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Notes
1 See, for example, Stephen G Brooks, G John Ikenberry and William C Wohlforth, ‘Don’t Come Home, America: The Case Against Retrenchment’, International Security (Vol. 37, No. 3, Winter 2012/13); Barry R Posen, ‘Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs (Vol. 91, No. 1, January/February 2013), pp. 116–28.
2 See, for example, Andreas Krieg, ‘Externalizing the Burden of War: The Obama Doctrine and US Foreign Policy in the Middle East’, International Affairs (Vol. 92, No. 1, 2016).
3 See Richard N Haass, Foreign Policy Begins at Home: The Case for Putting America’s House in Order (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2013).
4 See Dombrowski and Reich, ‘Does Donald Trump Have a Grand Strategy?’.
5 US Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, January 2012), p. 2.
6 Joseph S Nye Jr, ‘American and Chinese Power after the Financial Crisis’, Washington Quarterly (Vol. 33, No. 4, 2010), p. 151. See also Joseph S Nye Jr, Is the American Century Over? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015).
7 Chester A Crocker, ‘The Strategic Dilemma of a World Adrift’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy (Vol. 57, No. 1, 2015), pp. 11–12.
8 For a comprehensive account of the rebalance, or pivot, see Campbell, The Pivot. See also Michael J Green and Zack Cooper, ‘Revitalizing the Rebalance: How to Keep U.S. Focus on Asia’, Washington Quarterly (Vol. 37, No. 3, 2014).
9 New York Times, ‘A Retreat from TPP Would Empower China’, 21 November 2016.
10 See Patrick Cullen, ‘The Rebalance to Asia Under Trump: What Comes Next?’, RUSI Journal (Vol. 162, No. 2, 2017).
11 For a comprehensive overview of America’s evolving force posture and defence strategy in the Asia-Pacific, see Lord and Erickson, Rebalancing U.S. Forces. On the implications of the rebalance on US defence strategy in Europe, see Simón, ‘Understanding US Retrenchment in Europe’.
12 Wyatt Olson, ‘Pacific Pivot Makes Modest Gains in Early Years’, Stars and Stripes, 29 June 2015. For a more detailed discussion see Lord and Erickson, Rebalancing U.S. Forces.
13 See, for example, Thomas G Mahnken and Dan Blumenthal (eds), Strategy in Asia: The Past, Present, and Future of Regional Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014); Peter Dombrowski, ‘America’s Third Offset Strategy: New Military Technologies and Implications for the Asia Pacific’, RSiS Policy Report, June 2015.
14 Edward L Morse, ‘Welcome to the Revolution: Why Shale is the Next Shale’, Foreign Affairs (Vol. 93, No. 3, May/June 2014).
15 Kirsten Westphal, Marco Overhaus and Guido Steinberg, ‘The US Shale Revolution and the Arab Gulf States: The Economic and Political Impact of Changing Energy Markets’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Research Paper No. 11, 2014.
16 Sijbren de Jong and Willem Auping, The Geopolitics of Shale Gas (The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2014).
17 See Elizabeth Rosenberg, ‘Energy Rush: Shale Production and U.S. National Security’, Center for a New American Security, 2014.
18 For a discussion see Peter D Feaver and Hal Brands, ‘Trump and Terrorism: US Strategy After ISIS’, Foreign Affairs (Vol. 96, No. 2, March/April 2017).
19 Saskia Brechenmacher and Steven Feldstein, ‘Trump’s War on Terror’, National Interest, 18 October 2017.
20 See, for example, Dana H Allin, ‘Obama and the Middle East: The Politics, Strategies and Difficulties of American Restraint’, in Toby Dodge and Emile Hokayem (eds), Middle Eastern Security, the US Pivot, and the Rise of ISIS (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), pp. 165–84.
21 See Jon B Alterman, ‘Middle East Notes and Comment: The Asia Pivot’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10 January 2013.
22 David Rothkopf, ‘The Middle East’s Pivot to Asia’, Foreign Policy, 24 April 2015.
23 For a comparative analysis of current global defence spending trends, see, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2015 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), pp. 21–25.
24 Simón, ‘Understanding US Retrenchment in Europe’.
25 See, for example, Grygiel, ‘The Faulty Logic of the European Union’; Grygiel and Mitchell, The Unquiet Frontier.
26 As one example of calls for a scaled-back US global presence, see David A Shiapak, ‘Towards a More Modest American Strategy’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy (Vol. 57, No. 2, 2015). For a corrective to the logic of a conscious US decision to disengage, see Hal Brands, ‘Fools Rush Out? The Flawed Logic of Offshore Balancing’, Washington Quarterly (Vol. 38, No. 2, 2015).
27 Luis Simón, ‘Europe, the Rise of Asia and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship’, International Affairs (Vol. 91, No. 5, 2015), p. 969.
28 See, for example, James Rogers, ‘European (British and French) Geostrategy in the Indo-Pacific’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region (Vol. 9, No. 1, 2013).
29 See NATO, ‘Warsaw Summit Communiqué’, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, Poland, 8–9 July 2016. For an overview see also Karsten Friis (ed.), NATO and Collective Defense in the 21st Century: An Assessment of the Warsaw Summit (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017).
30 Between the end of the Cold War and Obama’s 2012 decision to phase out two brigade combat teams, the Army’s Fifth Corps headquarters, a forward-stationed air squadron and a host of Air Force and Army enablers, the number of US military personnel in Europe has been progressively reduced from a peak of 213,000 in 1990 to approximately 64,000. See Simón, ‘Understanding US Retrenchment in Europe’.
31 Helmut Schmidt, Men and Powers: A Political Retrospective (New York, NY: Random House, 1989), p. 12.
32 See, for example, Pavel K Baev, ‘Russia is Not Strong. And Putin is Even Weaker’, Brookings Institution, 8 June 2015.
33 Karen Dawisha, ‘The Putin Principle: How it Came to Rule Russia’, World Affairs (May/June 2015).
34 See Margarete Klein and Kristian Pester, ‘Russia’s Armed Forces on Modernisation Course’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Comments (No. 9, January 2014).
35 For an overview of Russian foreign policy during Putin’s years, see Lucas, The New Cold War.
36 James A Marshall, ‘Russia’s Struggle for Military Reform: A Breakdown in Conversion Capabilities’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies (Vol. 27, No. 2, 2014). For a detailed analysis of the Russian army’s military modernisation process from 2008 onwards, see Igor Sutyagin and Justin Bronk, Russia’s New Ground Forces: Capabilities, Limitations and Implications for International Security, RUSI Whitehall Paper 89 (Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2017).
37 Keir Giles, ‘A New Phase in Russian Military Transformation’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies (Vol. 27, No. 1, 2014).
38 Forbes, ‘Russian Military Spending: Drawing Blood from a Stone’, 19 May 2015.
39 Christopher P Cavas, ‘US: Russia Building “Arc of Steel” from Arctic to Med’, DefenseNews, 6 October 2015.
40 Matthew Bodner, ‘Russia Shows Early Success, New Capabilities in Syria’, DefenseNews, 18 October 2015; Sutyagin and Bronk, Russia’s New Ground Forces.
41 Luis Simón, ‘Assessing NATO’s Eastern European “Flank”’, Parameters (Vol. 44, No. 3, 2014), pp. 67–79.
42 See Alexander Lanoszka, ‘Russian Hybrid Warfare and Extended Deterrence in Eastern Europe’, International Affairs (Vol. 92, No. 1, 2016), pp. 175–95. For an account of the similarities between the KGB and the present-day FSU, see Jonathan Haslam, Near and Distant Neighbours: A New History of Soviet Intelligence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
43 See, for example, Martin Vladimirov and Ruslav Stefanov, ‘The Kremlin’s Economic Grip on Europe’, Foreign Policy, 23 December 2016. For a detailed overview of the different degrees of exposure EU member states have to disruption of gas supplies from Russia, see Chi-Kong Chyong and Vessela Tcherneva, ‘Europe’s Vulnerability on Russian Gas’, European Council on Foreign Relations, 17 March 2015.
44 BBC News, ‘Hungary Challenged on Nuclear Choice with Russia’, 12 June 2015.
45 See, for example, Spyridon N Litsas, ‘Russia in the Eastern Mediterranean: Intervention, Deterrence, Containment’, Digest of Middle East Studies (Vol. 26, No. 1, 2017), pp. 56–73.
46 See John Berryman, ‘Geopolitics and Russian Foreign Policy’, International Politics (Vol. 49, No. 4, 2012), pp. 530–44.
47 See, respectively, Raffaello Pantucci, ‘China and Russia’s Soft Competition in Central Asia’, Current History (Vol. 114, No. 174, 2015); Sergey Radchenko, ‘Sino-Russian Competition in Mongolia’, in Gilbert Rozman and Sergey Radchenko (eds), International Relations and Asia’s Northern Tier (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). On the broader process of Sino–Russian competition across Eurasia, see Ian Bond, ‘Chasing the Dragon: Russia’s Courtship of China’, Center for European Reform, 4 August 2015. On the resilience of the Sino–Russian relationship, see Samuel Charap, John Drennan and Pierre Noël, ‘Russia and China: A New Model of Great-Power Relations’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy (Vol. 59, No. 1, 2017).
48 See, for example, Yoram Schweitzer and Zvi Magen, ‘The Islamic State, the Caucasus and the Russian Response’, INSS Insight No. 725, July 2015. For a broader discussion on Russia’s interaction with Islam, see Marlene Laruelle, ‘How Islam Will Change Russia’, Jamestown Foundation, 13 September 2016.
49 See, for example, Kristian Atland, ‘Interstate Relations in the Arctic: An Emerging Security Dilemma’, Comparative Strategy (Vol. 33, No. 2, 2014); Shiloh Rainwater, ‘Race to the North: China’s Arctic Strategy and its Implications’, Naval War College Review (Vol. 66, No. 2, 2013).
50 See Nicholas Trickett, ‘The Reality of the Sino-Russian Oil Alliance’, The Diplomat, 26 April 2017.
51 Sarah Lain, ‘The Bear and the Dragon: Same Old Suspicions or Real Pivot East?’, RUSI Journal (Vol. 160, No. 1, 2015).
52 Jack Farchy, ‘Gazprom’s China Contract Offers no Protection Against Low Prices’, Financial Times, 10 August 2015.
53 Jakub Grygiel, ‘The Weak Attack the Strong’, American Interest, 5 October 2014.
54 See, for example, Judy Dempsey, ‘Does Russia Divide Europe?’, Carnegie Europe, 26 October 2015; Nelli Babayan et al., ‘Russia: A Test for Transatlantic Unity’, Transatlantic Academy Paper Series, German Marshall Fund of the United States, May 2016.
55 Luis Simón, ‘Britain, the EU and the Future of Europe: A Geostrategic Perspective’, RUSI Journal (Vol. 160, No. 5, 2015), p. 19.
56 See, for example, Elizabeth Pond, Beyond the Wall: Germany's Road to Unification (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994); Stephen F Szabo, The Diplomacy of German Unification (New York, NY: St. Martin’s, 1992).
57 See David J Howarth, The French Road to the European Monetary Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); Baun, ‘The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics’.
58 Baun, ‘The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics’, p. 610. See also Jarrod Hayes and Patrick James, ‘Theory as Thought: Britain and German Unification’, Security Studies (Vol. 23, No. 2, 2014).
59 Beverly Crawford, Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
60 Ibid.
61 See Julian Germann, ‘Beyond “Geo-economics”: Advanced Unevenness and the Anatomy of German Austerity’, European Journal of International Relations, early view 2017, pp. 1–24.
62 Klaus W Zimmermann and Tobias Just, ‘The Euro and Political Credibility in Germany’, Challenge (Vol. 44, No. 5, 2001), p. 102.
63 Baun, ‘The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics’.
64 Crawford, Power and German Foreign Policy.
65 Howarth, The French Road to the European Monetary Union.
66 Peter H Loedel, Deutsche Mark Politics: Germany in the European Monetary System (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp. 93–94.
67 Ibid. p. 94.
68 Lever, Berlin Rules.
69 Deutsche Welle, ‘US Warns German Economic Policies “Damaging to Eurozone”’, 31 October 2013.
70 Germann, ‘Beyond “Geo-economics’’’.
71 See, for example, Hans Kundnani, The Paradox of German Power (London: Hurst, 2014); Simon Bulmer and William E Paterson, ‘Germany as the EU’s Reluctant Hegemon? Of Economic Strength and Political Constraints’, Journal of European Public Policy (Vol. 20, No. 10, 2013).
72 OECD, ‘OECD Economic Surveys: Germany’, 2014, p. 8.
73 Martin Wolf, ‘The German Model is Not for Export’, Financial Times, 7 May 2013.
74 Philippe Legrain, ‘Don’t Envy Germany’, Prospect, 20 August 2014. For a comprehensive analysis of Germany’s economic challenges, see Marcel Fratzscher, The Germany Illusion: Between Economic Euphoria and Despair (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
75 Wolfgang Munchau, ‘German Carmakers Deserve to be Disrupted’, Financial Times, 30 July 2017.
76 Hans J Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York, NY: Alfred A Knopf, 1978), p. 239.
77 Reuters Graphics, ‘Europe’s Demographic Crisis’.
78 See, for example, Guntram B Wolff, ‘Germany’s Handling of Immigration Will Shape the Future of Europe’, Bruegel, 11 September 2015. See also Alberto Nardelli, ‘Refugee Influx Helps Halt Decline in Germany’s Population’, The Guardian, 6 January 2016.
79 Daniel Keohane, ‘A Greater Military Role for Germany?’, Carnegie Europe, 7 June 2016. For an in-depth analysis of Germany’s relationship with military force, see Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns W Maull (eds), Germany as a Civilian Power? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001).
80 Luis Simón, ‘CSDP, Strategy and Crisis Management: Out of Area or Out of Business?’, International Spectator (Vol. 47, No. 3, 2012).
81 Luis Simón, ‘Setting the Tone: The 2013 French White Paper and the Future of European Defence’, RUSI Journal (Vol. 158, No. 4, 2013).
82 See, for example, Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security.
83 See Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, ‘The Framework Nations Concept: Germany’s Contribution to a Capable European Defence’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Comments (No. 52, April 2014); Gotkowska, ‘High on Reassurance, Low on Deterrence’.
84 Deutsche Welle, ‘No Permanent NATO Troop Presence in Eastern Europe, Merkel Says’, 3 September 2014.
85 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, signed in Paris, France, 27 May 1997.
86 Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, ‘Not a Hegemon, but the Backbone: Germany Takes a Leading Role in NATO’s Stategic Adaptation’, European Leadership Network, 23 February 2015.
87 See Luis Simón, ‘France and Germany: The European Union’s “Central” Member States’, in Amelia Hadfield, Ian Manners and Richard G Whitman (eds), Foreign Policies of EU Member States: Continuity and Europeanisation (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017).