norris, ‘Russian Nuclear Forces, 2012’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Vol. 68, No. 2, 2012), p. 88.

¹⁸Oleg Bukharin, ‘A Breakdown of Breakout: U.S. and Russian Warhead Production Capabilities’, Arms Control Today, October 2002.

¹⁹Igor Sutyagin, ‘Russian Non-Strategic Nuclear Potential: Developing a New Estimate’, RUSI Occasional Paper (forthcoming, 2012); Hans M Kristensen, ‘Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons’, Special Report No 3, Federation of American Scientists, May 2012, p. 53.

²⁰Igor Sutyagin, ‘Russian Non-Strategic Nuclear Potential: Developing a New Estimate’, RUSI Occasional Paper (forthcoming, 2012); Hans M Kristensen, ‘Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons’, Special Report No 3, Federation of American Scientists, May 2012, p. 53.

²¹George Perkovich, Malcolm Chalmers, Steve Pifer, Paul Schulte and Jaclyn Tandler, ‘Looking Beyond the Chicago Summit: Nuclear Weapons in Europe and the Future of NATO’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2012.

²²US Department of Defense, ‘Fact Sheet: Increasing Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile’, 3 May 2010, <http://www.defense.gov/news/d20100503stockpile.pdf>, accessed 13 August 2012.

²³HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948 (London: The Stationery Office, October 2010) pp. 38–39.

²⁴Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, ‘Fact Sheet: China: Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction’, 27 April 2004, cited in Hans M Kristensen, ‘Nuclear Arms Racing in the Post-Cold War Era: Who is the Smallest?’, FAS Strategic Security Blog, 22 August 2007.

²⁵‘Statement by the People's Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America to the 2012 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, 3 May 2012’, <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT2015/PrepCom2012/statements/20120503/P5_US_on_behabe.pdf>, accessed 13 August 2012.

²⁶US Department of Defense, ‘Fact Sheet: Increasing Transparency’.

²⁷Acton places greater emphasis on curtailing these capabilities, but agrees that ‘limiting production capacity should not be a goal for the next round of bilateral reductions, which is already overloaded with complex issues’. See James M Acton, ‘Low Numbers: A Practical Path to Deep Reductions’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2011, pp. 24–27.

²⁸Bruce Blair, Victor Esin, Matthew McKinzie, Valery Yarynich, and Pavel Zolotarev, ‘Smaller and Safer: A New Plan for Nuclear Postures’, Foreign Affairs (Vol. 89, No. 5, 2010), pp. 9–16.

²⁹Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences, The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1997), p. 78.

³⁰Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences, The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1997), p. 83.

³¹Detailed proposals along these lines are made in James M Acton, ‘Low Numbers’, pp. 56–61. Acton goes further than the proposal in this paper, however, by suggesting detailed information exchanges in relation to numbers and locations of all warheads, and not only those that are operationally deployed.

³²Author interviews with arms-control specialists, Beijing, March 2012.

³³ The Economist, ‘China's Military Rise’, 7 April 2012.

³⁴For a recent survey, see Christopher P Twomey, ‘Chinese Strategic Cultures: Survey and Critique’, SAIC, October 2006.

³⁵Fravel and Medeiros, ‘China's Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure’, International Security (Vol. 35, No. 2, Fall 2010), p. 77.

³⁶For further discussion, see Jeffrey G Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China's Search for Security in the Nuclear Age (Boston: MIT Press, 2007).

³⁷Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, ‘Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust’, John L Thornton Center at Brookings, Monograph Series No. 4, March 2012, p. vi.

³⁸Hans M Kristensen and Robert S Norris, ‘Indian Nuclear Forces, 2012’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Vol. 68, No. 4, July/August 2012).

³⁹Bruno Tertrais, ‘Pakistan's Nuclear and WMD Programmes: Status, Evolution and Risks’, Non-Proliferation Papers (No. 19, July 2012), p. 6.

⁴⁰Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, cited in Shashank Joshi, ‘The Arms Race Myth’, New York Times, 23 April 2012.

⁴¹M Taylor Fravel and Vipin Narang, ‘The Asian Arms Race That Wasn't’, Foreign Policy, 8 May 2012.

⁴²James M Acton, ‘Bombs Away? Being Realistic about Deep Nuclear Reductions’, Washington Quarterly (Vol. 35, No. 2, Spring 2012), p. 38.

⁴³ Deccan Chronicle, ‘India Eyes Agni-VI to Double Range’, 20 April 2012.

⁴⁴Vipin Narang and Christopher Clary, ‘Capability without Strategy’, Indian Express, 22 May 2012, <http://m.indianexpress.com/news/capability-without-strategy/952086/>, accessed 14 August 2012. The author thanks Shashank Joshi for this reference.

⁴⁵Vipin Narang, ‘Indian Nuclear Posture: Confusing Signals from DRDO’, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis Comment, 26 September 2011.

⁴⁶ Deccan Chronicle, ‘India Eyes Agni-VI to Double Range’.

⁴⁷Jeffrey Goldberg and Marc Ambinder, ‘The Ally from Hell’, The Atlantic, December 2011.

⁴⁸SIPRI, Military Expenditure Database, 2012.

⁴⁹For a compendium of the different estimates that have been made, see Avner Cohen, The Worst Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), pp. xxvi–xxvii.

⁵⁰Amatzia Baram, ‘Deterrence Lessons from Iraq: Rationality is Not the Only Key to Containment’, Foreign Affairs (July/August 2012).

⁵¹Andrea Berger and Malcolm Chalmers (eds.), ‘Forging UK-China Consensus on a Strengthened NPT Regime’, RUSI Occasional Paper, 2012, especially pp. 17–18, 48.

⁵²Sarah Diehl and Eduardo Fujii, ‘Brazil's New National Defense Strategy Calls for Strategic Nuclear Developments’, Nuclear Threat Initiative Issue Brief, 30 October 2009.