Figure 1: Russia’s Critical Economic Infrastructure in the Arctic
Source: Author generated
Figure 2: Delta-, Akula- and Borei-Class Submarines Present at Gadzhiyevo Naval Base on 1 May 2021
Source: Airbus Defence and Space and authors'
Figure 3: Submarine Bases of the Northern Fleet
Source: Author generated
Figure 4: Oscar II-Class SSGNs at the Zapadnaya Litsa Naval Base on 22 March 2021
Source: Airbus Defence and Space and authors'
Figure 5: Victor III-Class and Sierra II-Class Submarines at Vidyayevo Naval Base, 11 February 2021
Source: Maxar Technologies and authors'
Figure 6: Yasen-M-Class SSGN Under Construction at the Sevmash Yard in Severodvinsk on 18 April 2021
Source: Maxar Technologies and authors'
Figure 7: Kilo-Class Submarines at the Polyarny Naval Base on 1 May 2021
Source: Airbus Defence and Space and authors'
Figure 8: IL-38 MPAs at Severomorsk-1
Source: Airbus Defence and Space and authors'
Figure 9: Russia’s Arctic Airfields Capable of Hosting MPAs
Source: Author generated
Figure 10A: Russia's Improving Sea Denial Network – Bastion-P TELS on Kotelny Island
Source: Maxar Technologies and authors
Figure 10B: Russia's Improving Sea Denial Network – Bastion-P TELS on Alexandra Land
Source: Maxar Technologies and authors'
Figure 11: Russian Warships at Severomrosk on 10 May 2021
Source: Airbus Defence and Space and authors'
Figure 12A: The 40th Mixed Aviation Regiments Backfire Bombers at Olenya
Source: Airbus Defence and Space and authors' Note: The number of bombers, 32, stayed constant across multiple images taken over a year, of which this one is a sample. This suggests that this sample is representative of the bases permanently assigned TU-22s.
Figure 12B: The 40th Mixed Aviation Regiments Backfire Bombers at Olenya
Source: Airbus Defence and Space and authors'
Figure 13: Russia’s Network of Air- and Ground-Based Sea Denial Assets in the High North
Source: Author generated Note: Range radiuses are for bombers, with the assumption being that a single bomber operates for the whole of a given day without relief. The radiuses are shorter than the bombers’ maximum range to account for loiter time.
Figure 14: The Growth of Kotelny’s Temp Air Base Between 2014 and 2020
Source: Maxar Technologies and authors'
Figure 15A: Aircraft of the 100th Regiment, 279th Regiment and 98th Air Regiment at Monchegorsk on 19 March 2021
Source: Maxar Technologies and authors'
Figure 15B: Aircraft of the 100th Regiment, 279th Regiment and 98th Air Regiment at Severomrosk-1 on 22 August 2020
Source: Maxar Technologies and authors'
Figure 16: The Disposition of Russia’s IADS in the Arctic
Source: Author generated, based on open source data and imaging of Russian facilities
Figure 17: S-400 Battalion at Rogachevo
Source: Maxar Technologies and authors' Note: In the interests of brevity, all imagery used to identify SAM and radar locations are not displayed; samples are used throughout Chapter IV.
Figure 18: Sopka-2 Site on Kotelny
Source: Maxar Technologies and authors'
Figure 19: Russia’s Early-Warning Radar Network in the High North
Source: Author generated, based on open source data and imaging of Russian facilities
Figure 20: 1528th AD Regiment SAM Site Severodvinsk
Source: Maxar Technologies and authors'
Figure 21: Trefoil Bases at Alexandra Land and Kotelny, with Shelters for Bastion-P TELS
Source: Maxar Technologies and authors'
