I. INTRODUCTION: ‘MISSION BiH’

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size

Notes

¹The Office of the High Representative (OHR) in BiH was formed in 1995 shortly after the successful negotiations of the Dayton Agreement to oversee the civilian implementation of this agreement on behalf of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), a body that comprises fifty-five countries and agencies that support the peace process by assisting financially, providing troops for the EU Force (EUFOR), or directly running various efforts in BiH. At its December 1997 meeting in Bonn, the PIC agreed to grant further substantial powers to the OHR in order to avoid the implementation being delayed or obstructed by local politicians. The OHR was requested to adopt binding decisions when local parties seem unable or unwilling to act, and to remove from office public officials who violate legal commitments or, in general, the Dayton Agreement. This is referred to as the ‘Bonn Powers’ of the OHR. The PIC selects the High Representative for BiH, pending confirmation by the UN. The following have held the position: Carl Bildt (December 1995–June 1997); Carlos Westendorp (June 1997–July 1999); Wolfgang Petritsch (August 1999–May 2002); Paddy Ashdown (May 2002–January 2006); Christian Schwarz-Schelling (January 2006–July 2007); Miroslav Lajcak (July 2007–March 2009); and Valentin Inzko (March 2009–present).

²Defence Reform Commission, ‘The Path to Partnership for Peace’, OHR, Sarajevo, September 2003.

³BiH comprises two entities – the Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska – plus the small Brcko District belonging to neither entity. For the purposes of this paper it is the entities that are relevant, given that they possessed their own independent armed forces at the beginning of the defence-reform process.

⁴The ICTY indicted 161 persons in total: see ICTY, ‘Key Figures of the Cases’, <http://www.icty.org/sid/24>, accessed 24 April 2013. By the end of July 2005, only ten remained at large: see ICTY, ‘Twelfth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecutions of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991’, 17 August 2005, <http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/AnnualReports/annual_report_2005_en.pdf>, accessed 24 April 2013.

⁵In October 2005, the EU judged that BiH was ready to begin talks on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement – that is, a contractual framework with the goal of eventual BiH membership in the EU: see Delegation of the European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovina, ‘Key Dates: Milestones on BiH's Road to Europe’, <http://www.delbih.ec.europa.eu/Default.aspx?id=12&lang=EN>, accessed 16 April 2013.

⁶Bruno Waterfield, ‘Bloodshed to Return to Bosnia, Paddy Ashdown Fears’, Daily Telegraph, 27 May 2011.

⁷Patrice C McMahon and Jon Western, ‘The Death of Dayton: How to Stop Bosnia From Falling Apart’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2009.

⁸Vlado Azinovic, Kurt Bassuener and Bodo Weber, ‘Assessing the Potential for Renewed Ethnic Violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Security Risk Analysis’, Atlantic Initiative Democratization Policy Council, October 2011.

⁹The adjective ‘Bosnian’ does not reflect the full name of the country. However it is used throughout the text in preference to constructions such as ‘Bosnian and Herzegovinian’ or ‘observers from BiH’.

¹⁰During September and October 1995, many of the world powers (including the US and Russia) gathered as the Contact Group to apply intense pressure to the leaders of the three sides involved in the 1992–95 conflict to attend the negotiations in Dayton, Ohio. The summit took place from 1–21 November 1995. The main participants from the region were the President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic (representing the Bosnian Serb interests due to the absence of Republika Srpska President Radovan Karadzic), President of Croatia Franjo Tudjman, and President of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegovic with his Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbey. The peace conference was led by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher and negotiator Richard Holbrooke, with two co-chairmen in the form of EU Special Representative Carl Bildt and the First Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia Igor Ivanov. A key participant in the US delegation was General Wesley Clark (later to become NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe in 1997). The UK military representative was Colonel Arundell David Leakey (later to become commander of EUFOR in 2005). Paul Williams, through the Public International Law and Policy Group, served as legal counsel to the Bosnian government delegation during the negotiations.

¹¹NATO, ‘NATO Istanbul Summit Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council’, 28 June 2004, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm>, accessed 24 April 2013.

¹²NATO, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina Membership Action Plan’, 22 April 2010, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-86055888-2E7A77C5/natolive/news_62811.htm?>, accessed 24 April 2013. The activation of this programme entails registering ownership of immovable defence property, required for future defence purposes, with the state of BiH rather than with entities or municipalities.

¹³NATO's continued support to BiH is noteworthy. The Allies fully recognise the complexities, challenges and risks, yet they continue to work closely with BiH to implement and strengthen necessary reforms, and are committed to keeping NATO's door open to BiH and other Western Balkan partners that wish to join the Alliance. In fact, since 2002, NATO has taken unprecedented steps to support BiH in this regard. The Alliance, through its secretary general, has twice communicated in writing with BiH – in 2002 and 2004 – to describe detailed requirements for membership in the PfP and NATO, thus providing a concrete framework for reform efforts. In addition, even before the country joined the PfP, it benefited from a special Tailored Cooperation Programme designed and implemented for BiH alone, funded from NATO resources.

¹⁴UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, The United Nations SSR Perspective, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Security Sector Reform Unit (New York, NY: United Nations, May 2012), pp. 1–3.

¹⁵The UN has established the SSR Unit to serve as the focal point on SSR for the UN and other national and international partners. The SSR Unit provides the secretariat for the UN interagency SSR Task Force, which is co-chaired by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the UN Development Programme, with the objective of facilitating a comprehensive and coherent approach to SSR. The UN has ten basic principles to its SSR support: ‘1) The goal of the UN in SSR is to support the States and societies in developing effective and accountable security, 2) SSR processes should be based on a national and/or Security Council mandate, 3) The sustainability of SSR depends on the ownership and commitment of the States and societies involved, 4) A UN approach to SSR must be flexible and tailored to the needs of the specific environments, 5) A gender perspective is critical in all stages of an SSR process, 6) A SSR framework is essential at the outset of a peace process in early recovery strategies and in post-conflict contexts, 7) A clearly-defined SSR strategy is essential, 8) The effectiveness of international support to SSR will be shaped by integrity of motive, accountability, resources, and capacity, 9) The efforts of national and international partners must be well coordinated, and 10) Monitoring and evaluation are essential to track and maintain progress in SSR over time.’ Ibid. pp. 14–17.

¹⁶See UN Security Council, ‘Security Council Endorses Importance of “Multidimensional” Approach to Peacekeeping Aimed at Facilitating Peacebuilding, Preventing Relapse into Conflict’, Security Council 6903^rd Meeting (AM), SC/10888, 21 January 2013, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10888.doc.htm>, accessed 15 March 2013. Thanks to Adrian Johnson for bringing this development to our attention.