Introduction

North Korea's first nuclear test in October 2006 confirmed the fears of those who had watched it withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons three years earlier: Pyongyang was steaming ahead on a quest for a deliverable nuclear-weapons capability. The UN Security Council reacted swiftly to the development, acknowledging that other approaches – including the so-called ‘Six-Party Talks’ between North Korea, South Korea, Japan, the US, China and Russia – had not succeeded in preventing it. ‘All of us find ourselves in an extraordinary situation, which requires the adoption of extraordinary measures’, Russia's representative on the Security Council noted.¹ The US agreed that it constituted ‘one of the gravest threats to international peace and security that [the Security] Council has ever had to confront’.² China called the move ‘brazen’, a term it reserves for its harshest condemnations.³

Amongst the extraordinary measures enacted by the Security Council in Resolution 1718 (2006) was an arms embargo. Member states were prohibited from importing from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the official name for North Korea,⁴ any weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or related materiel, or major conventional weapons systems.⁵ The Resolution also set out that member states should prevent any transfer ‘from the DPRK by its nationals or from its territory, of technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use’ of the weapons mentioned above. In a similar vein, member states were forbidden from selling to the DPRK any of these same weapons, or their related materiel or services.⁶

When North Korea unsuccessfully attempted to launch a satellite using long-range ballistic-missile technology in April 2009 and tested a second nuclear device in May 2009, the UN Security Council tightened the arms embargo against the country. Resolution 1874 (2009) extended the embargo to include all arms and related materiel and services, though an exception was made for sales of small arms and light weapons to North Korea.⁷ Nevertheless, weapons-related exports by Pyongyang were henceforth prohibited by international law.

Conventional arms trade was targeted by the UN Security Council in response to successive North Korean nuclear tests for a number of reasons. In part, an arms embargo was simply one of the available tools for punishment, alongside restrictions on luxury goods, travel bans for North Korean officials and asset freezes. To a larger extent, however, the arms embargo was a means of achieving two things: first, reducing revenue sources for the regime, particularly for its nuclear and missile programmes; and second, disrupting North Korea's broader proliferation network.

France's representative to the Security Council highlighted the first objective during his remarks on the passage of Resolution 1874 (2009). The resolution, he said, is designed to:⁸

[L]imit North Korea's capacity to advance its banned programmes, in particular by cutting off the financial resources originating from another destabilizing activity – the spread of weapons throughout the world – by blocking the financial networks that fuel those programmes, by extending the embargo to products that feed it, and by adopting sanctions against the persons and entities involved.

His assertion, and that of the Security Council as a whole, is premised on the fact that North Korea's nuclear and missile programmes draw to some degree upon those domestic coffers that are filled by overseas arms sales. Some North Korean entities, such as the Second Economic Committee, are actively involved in both activities. In addition to being ‘responsible for overseeing the production of North Korea's ballistic missiles’, the Second Economic Committee also directs the activities of the nation's primary arms dealer overseas, the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID).⁹ Curbing defence-export revenue streams can thus limit the resources available to entities responsible for pursuing nuclear- and missile-related procurement and production. In this sense, the volume of revenue that North Korea generates through weapons-related sales overseas is an important metric for the sanctions regime's success.

Inhibiting conventional arms sales can also help disrupt and undermine the North Korean weapons-export apparatus itself – a second objective of the arms embargo. In an era where foreign revenue generation has been prioritised by the North Korean regime, smaller multi-role entities may wither without overseas arms sales to sustain themselves. In addition, most of Pyongyang's military customers allow representatives or offices of North Korea's key arms-dealing entities to operate from their territories. Eroding the networks that North Korea draws upon to facilitate arms sales to foreign customers, and reducing the number of territories from which those individuals and entities are able to easily operate, could similarly increase Pyongyang's difficulties in sourcing goods and components for its nuclear and missile activities. The number of North Korean clients – regardless of the value of their custom – is therefore a significant metric of success for the sanctions regime as well.

Sanctions create other undesirable complications for North Korea and its customers, such as additional financial costs, especially at the transport stage of a transaction. Above all, the risk of being caught red-handed in violation of international law can involve political costs – more so for a would-be customer than for North Korea. As a result, it is believed that sanctions might change the cost-benefit calculus behind some of the demand for North Korean goods and services.

The arms embargo offers a presumed third benefit not directly mentioned in official UN Security Council discussions: preventing undesirable military developments by the DPRK's foreign partners, particularly those which might seek their own WMD capabilities, whose actions pose a threat to international peace and security, or whose military might is used against their own populations. For example, sanctions might be expected to stem the flow of North Korean weapons to Syria, Burma and non-state militias in the Middle East.

The Security Council action helped to cement a longstanding downward trend in North Korea's defence-export industry, which was already troubled. As this study will demonstrate, the country's customer base for arms and related materiel and services had been steadily shrinking since the end of the Cold War. Before 1990, North Korea's military exports had formed an important part of its foreign-policy strategy and Pyongyang was gifting or selling discounted weapons to state and non-state customers, from Grenada to Malta to revolutionary groups across Africa.¹⁰ In recent times, by contrast, those exports appear to have become less an expression of foreign-policy priorities than a means of generating revenue. Shifts in the international political climate and global defence market, North Korea's increasingly out-of-date technology, and strengthened international laws and norms against Pyongyang's military exports have all helped to undermine its prospects for success in this area.

Despite these changes and a robust sanctions regime after 2006, a host of countries continue to find North Korea an attractive partner. For example, a recent UN report identifies a number of countries – including Ethiopia, Tanzania and Uganda – that are suspected of recently being customers for its weapons-related goods or services.¹¹ In 2013, the US Treasury designated¹² new individuals and entities in Burma for allegedly doing the same;¹³ and over the past five years, numerous vessels containing illicit North Korean cargo destined for Syria have been seized.¹⁴ North Korea's alleged dealings with non-state actors have also made headlines. The Daily Telegraph reported that Hamas's 2014 war against Israel had depleted its weapon stocks, and that as a result, the group was again turning to North Korea for replenishment.¹⁵ An incident a few years earlier had highlighted Hamas as a North Korean customer: in 2009, Thailand seized a cache of North Korean weapons which the White House and Israel agreed was on its way to Hamas, and possibly Hizbullah.¹⁶

Demand perseveres and Pyongyang, for its part, is working to ensure supply. It is persistent in translating its arms-production capabilities and military expertise into financial gain, and, as this Whitehall Paper will show, is actively reaching out to new military markets. The job of governments and non-governmental experts working to improve the implementation of the sanctions regime is to develop a detailed understanding of the problem, to outline tailored, multilateral and creative solutions to counter it, and ultimately, to match North Korea's persistence.

Purposes of the Study

Recognising North Korea's continued ability to find markets for its weapons-related exports, this study's purpose is threefold: to fill in gaps in the existing scholarly literature on North Korean proliferation activity and foreign relations; to support sanctions implementation by providing detailed analysis of the recent demand for North Korean military products and services; and to advance ongoing discussions about the efficacy of the current UN sanctions regime.

In terms of the first aim, the majority of the analysis on Pyongyang's military endeavours focuses on the country's own nuclear and missile programmes, rather than on its arms-related exports,¹⁷ which have previously included WMD-relevant technology but today are believed to be largely conventional – both in terms of volume and revenue.¹⁸ This is an understandable preoccupation, as it is precisely because of North Korea's national pursuit of WMD and delivery capabilities that UN restrictions on its arms trade were put in place. Yet, given Pyongyang's frequent use of conventional weapons-related exports as a means of generating revenue for its nuclear- and missile-development programme, and the importance of weapons sales in sustaining North Korea's proliferation apparatus as a whole, it is also essential that one activity is not discussed to the exclusion of the other.

Despite the overlap between the threat posed by North Korean WMD and that posed by its defence exports, analysis of the latter is thin. The valuable work that has been done in this area tends to be heavily supply-centric, and often focuses either on specific systems or individual bilateral military partnerships with Pyongyang.¹⁹ Analyses of North Korean arms sales, particularly when presented by the media, consistently allude to the regime's quest to earn foreign currency through whatever means possible.²⁰ While there is truth to this claim, as Chapter II will demonstrate in relation to North Korea's arms-export catalogue, it is usually raised at the expense of robust demand-side analysis.

With regards to specific systems, Pyongyang's sale of ballistic missiles has undoubtedly received the most public attention,²¹ not least due to their potential role as a delivery system for WMD. Together with other WMD-relevant technology, they represent the country's most troubling defence export. From the late 1980s until the early 2000s, they were believed to account for the bulk of North Korea's revenue from weapons sales, though it is possible that today the majority is generated through conventional weapons-related goods and services.²²

Aside from weapons-systems-specific analysis, available literature on North Korea's arms sales largely examines individual bilateral relationships, such as the Iran–North Korea and Burma–North Korea connections. Literature that goes beyond bilateral ties usually only considers North Korea's foreign relations, broadly defined. Charles Armstrong's Tyranny of the Weak presents a comprehensive and detailed overview of the genesis of some of North Korea's longest-standing relationships, including those with a military component.²³ Exploring the contemporary practicalities of the DPRK's international dealings, John Park's ‘North Korea, Inc.’ offers insights into the state trading companies operating abroad that bring life to some of the relations that Armstrong discusses and this paper presents.²⁴

While this paper is informed by the supply-centric or system-specific analysis that exists in abundance in expert literature, its primary aim is to capture a broad picture of North Korea's military customers in the sanctions era, focusing particularly on what drives them. In doing so it updates the earlier literature and draws trends between known or suspected purchasing states. It is this understanding that enables a more concrete and nuanced discussion about the policy approaches that might successfully peel customers away from Pyongyang.

As a result, the second aim of this study is to support efforts to implement sanctions by analysing the demand for North Korean defence exports. Focusing on demand is crucial. Decades of scuppered negotiations have shown that when it comes to its military activity, Pyongyang is largely immune to external influence and pressure from those governments that are the most ardent supporters of the current sanctions regime. Arms-related exports appear to be no exception. As this Whitehall Paper will argue, concentrating efforts on making North Korea and its products less appealing from the perspective of potential consumers, rather than eroding North Korea's interest in supplying them, holds up the greatest prospect of success for the sanctions regime.

In analysing North Korea's military customers, this paper adheres to the scope of the extended arms embargo outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009): namely, ‘all arms and related materiel, as well as financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms or materiel’.²⁵ It does not touch on the UN-mandated ban on luxury goods, which is designed to deny the North Korean regime its daily comforts, rather than directly inhibit military activity. Due to its focus on Pyongyang's customer base, this study also does not delve into detail about North Korean imports for its defence research-and-development programmes, though it does highlight the importance of denying North Korea access to advanced military technology. Instead, after briefly considering the evolution of North Korea's place in the global market (Chapter I) and the country's arms-manufacturing capabilities (Chapter II), this study identifies the state and non-state groups that form North Korea's sanctions-era clientele, and the items and services in Pyongyang's export catalogue that they have found most attractive (Chapters III, IV and V). Together, these chapters will provide a rounded sense of the landscape of the market in which North Korea operates and the custom it enjoys.

This paper will also explore why countries turn to North Korea over other suppliers. Two common answers to this question are peppered throughout expert literature and public commentary: Pyongyang's offerings are inexpensive; and North Korea and its military customers are bonded by their shared pariah status.²⁶ While both these narratives carry some truth, the picture is more complex. North Korea is likely more competitive on price in certain categories of products and services – namely, conventional weaponry and related parts, and repair, maintenance and training services – a conclusion outlined in Chapter II. Furthermore, price and level of international isolation rarely offer a complete explanation for a customer's decision to purchase from North Korea. To effectively curtail demand, those wishing to improve sanctions implementation must first seek to fully understand the reasons that individual clients find Pyongyang an attractive supplier.

These perceived benefits vary widely between individual customers. Chapter III presents some of North Korea's recent ‘resilient’ customers: a group that is aware of the existence of sanctions, but defies them because of deep political and military ties to Pyongyang, North Korea's reliability as a supplier, shared international isolation and, to some extent, affordability. These include Syria, Iran, Burma and Uganda, amongst others. Chapter IV looks at the ‘reluctant’ customers: those who would probably prefer to purchase military goods elsewhere, but found that historical military aid and purchases from North Korea have created a degree of dependence upon their supply; those struggling to find other suppliers able and willing to replace or service Cold War-era weaponry; or those whose pockets are not deep enough to choose to buy elsewhere. These include Ethiopia and, until recent political turmoil, Yemen. Finally, Chapter V presents ‘ad hoc’ customers – states such as the Republic of the Congo (RoC) and possibly Tanzania – whose awareness of the sanctions regime is weaker than clients in other categories. For these countries, the need to extend the lives of their Cold War-era arsenals as inexpensively as possible made Pyongyang an attractive choice amongst limited options.

In all three chapters examining the different categories of North Korea's customers, analysis focuses on the state and non-state groups that are known or strongly suspected to have purchased arms or related services from North Korea since the application of UN sanctions against the country in 2006. Two qualifications are necessary here. First, evidence of relevant contracts with North Korea during the sanctions era does not necessarily constitute a sanctions violation. Until UN Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), North Korean sales of small arms, light weapons, and related materiel and services were not subject to UN arms embargoes. It was only in June 2009 that all arms and related materiel and services sold by Pyongyang were declared illegal, even if not North Korean-made.

Second, due to the nature of the activity in question, information on any given country's dealings with North Korea in this period is often inconsistent. Clusters of information appear in leaked US State Department cables dated up to 2010 or in annual UN reports, for example. As a result, while Chapters III, IV and V seek to bring together as many credible sources as possible to provide an outline of North Korea's recent customers, in many cases it is difficult to be certain that they are current customers at the time of writing. Information from before 2006 is included where relevant, particularly to demonstrate that a specific client's motivation for continually purchasing from Pyongyang either includes traditional political, military or personal friendships, or has notably changed over time.

The third and final purpose of this study is to advance ongoing discussions about the effect that UN sanctions have had in curbing North Korea's military sales, and thereby stemming the flow of profits into coffers that can fund nuclear and missile advancement. In particular, by providing the clearest and broadest picture of North Korea's defence-export markets to date, it highlights how, with the help of sanctions, the types of goods and services that North Korea markets most successfully are changing, with implications for the country's ability to maintain or expand these revenue streams.

In the process of painting this picture, the study draws several conclusions: that North Korea's customers vary greatly; that policy tools available to government and UN officials should be tailored to take account of those differences; and, as discussed in Chapter VI, that one of the long-term approaches with the greatest potential for success is to deny North Korea the technology that will allow it to remain relevant as a defence exporter.

Of the three broad types of customer identified – ‘resilient’, ‘reluctant’ and ‘ad hoc’ – this paper will demonstrate that the majority of known sanctions-era customers are of the most problematic, ‘resilient’ variety. They have longstanding military trade relationships with North Korea and defy pressure to cease them. Policy tools which might in other cases compel a country to stop dealings with North Korea are likely to have little effect towards ‘resilient’ clients, unless they form part of a broader political or military change in that country.

This is important to bear in mind when trying to curb demand from these customers, and this study highlights the importance of being aware of the reasons that a client chooses to buy from North Korea in the first place when selecting and applying policy tools. ‘Reluctant’ and ‘ad hoc’ clients have no particular affinity for North Korea itself as a supplier. As a result, they are in theory more easily dissuaded from continuing to do business with them than the ‘resilient’ customers are – a conclusion borne out by the recent RoC case (discussed in Chapter V). Interdictions and political pressure can have significant impact upon their procurement decisions, as can assistance (whether financial or procedural) in finding alternative supply.

Finally, this Whitehall Paper also explores one of the most significant, but unacknowledged, contributions of the UN sanctions regime: denying North Korea the ability to stay relevant as a defence exporter for the indefinite future, especially in the minds of customers who currently fall, or may in the future fall, into the ‘reluctant’ or ‘ad hoc’ categories. The arms embargo has been largely successful in mitigating Pyongyang's access to new, foreign weapons designs or production technology. North Korea has had to innovate on its own, often producing slight variations of its older weapons, as will be shown in Chapter II. Nevertheless, much of its arms-export catalogue now consists of base technology that is many decades old, and as a whole is sliding progressively farther out of date. Continuing to deny Pyongyang advanced weapons technology in the long term will undoubtedly make it more difficult for it to identify new markets for its conventional weapons.

Existing ‘reluctant’ or ‘ad hoc’ customers may fall by the wayside too. Life-extension programmes cannot go on indefinitely, and countries that currently possess Cold War-era weaponry will over time also have to withdraw them from service. Given that one of Pyongyang's current competitive advantages in these markets is its familiarity with repairing antique systems, if those deploying such weapons no longer require repair services and North Korea does not have newer wares to offer, Pyongyang may find itself more peripheral within the global defence market than ever.

Notes

1 UN Security Council, ‘Security Council Condemns Nuclear Test by Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1718 (2006)’, 14 October 2006, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8853.doc.htm>, accessed 20 October 2015.

2 Ibid.

3 Joseph Khan, ‘Angry China is Likely to Toughen its Stand on North Korea’, New York Times, 10 October 2006.

4 This paper will use the two names interchangeably.

5 Major conventional weapons systems were defined as including: ‘any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms, or related materiel including spare parts, or items as determined by the Security Council’ or by the Sanctions Committee established pursuant to the resolution. UN Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006), S/Res/1718 (2006), 14 October 2006, para. 8(a).

6 Ibid., para. 8(a)(i). ‘Related materiel and services' is a term that has yet to be defined by the relevant UN Sanctions Committee. Instead, it has been subject to interpretation by UN member states, and by the UN Panel of Experts established pursuant to the resolution. Some points of clarity have emerged as a result of specific incidents, and a more general consensus appears to be emerging that items or services can be categorised as ‘weapons-related’ if they contribute directly to the use or manufacture of lethal armaments. Machine tools used in weapons production lines would therefore be considered ‘weapons-related’, for example.

7 Circumstances underpinning the decision to exempt small arms and light weapons are not entirely clear. In most of the author's informal conversations on the subject, it has been asserted that China insisted on the provision. Two claims have been made in particular: that the exemption was inserted because North Korea should be allowed access to these weapons for self-defence, and that the comparatively small revenue generated by the export of these weapons means they are not relevant to efforts to inhibit Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programmes. UN Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), S/Res/1874 (2009), 12 June 2009, para. 10.

8 Statement by Ambassador Ripert of France to the UN Security Council, S/PV.6141, 64^th year, 6141^st meeting Friday, 12 June 2009.

9 US Department of the Treasury, ‘United States Designates North Korean Entities and Individuals for Activities Related to North Korea's Weapons of Mass Destruction Program’, 30 August 2010, <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg840.aspx>, accessed 20 October 2015.

10 See Malta Independent, ‘1982 Labour Government “Secret” Agreement with North Korea – “Times Change” – Alex Sceberras Trigona’, 7 February 2010, <http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2010-02-07/news/1982-labour-government-secret-agreement-with-north-korea-times-change-alex-sceberras-trigona-270034/>, accessed 20 October 2015; US Department of State and Department of Defense, Grenada: A Preliminary Report (Washington, DC: Government Press Office, 1983), p. 24.

11 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’, S/2014/147, 6 March 2014.

12 The term ‘designate’ is used in this study to refer to a government's decision to sanction an individual or entity for carrying out activity counter to its laws. Designations ordinarily involve the freezing of assets, as well as prohibiting the nationals of the country taking the action from dealing with the sanctioned individual or entity. In the US, those sanctioned by the Office of Foreign Assets Control are collectively referred to as ‘Specially Designated Nationals’.

13 US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Designates Burmese LT. General Thein Htay, Chief of Directorate of Defense Industries’, 2 July 2013, <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl1998.aspx>, accessed 20 October 2015. See also US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Designates Burmese Companies and an Individual with Ties to the Directorate of Defense Industries’, 17 December 2013, <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2247.aspx>, accessed 20 October 2015.

14 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’, S/2012/422, 14 June 2012.

15 Con Coughlin, ‘Hamas and North Korea in Secret Arms Deal’, Daily Telegraph, 26 July 2014.

16 Andrea Berger, ‘North Korea, Hamas and Hezbollah: Arm in Arm?’, 38 North, 5 August 2014, <http://38north.org/2014/08/aberger080514/>, accessed 20 October 2015.

17 See, for example, Leon V Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Jonathan D Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security, Adelphi series 418–19 (Abingdon: Routledge for IISS, 2011); Su Hoon Lee (ed.), Nuclear North Korea: Regional Dynamics, Failed Policies, and Ideas for Ending a Global Stalemate (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012). Some work has been done on proliferation and North Korean illicit trade networks generally defined. See, for example, Sheena Chestnut, ‘Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks’, International Security (Vol. 32, No. 1, Summer 2007).

18 It is possible, and perhaps likely, that a single contract for large-ticket weapons, systems, or programmes such as ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction could account for more than the entire revenue from conventional-arms sales and services. However, as this paper will show, aside from those with Syria and possibly Iran, North Korea is today believed to have few such contracts.

19 Examples of the valuable system-specific literature that has been produced, which encompasses analysis of North Korean exports, include Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2003). Janne E Nolan's work on the missile market in the developing world remains relevant and is an exception to the supply-centric focus of the majority of the literature. Janne E Nolan, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1991). Similarly, while Joshua Pollack's analysis focuses on North Korea's ballistic-missile exports, his work importantly recognises the more recent comparative significance to Pyongyang of conventional-systems sales, particularly in light of the declining global demand for its missile products. Joshua Pollack, ‘Ballistic Trajectory: The Evolution of North Korea's Ballistic Missile Market’, Nonproliferation Review (Vol. 18, No. 2, July 2011). Among others, Balázs Szalontai of Kookmin University has produced quality analysis of North Korea's bilateral partnerships, including military partnerships, in regions such as the Middle East. Balázs Szalontai, ‘Cracks in the North Korea-Iran Axis’, NK News, 5 August 2014, <http://www.nknews.org/2014/08/cracks-in-the-north-korea-iran-axis/>, accessed 20 October 2015. Outside of the Middle East, only a few of North Korea's bilateral military relationships have received attention. See, for example, Joost Oliemans and Stijn Mitzer, ‘North Korea and Ethiopia, Brothers in Arms’, NK News, 4 September 2014, <http://www.nknews.org/2014/09/north-korean-military-support-for-ethiopia/>, accessed 20 October 2015.

20 See, for example, Claudia Rosett, ‘North Korea's Middle East Webs and Nuclear Wares', Forbes, 13 February 2013.

21 See footnote 19 for information on system-specific analysis, which is heavily concentrated on North Korea's ballistic-missile exports.

22 In fact, in 1999 North Korea insisted that it would cease its sale of ballistic missiles if the US paid it $3 billion over three years – a proposal that was a non-starter in Washington. US Department of State Daily Press Briefing, DPB #40, 30 March 1999 at 2:50 pm, available at <http://fas.org/news/dprk/1999/990330db2.htm>, accessed 20 October 2015. See also Joseph S Bermudez, Jr, ‘A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK’, Center for Nonproliferation Studies Occasional Paper No. 2, 1999; Paul K Kerr, Steven A Hildreth and Mary Beth D Nikitin, ‘Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Cooperation’, Congressional Research Service, Report 7-5700, 16 April 2014.

23 Charles K Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the World, 1950–1992 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).

24 John S Park, ‘North Korea, Inc.: Gaining Insights into North Korean Regime Stability from Recent Commercial Activity’, United States Institute of Peace Working Paper, 22 April 2009, <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/North%20Korea,%20Inc.PDF>, accessed 20 October 2015.

25 UN Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), S/Res/1874 (2009), 12 June 2009.

26 See, for example, Oliemans and Mitzer, ‘North Korea and Ethiopia, Brothers in Arms'. Bertil Lintner similarly focuses on price as the reason Burma started buying from North Korea. Bertil Lintner, ‘Clouded Alliance: North Korea and Myanmar's Covert Ties', Jane's Intelligence Review, October 2009, p. 49, available at <http://www.asiapacificms.com/articles/pdf/clouded_alliance.pdf>, accessed 20 October 2015. See also ‘Breaking the Iran, North Korea, Syria Nexus', Joint Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, 113^th Congress, First Session, 11 April 2013, <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20130411/100636/HHRG-113-FA13-20130411-SD002.pdf>, accessed 20 October 2015.